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Abstract 
This thesis engages with the problem of meta-ethics in postanarchist theory. 
In their rejection of ‘classical’ anarchism, various postanarchist thinkers adopt 
a position of epistemological critique and reduce their metaphysics to a 
minimal conception of the self and broad, common knowledge statements 
about politics. Morality in the form of coercive rules or obedience to norms is 
rejected, whilst ethics in the form of guidelines or suggestions is taken to be 
desirable, and even necessary, for anarchist politics. The main argument of 
the thesis takes up the postanarchist critique of morality, taking seriously the 
concerns that essentialism, universals and representation are contestable and 
open to fallibility, and suggests that a further contradiction exists between 
anarchist principles and transcendent ethical systems. As long as 
postanarchist metaphysics appeal to transcendence, there is a possibility for 
anarchist ethics to become coercive. 
This work’s original contribution to knowledge is the introduction of 
immanent metaphysics as a foundation for anarchist ethics. This is done 
primarily through the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and his critique of 
transcendence. The argument begins by outlining Deleuze’s metaphysics of 
difference which are to underpin the rest of the discussion on anarchist ethics. 
Following this, the thesis draws on the work of Deleuze and Guattari and 
others to explore the ‘political’ and active aspects of immanent ethics. The 
final part sketches anarchist ethics in immanent modes of existence.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the beginning there was a wall.1 
 
Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay 
from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually 
encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall.2 
 
This dissertation is a story, and the question of how a story is to be told is of 
utmost importance. The purpose of this introduction is, therefore, to explain 
the choices I have made about how to tell this story, to introduce the main 
characters and the setting, as well as the main ideas in each chapter. As 
Deleuze suggests, “[p]hilosophy is like a novel: you have to ask ‘What's going 
to happen?’ ‘What's happened?’ Except the characters are concepts, and the 
settings, the scenes, are spacetimes.”3 
1.1.1 Setting and characters 
Gone are the times when ‘other worlds, other values’4 seemed possible. The 
Battle of Seattle is a distant memory of the anarchist collective imagination. 
                                                
1 U. Le Guin, The Dispossessed, 2nd edn., Golancz, Great Britain, 2002, p. 5.  
2 M. Foucault and G. Deleuze, ‘Intellectuals and Power’, in D. F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980, p. 206.  
3 G. Deleuze, Negotiations, 2nd edn., Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 140.  
4 T. Muller, ‘Other Worlds, Other Values’, PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, 1998. 
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We are not winning. There is no ‘we’.5 At least in Europe, the 
activist/anarchist/radical social movement(s) seem stuck with the same 
arguments, same battles, and no substantial ‘victories’ have been achieved 
without conceding even more substantial sacrifices.6 The economic crisis of 
2008 left a generation of young people facing unemployment, soaring 
inequality and a politics of austerity aimed at destroying all hope.7 In the UK 
and elsewhere the seeds for this were already planted by the 1970s and 1980s 
with the dispossession of industrial workers and the shift to more diffuse 
systems of governance. While in the 2000s it was possible to argue that “the 
past ten years have seen the full-blown revival of anarchism, as a global social 
movement and coherent set of political discourses, on a scale and to levels of 
unity and diversity unseen since the 1930s,”8 by the late 2010s activists 
struggle to find secure housing, jobs or means to support themselves, having 
less and less energy to dedicate to organising or fighting back. The reign of 
neoliberalism is so well established that it feels like it has been here forever.9 
Governments, along with the likes of Facebook and Google, are capable of 
identifying individuals (subversive or not) through algorithms and trait 
analysis;10 a black mask no longer anonymises or protects. However, the 
anarchist revival at the turn of the century hadn’t only happened on the 
                                                
5 Here I am referring to the famous Seattle slogan, ‘We are winning’, but also to the growing feeling that 
there is no ‘we’ in the fragmented British left. The collapse of the image of a revolutionary identity is 
exemplified by feminist and postcolonial analyses, a good example of which is A. Emejulu, ‘Diversity is 
Liberalspeak: Why We Must Build a Decolonised Left’, Strike!, March 2016. 
6 For an excellent study of the politics of austerity and activism, see E. Craddock, ‘Emotion and gender 
in local anti-austerity activist cultures’, PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 2017.  
7 For (bleak) accounts of the effects of austerity on the British left see Phil, ’20 June: The Beginning of 
What?’, [web blog], 15 June 2015, <https://libcom.org/blog/20-june-beginning-what-22062015>, 
accessed 14 December 2017; A. Ishkanian and I. Ali, ‘From Consensus to Dissensus: The Politics of Anti-
Austerity Activism in London and Its Relationship to Voluntary Organizations’, Journal of Civil Society, 
vol. 14, no. 1, 2017. 
8 U. Gordon, ‘Anarchism Reloaded’, Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 12, no. 1, 2007, p. 29. 
9 M. Fisher, ‘Capitalist Realism: Is There Still No Alternative?’, Strike!, November 2012, 
<https://strikemag.org/capitalist-realism-is-there-still-no-alternative>, accessed 14 December 2017. 
10 For a comprehensive guide on how it’s done, see B. Schneier, Data and Goliath. The Hidden Battles to 
Collect Your Data and Control Your World, W.W. Norton and Company, London, 2016. For a critical, 
anarchist approach to surveillance, The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends, Semiotext(e), South 
Pasadena, 2015 and Institute For The Study of Insurgent Warfare, Panopticons Then and Now, [zine], 
2014, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/institute-for-the-study-of-insurgent-warfare-
panopticons-then-and-now>, accessed 10 September 2017. 
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streets with the rise of the anti-globalisation movement.11 Anarchist academic 
work also proliferated in that decade, with postanarchism appearing as the 
frontrunner with its claims to freshen up ‘old’ anarchism. Even though the 
activists on the streets incorporated elements of a traditional anarchist ethos,12 
many academics claimed that there were undeniable differences between the 
ideas of ‘classical’ anarchism and the new anarchists.13 As Uri Gordon writes: 
[T]he sources of anarchism in its contemporary idiom are largely 
discontinuous with the traditional thread of anarchist movement and 
theory, as it developed in the context of workers’ and peasants’ 
movements in Europe and the Americas during the nineteenth and 
earlier twentieth centuries . . .  Instead, the mainspring of today’s 
anarchism can be found at the intersection of several trends of social 
criticism and struggle whose beginnings were never consciously 
‘anarchist’.14 
These intersections came in the form of alliances between “radical ecology, 
feminism, black and indigenous liberation, anti-nuclear movements,”15 
producing a network of heterogeneous, anti-hierarchical, but connected 
groups.16 
The need to reflect and analyse these intersections was also taken up by 
postanarchism, the prefix post- denoting both its debt to poststructuralism 
and its move beyond traditional anarchist theory.17 Süreyyya Evren remarks 
that “interest in postanarchism was directly linked to the enthusiasm created 
                                                
11 R. Kinna, ‘Fields of Vision: Kropotkin and Revolutionary Change’, SubStance, vol. 36, no. 2, 2007, p. 
67. 
12 U. Gordon, ‘Anarchism and Political Theory: Contemporary Problems’, PhD Thesis, University of 
Oxford, 2005, p. 80. 
13 D. Graeber, ‘The New Anarchists’, The New Left Review, vol. 13, 2002.  
14 U. Gordon, loc. cit. 
15 ibid. 
16 See G. Chesters and I. Welsh, Complexity, Multitudes and Movements: Acting on the Edge of Chaos, 
Routledge, London, 2005; M. Sheller, ‘From Social Networks to Social Flows: Re-thinking the Movement 
in Social Movements’, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, 2000. 
17 L. Call, ‘Post-anarchism Today’, Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 2010. 
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in post-Seattle anti-globalization movements,”18 a sentiment confirmed by its 
most prominent authors in the English-speaking world Simon Critchley, 
Todd May and Saul Newman.19 When this thesis was being researched, 
postanarchism was already an established field, though it had become 
somewhat controversial and many of its more prominent figures were 
distancing themselves from the label. 
In the context of the struggles of the economic crisis and austerity politics, 
British activism appeared to have lost much of its momentum by the mid-
2010s. In 2016, Some London Foxes proclaimed, “In talking about resistance 
and rebellion in London, we may as well start with the obvious point: there 
isn’t much.”20 Coinciding with this shift, there has been a noticeable drop-off 
in the production of postanarchist texts, though that is not to say their 
insights have not been incorporated in other works. Both Todd May and 
Simon Critchley have been engaged with other avenues of radical politics, 
leaving Saul Newman as the principal writer keeping the field active. Most 
others who had previously been interested have also moved onto other, 
presumably more productive battlegrounds. 
Given this, it might seem strange that this work is situated in the field of 
postanarchism. The reason behind this choice is less to do with any particular 
affinity to postanarchist politics or academic theory, and more for the 
pragmatic reason that it is the postanarchists who first ‘married’ 
poststructuralism and anarchism. In this sense, postanarchism is used 
primarily as a springboard to talk about issues of theory and praxis and this 
work is perhaps closer to philosophy (especially in the sense in which 
                                                
18 S. Evren, ‘What is Anarchism? A reflection on the canon and the constructive potential of its 
destruction’, PhD Thesis, Loughborough University, 2012, p. 22. 
19 S. Critchley interviewed in S. James, Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2, 
no. 1, 2009; T. May interviewed in S. Evren and T. May, ‘An Interview with Todd May’, Varlik, no. 9, 
2006, <https://www.eurozine.com/an-interview-with-todd-may/>, accessed 28 May 2015; S. Newman, 
interviewed in S. Evren, K. Kiziltug and E. Kosova, ‘Interview with Saul Newman’, Siyahi Interlocal 
Journal of Postanarchist Theory, Culture and Politics, April 2005, 
<http://community.livejournal.com/siyahi>, accessed 25 May 2015. 
20 Some London Foxes, London 2016: The Terrain of Struggle in Our City, [zine], 31 Dec 2015, 
<https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/some-london-foxes-london-2016-the-terrain-of-struggle-in-
our-city>, accessed 11 June 2016, para. 56. 
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Deleuze and Guattari talk about philosophy) than it is to politics in the 
academic sense. 
To take up our dramatis personae, the characters which populate this story 
include: anarchism, the theoretical and practical field of contemporary 
European/UK activism, the writings of Gilles Deleuze (including his 
collaborations with Guattari), and ethics, the branch of philosophy concerned 
with what we should do. This intersection makes it difficult to situate the 
work in a particular tradition. It could be read simultaneously as a critique of 
anarchism, of philosophers and of academics. It is an attempt at writing 
differently – by virtue of the theory and methodology it utilises, it inevitably 
needs to break with the academic framework it would normally be part of. 
In terms of content, our aim is to understand what ethics might look like in 
anarchist political practice if conceptualised through an immanent 
metaphysical schema. However, by trying to incorporate a radically different 
approach to theory and practice, an auxiliary aim of this thesis is to critique 
and interfere with the normative practices that have come to define, 
categorise and affirm certain types of writing as academic and therefore 
‘examinable’. Deleuze comments: 
What now seems problematic is the situation in which young 
philosophers, but also all young writers who’re involved in creating 
something, find themselves. They face the threat of being stifled from the 
outset. It’s become very difficult to do any work, because a whole system 
of “acculturation” and anticreativity specific to the developed nations is 
taking shape. It’s far worse than censorship.21 
The situation which Deleuze refers to here is the French academy in the 
generation after his own, where, he felt, philosophy and academia were 
blocked by a reactionary economic and political space and where more and 
more rules were being put in place to encourage philosophers and theorists to 
                                                
21 Deleuze, Negotiations, 2nd edn, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 27. 
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conform. Looking at Britain in 2018, the situation does not seem so very 
different. The turn towards the commodification of knowledge and 
privatisation of universities is well on its way, with humanities and arts 
degrees a primary target through their failure to easily produce quantifiable 
results. The current expectations around producing knowledge in the form of 
articles, books, conference presentations etc. and disseminating that 
knowledge to students are subordinated more and more to this market logic. 
As one might expect, the ‘knowledge’ that is produced is also closely 
monitored and curated, most often by other academics through a system of 
peer-reviewed journals resulting in “an orthodoxy of research that is so 
disciplined, so normalized, so centered . . . that is has become conventional, 
reductionist, hegemonic, and sometimes oppressive and has lost its radical 
possibilities.”22 It is not surprising then that the proliferation of written 
information in the form of textbooks, articles, chapters, blogs, etc. heaps up so 
quickly that new students are often left discouraged and frustrated in their 
attempts to navigate the field. At the same time, we rarely see a break from 
the established knowledge and methodologies of academic writing and 
attempts to question this framework are ‘stifled’, as Deleuze puts it. 
Initially, this thesis was not conceived of as such a break, and indeed it may 
seem somewhat arrogant for a novice academic to attempt a radical departure 
from the norm. However, in the process of writing, it became apparent to me 
that I would have to do a bit more than just write about Deleuze’s 
metaphysics – I would have to (attempt to) embody this approach if I wanted 
to do it justice. As Deleuze and Guattari observe, “There is no difference 
between what a book talks about and how it is made.”23 Following Braidotti, I 
refuse to embrace the ‘image of thought’ which constitutes the role of the 
academic as a judge or moral arbiter and prefer instead to produce a new set 
                                                
22 E. A St. Pierre, ‘Post qualitative research: The critique and the coming after’, in N. K. Denzin & Y. S. 
Lincoln eds, The Sage handbook of qualitative research, 4th edn, Sage, Thousand Oaks CA, 2011, cited in D. 
Bright and E. Honan, ‘Writing a Thesis Differently’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in 
Education, vol. 29, no. 5, 2016, p. 732. 
23 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Bloomsbury, London, 2013, p. 2. 
7 
 
of connections with the tools Deleuze and others have offered.24 While this is 
inspired by Deleuze’s critique of philosophy, I am also driven by the anarchist 
exhortation to question authority and dogmatism. Thus, this dissertation is 
different in a few ways that I now attempt to reflect upon. 
1.1.2. My aim and content 
This thesis attempts to construct a new form of anarchist ethics employing the 
‘ultimate philosopher of immanence’, Gilles Deleuze. One aim of this work is 
to foster a conversation which redefines the rules of the game in a way that 
creates space for new, complex solutions to emerge.25 I hope to disturb 
stagnated debates and open up some blockages. Ultimately, the aim is to 
discern ways of creating new assemblages and analyse the conditions for 
them to emerge. I enter the debate through the postanarchist argument that 
Enlightenment-inspired approaches to ethics on which much classical 
anarchist theory is founded are destabilised by poststructuralism. While in 
postanarchism, and in political theory in general, this move is often taken to 
mark the end of metaphysics, I argue that there is nevertheless necessarily a 
metaphysical foundation to anarchism. Indeed, Deleuze himself argues that 
there is no such thing as ‘overcoming metaphysics’ in philosophy, only a turn 
towards the recognition that all metaphysics is immanent.26 Following this 
approach I establish an immanent foundation for anarchist ethics. 
It is worth also briefly mentioning what the purpose of this dissertation is not. 
I do not aim to reach a truth or solve a problem or produce some form of 
quantifiable result. Even though this is a work of ethics, I also do not aim to 
offer rules, speculations, blueprints or to discern a core set of values. This 
                                                
24 R. Braidotti, Metamorphoses. Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 
9.  
25 R. Braidotti, ‘The Subject in Feminism’, Hypatia, vol. 6, no. 2, 1991, p. 164. 
26 A. Villani, ‘The Problem of an Immanent Metaphysics’, in A. Beaulieu, E. Kazarian and J. Sushytska 
eds, Gilles Deleuze and Metaphysics, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2014, p. vii. 
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thesis is also not ‘making the case for anarchism’ to non-anarchists.27 
Furthermore, I have no intention of entering the debate around whether 
Deleuze is an anarchist, or anarchists Deleuzian. I do not intend to be 
‘representative’ of the politics on the streets (as postanarchism has sometimes 
been understood to be), or use theory to understand social movements, or be 
a ‘gift’28 back to the community as others have. All of these approaches frame 
the relationship between activists and academics as two separate spheres 
which are limited in the ways they co-exist and relate to each other. The 
problems with such an approach and the question of theory/practice will be 
addressed more in chapter three. 
In terms of content, this work inserts itself into the debate around how we 
might conceptualise (post)anarchist ethics, and more specifically, what they 
look like in theory/practice. My central contention is that in order to complete 
the postanarchist project (that is, if we agree that we need a non-universalist, 
non-essentialist and non-representative anarchist politics) we need to ground 
it in an immanent metaphysics; this can free us from the bind of transcendent 
ethical frameworks, a move I argue is necessary. To this end, the whole thesis 
can be understood as charting a path through three primary ethical questions: 
How should we act? 
The first question is the quintessential traditional moral question. It is also the 
question postanarchists saw as incompatible with the new forms of 
poststructuralist anarchism since it appeals to human essence and 
representation to posit a foundation on which a set of duties, rules or values 
that guide our actions are established. When this question is addressed in 
later sections I propose the theoretical division between ethics and morality in 
anarchism, postanarchism and Deleuze’s philosophy, further problematising 
                                                
27 See, for example, L. S. Brown, The Politics of Individualism. Liberalism, Liberal Feminism and Anarchism, 
Black Rose, Montreal, 1993; A. Carter, ‘Analytical Anarchism: Some Conceptual Foundations’, Political 
Theory, vol. 28, no. 2, 2000, pp. 230-253; A. Ritter, Anarchism: A theoretical analysis, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1980; M. Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976; R. P. Wolff, In Defense 
of Anarchism, Harper and Row, New York, 1971. 
28 D. Graeber, Fragments of Anarchist Anthropology, Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago, 2004, p. 12. 
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the concept. The bulk of the answer to this question comes through an 
analysis of the possible foundations of ethics. First, I present the postanarchist 
critique of universals and essentialism and, second, move towards a 
Deleuzian critique of transcendence. 
How do we act? 
The second question has become necessary for our construction of an 
alternative postanarchist ethical schema. The starting position of Deleuzian 
metaphysics – beginning from ‘what is given’ – allows us to take immanence 
as the foundation of ethics, thus is materialist and affirmative in the sense of 
not denying or condemning what we do on the basis of moral categories. This 
is the way we avoid the ‘mental gymnastics’ of ‘deeming what we will to be 
good’– Spinoza’s critique regarding the contingency of moral values.29  ‘How 
do we act?’ is a question that, by virtue of starting from the given, allows us to 
also reject the primacy of representation through the recognition and 
acknowledgement of one’s actions, without judgment or comparison to a 
higher arbiter such as moral duty. Thus, I present a descriptive account of 
Deleuze’s metaphysics of immanence. 
How can we act? 
The third question highlights the possibility of change and self-determination. 
It is also a return to normativity, albeit a re-worked, Deleuzian version of it. 
Here it becomes possible to emphasise the complexity of social and ethical 
problems and the possibilities for their resolution. It is also a discussion of 
how we can push the limits of our bodies, of our environment and of the 
realm of ethics. Finally, this question is an attempt to address anarchist ethical 
problems – in a sense, to move the thesis towards applied ethics, and re-think 
them in new and different ways. 
These questions correspond roughly to the three chapters of the thesis. The 
                                                
29 B. Spinoza, Ethics, III, P9. 
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first chapter concerns postanarchism, where I begin by problematising the 
definition of ‘anarchism’ and offer a working concept that is built upon 
throughout the whole dissertation. The chapter then moves onto the first 
stage of the argument, namely that postanarchist theory has provided an 
invaluable epistemological critique of anarchism but has failed at establishing 
an ontology which enables that critique to move further and become 
productive. This claim is supported through an analysis of the two main 
moral frameworks adopted by ‘classical’ anarchists and their epistemological 
foundations. This sets the ground for outlining the postanarchist critique of 
classical anarchism. The postanarchists identify four main points of tension in 
anarchist ethics – essentialism, ethical subjectivity, universalism and 
representation – which I examine in detail. The chapter then presents the 
second claim of my argument, which is that anarchism needs a strong 
metaphysical foundation (and, in particular, an immanent one). A number of 
anarchist thinkers with strong ontologies adapted their ethical frameworks in 
response to the postanarchist critique and I examine the success of these 
endeavours here. Through this analysis I excavate the problem of 
transcendence, and the issues it poses for anarchism as a set of philosophical 
principles. Having established that anarchist ethics need metaphysics and 
should be resistant to transcendent frameworks, I argue the case for using 
Deleuze, one of the few poststructuralist philosophers to have a direct and 
sustained engagement with the question of metaphysics. This becomes the 
foundation for the claim that anarchist ethics needs immanent metaphysics 
and will therefore engage with the problematic outlined by Deleuze. 
The second chapter deals primarily with the philosophy of Deleuze (and 
Guattari) and can be understood in a sense as a ‘methodology’ chapter. I have 
found ‘Deleuzian ethics’ to be a contradictory field. Even though the issue of 
ethics and normativity is present throughout his entire opus, the conceptual 
break he proposes distances him from debates in moral philosophy, and to an 
extent also the terms of reference for traditional ‘ethics’. This often leads 
commentators to talk about Deleuze’s analysis of Spinoza or Nietzsche as if it 
11 
 
were his own ethical position.30 Without diminishing the importance of 
Spinoza and Nietzsche for Deleuzian ethics, the purpose of this chapter is to 
understand, and outline, the metaphysical foundation of immanence which 
serves as the basis for a new normativity to emerge. Thus, it starts by 
discerning the problems of the philosophical ‘image of thought’, followed by 
the ontology of difference Deleuze builds in Difference and Repetition, moving 
on to the productive statements that Deleuze offers on the question of ethics 
in relation to the Event. Towards the end of the chapter, the question of 
Deleuzian-Guattarian subjectivity is explored further in relation to desire and 
production. These sections serve to construct the problems which our 
formulation of immanence must respond to and provide a guide (albeit 
perhaps one of many possible) to resolving them. 
The final chapter incorporates the metaphysics of immanence with practical 
anarchist ethical questions. It identifies and examines the dogmatic image of 
thought in anarchist ethics using the tools provided by Deleuze. I provide 
examples of contemporary debates and the philosophical presuppositions 
that prevent them from moving forward. The main issues we are concerned 
with here are: dislodging ethics from the domain of the ‘rational’, 
reformulating ethical subjectivity, and establishing the conditions for change 
in the ethical event. 
1.1.3 Notes on methodology 
Deleuze’s own methodology is very particular to the problems he formulates 
and addresses. As such, it is only partially possible (and desirable) to replicate 
it for our project. The ways in which this happens will become apparent as we 
move through. I try to avoid binarized argument forms, in which a position is 
critiqued, synthesised into a new object of critique and taken up in a linear 
manner. Rather, I attempt a more ‘rhizomatic’ approach where the 
                                                
30 L. Bryant, ‘Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of 
Immanence’, PhD thesis, USA, Northwest University Press, 2008, p. xi. 
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connections are numerous and lead in multiple directions at once. As a result, 
you are unlikely to find neat conclusions or clear answers. 
Secondly, I want to avoid always presenting (my own) thinking and writing 
as clear, logical and rational from the onset. The way this work is presented is 
going to evoke a response in the reader, and my intention is, partly, to 
provoke new assemblages through this affect. As Karen Houle observes, 
thinking is messy and unclear, and there is a certain merit in recognising and 
accepting it as such. She discerns that such an approach allows us to foster 
new creative engagements, helps discover new blockages or points of 
stagnation, and that, by recognising the contingency and uncertainty of the 
domain, we might be able to put judgment aside and discuss the problem 
with different eyes.31 
Last but not least, our approach, 
gives us a way to envision the role of the self – whether as the story teller 
or the reader or the philosopher theorizing the issue – in the production 
of the domain and the power of its values; and conversely, to see the role 
of the domain in the production of the self and the self’s values, or sense 
of worth and meaning.32 
I do not mean to imply that this work has not been edited or thought through, 
but that allowing the possibility for thinking to be other than clear and 
rational is important – for new solutions to emerge, new ways of thinking and 
writing need to be present. As Deleuze says, “to think is to create – there is no 
other creation – but to create is first of all to engender ‘thinking’ in thought.”33 
His collaborations with Guattari experiment with the rejection of structured 
and clear language, opting instead for novelty and fragmentation which 
disrupts whilst connecting and re-connecting. In the first plateau of A 
                                                
31 K. Houle, Responsibility, Complexity, Abortion: Towards a New Image of Ethical Thought, Lexington Books, 
Lanham, 2014, p. 11. 
32 ibid. 
33 G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Continuum, London, 2012, p. 147. 
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Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari identify two types of thought. The 
tree-form, or arborescent structure, is based on ‘striated’ metaphysics – it 
incorporates binarizing logic, stable entities, and allows us to understand 
static relationships. The rhizome, on the other hand, is a more fluid structure. 
It is horizontal, whereby parts of the system can join or disappear without 
harming the structure as a whole. Both of these should be taken as 
descriptive, rather than prescriptive terms. Rhizomatic thinking, is a method 
that emphasises connections and meeting points, the various ways in which 
we enter and exit ‘assemblages’. In this sense, rhizomes are conglomerations 
of various interconnected organic and non-organic elements, making 
rhizomatic thinking more suitable for understanding change.34 There are, 
then, well-justified reasons for attempting a less formal academic format, 
given my objectives. 
That said, the style of the thesis is intended to be accessible. The problems I 
am trying to deal with are complex and sometimes they call for specialised 
terminology, but I have tried to not over-complicate this by using 
unnecessary jargon. Moreover, I am going to be using a mix of academic and 
activist literature. Of course, there is a huge overlap between the two, and 
sometimes similar ideas have different names in the respective fields. The 
choice of terminology I have used depends largely on the context of the 
discussion.  
In addition, despite the general recommendation to avoid using personal 
pronouns in academic texts, I have chosen to recognise my position as an 
author of this text and therefore refer to myself. The reason behind that choice 
is my rejection of the notion of ‘objectivity’, or unbiased writing, which is the 
aim of such language, and the false feeling of distance that is created when 
the author is not present. This work does not begin with the unquestionable 
assumption that there is a Truth which is objective, achievable and the object 
of knowledge. Instead, it takes truths as many, as heterogeneous and 
                                                
34 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 10. 
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sometimes opposing, and, by adopting a radically subjective language, 
recognises the accountability of the author for which truths are presented. 
In this sense, this work will be part of a conversation we are going to have 
together. ‘I’ will appear often in this conversation – I have kept my own name 
not because it is important, but because I am as much a product of my habits 
as anybody else.35 Echoing Rosi Braidotti’s politics of location – “a collectively 
shared and constructed, jointly occupied spatio-temporal territory”36 – I 
would like to acknowledge that the position I am occupying in relation to this 
conversation is European, geographically in Britain, and this sets certain 
limitations on this work (and perhaps open connections unfamiliar to some 
readers). In the same breath, I would like to specify my use of the academic 
‘we’. Rather than an undefined, broad category of shared commonality 
between humans, my use of ‘we’ refers to me and you, the author and the 
reader. Moreover, I have used ‘they’ as a neutral singular pronoun 
throughout when referring to undetermined individuals; for example: “An 
activist throws a brick through a wall. They are dressed in black.” ‘They’ in 
this usage substitutes the male universal. I have also used ‘they’ to refer to the 
authors of various works when their gender is unknown. The reason is 
twofold – first of all, to dispense with the use of the masculine pronoun as the 
neutral, universal subject, and second, in the case of real people, to 
acknowledge that the subject might not identify with the gender I have 
perceived them to be. 
Finally, in this section I would like to reflect briefly on a few methodological 
premises. Anarchists, it is sometimes argued, can have a prickly relationship 
with ‘intellectuals’ because of their tendency to impose ‘theory’ (perhaps 
often seen as irrelevant).37 In response, Gordon, for example, argues for a 
‘participatory strategy’ of theorising, where the researcher is ‘embedded’ in 
                                                
35 ibid., p. 1. 
36 R. Braidotti, Metamorphoses, p. 12. 
37 D. Graeber, The New Anarchists, p. 1. 
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the practices they seek to explore.38 Similarly, Sandra Jeppesen talks about the 
trilogy of ‘do-make-think’ as the three focal points of anarchism.39 Rather than 
adopting one, or a combination, of these methods, I shall follow Elizabeth 
Grosz in her more Deleuzian understanding of theory as “labor, production, 
building, or making, in the same ways as other practices . . . are forms of labor 
and production.”40 I hope this will resonate with the anarchist sceptics and 
allow us to bridge some of these divides. Echoing the Invisible Committee’s 
recent call, I submit this work to the on-going conversation about a very real 
problem that we share as friends.41 
Theory and practice are often thought to form two sides of a coin – the former 
relates to abstract meaning and expression, the latter relating to the material 
world, to actual people and actions. Theory is ‘applied’ in practice. The 
rejection of this strict division between theory and practice is often taken to be 
foundational for new materialist philosophy. New materialism is a term used 
by a range of Deleuze-influenced scholars such as Rosi Braidotti, Manuel 
DeLanda and Quentin Meillassoux to refer, broadly, to a 
methodology/metaphysics which does not privilege the side of ‘culture’ in 
the nature-culture divide: 
The term proposes a cultural theory that radically rethinks the dualisms 
so central to our (post-)modern thinking and always starts its analysis 
from how these oppositions (between nature and culture, matter and 
mind, the human and the inhuman) are produced in action itself.42 
This should point to the ways in which this ‘new’ materialism differs from 
‘old’ or dialectical materialism, but also to the ways in which it is similar. It 
takes as its point of departure the existence of a material world and accepts 
                                                
38 U. Gordon, ‘Anarchism and Political Theory: Contemporary Problems’, p. 20. 
39 S. Jeppesen, ‘Do Make Think: Anarchy and Culture’, in G. Zezulka-Mailloux and J. Gifford eds, 
Culture+The State: Alternative Interventions, Humanities Studio, Edmonton, 2003, p. 64. 
40 E. Grosz, ‘Deleuze, Theory and Space’, Log, no. 1, 2003, p. 77. 
41 The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends. 
42 R. Dolphijn and I. Van der Tuin, New materialism: Interviews & Cartographies, Open Humanities Press, 
Michigan, 2012, p. 93. 
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that identity is a product of processes rather than essence. The main 
difference, however, is that this process doesn’t follow a dialectical model. For 
DeLanda it is the process of double articulation while for Braidotti it is 
monism with difference as the primary ontological category. 
New materialists do not take theory and practice as ontologically separate 
and claim that to prioritise the discursive is to deny that the two sides 
inevitably mix and that elements of them are combined or separated again. To 
highlight an example, for somebody who is actively involved in activism and 
at the same time produces knowledge about it, it is rarely if at all clear how 
much theory informs their practice and vice versa. Theory is itself a practice, 
not a pre-existent field of knowledge intellectuals draw from.43 As Deleuze 
put it, “A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the 
signifier. It must be useful. It must function. And not just for 
itself.”44 Moreover, in terms of anarchism, theory/practice come together not 
only historically – the canonised writings we have today and the actualisation 
of the movement in 19th century clearly fed off one another – but also 
continued to operate in a very specific relationship which can be called 
‘thinking and acting’, in which neither is clearly defined or necessarily a 
representation of the other. 
Reading Deleuze 
There are a few methodological difficulties stemming from the choice to 
engage with the philosophy of Deleuze. Notoriously difficult to read, his 
works are often taken to be ‘symbolic’ or impressionist and labelled elitist or 
exclusive. In an attempt to avoid that problem, I follow Paul Patton in his 
rejection of readings of Deleuze (and Guattari’s) terminology as metaphorical 
and/or poetic and attempt to read them through the unfolding of problems 
                                                
43 T. May, Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, Pennsylvania State University Press, USA, 
1994, p. 64.  
44 M. Foucault and G. Deleuze, ‘Intellectuals and Power’, p. 208. 
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we encounter45 – as Levi Bryant phrases it, to read “Deleuze as he himself 
read other thinkers,” considering “what problems informed Deleuze’s 
thought and [seeking] to determine how these problems necessitated the 
construction of particular concepts.”46 This is the same approach I attempt to 
apply to my analysis of anarchist ethics as well. This necessitates the use of 
Deleuzian (and Deleuze-Guattarian) neologisms and language at times, 
despite all of their conflicting and overlapping deployments. Rather than give 
a (lengthy) presentation of the entirety of Deleuze’s canon and terminology at 
the beginning I will deploy concepts as I go, hopefully resulting in a finely 
tuned set of tools specific to our needs. 
It is also worth reiterating that my reading of, and engagement with, Deleuze 
is concerned with an application of his metaphysics rather than his statements 
about ethics. However, it is worth briefly addressing charges of implicit 
normativity or an unaccounted for ethical position that have been brought 
against poststructuralism in general and Deleuze in particular.47 Although 
Deleuze and Guattari arguably did little to explicitly outline their ethical 
positions, they never claimed to have none. In accordance with their 
philosophy, it would be fair to assume that their silence on the matter 
indicates a desire to avoid a position of objective, universal ethical 
subjectivity. In their writings, they do assume an ethical position, even if one 
of the ways it is expressed is in the fact that they have chosen to engage with 
particular concepts in a particular way. This choice has significance for the 
type of ethical position they embody. Therefore, I claim there are clear 
grounds for utilising their philosophy for ethics work. As we will discuss 
later, there are no ‘pure beginnings’ in philosophy. 
The choice of the term ‘metaphysics’ in this thesis is deliberate. Deleuze 
                                                
45 P. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 1.  
46 L. Bryant, ‘Difference and Givenness’, p. xi 
47 This issue will be taken up again in section 1.3.1. For a more detailed account than that given here, see 
R. Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 13-30.                                                                                          
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characterises himself as a “pure metaphysician.”48 This metaphysics is 
perhaps best understood as a mix of both ontology and epistemology – “a 
thought that aspires to give a complete description of the wholeness of what 
exists”49 – rather than the more traditional interpretation as the study of 
transcendence. Indeed, Deleuze sees the ‘overcoming of metaphysics’ (in a 
Heideggerian sense, for example) as only applicable to metaphysics of 
transcendence. As such, the construction of immanent metaphysics, therefore, 
is the main task of this thesis. His particular favouring of ‘metaphysics’ over 
‘ontology’ is a sign, according to Villani, that he feels himself belonging to an 
alternative tradition that has, “with Nietzsche and Whitehead, its great texts 
and titles.”50 Keeping that in mind, it is also worth noting that Deleuze’s 
choice of terminology does not correspond with the contemporary division of 
ontology and epistemology and therefore the terms ontology and 
metaphysics should not be confused. Given this, I use ontology to refer to 
contemporary understandings of the study of being, and metaphysics to 
designate a Deleuzian understanding. 
Finally, this thesis moves between Deleuze’s writings and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s collaborative works without overly problematising the difference 
between the two corpora. This might be considered a problem due to  i ek51 
and Badiou’s52 claims that Deleuze’s ontology shifts notably between his early 
and later work. To begin with, Deleuze posits subjectivity as preceding and 
conditioning experience, driven by “the transcendental and critical thought 
that the real processes of production of empirical objects cannot themselves be 
objects.”53 In Difference and Repetition, temporality is subjectively constituted 
through ‘larval subjects’, still rooted in contemplation, but by Anti-Oedipus the 
transcendental becomes a material process in ‘desiring-production’ with the 
                                                
48 G. Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 88-89. 
49 A. Anelli, ‘Leaving Metaphysics? Deleuze on the Event’, in A. Beaulieu, E. Kazarian and J. Susthytska 
eds, Gilles Deleuze and Metaphysics, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2014, p. 36. 
50 A. Villani, ‘Foreword’ A. Beaulieu, E. Kazarian and J. Susthytska eds, Gilles Deleuze and Metaphysics, 
Lexington Books, Lanham, 2014, p. vii. 
51  S. Žižek, Organs without bodies: On Deleuze and consequences, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 19. 
52 A. Badiou, Deleuze: Clamor of Being, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000, p. 69. 
53 A. Welchman, ‘Deleuze’s post-critical metaphysics’, Symposium, vol. 13, no. 2, 2009, p. 32. 
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syntheses becoming properly immanent. At this point contemplation is no 
longer necessary, as desire and the assemblage reconfigure the notion of the 
subject altogether. The accusation amounts to something like an early 
‘idealist’ Deleuze and a ‘materialist’ later one. The validity of this division is 
contended by Manuel DeLanda, who claims that the two paradigms “retain 
enough overlaps that they can be meshed together as a heterogenous 
assemblage.”54 Rather than attempting to keep Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari 
separate, I have chosen to freely employ concepts from the two, driven by the 
impetus to create the joyous hybrid connections Rosi Braidotti calls for.55 
Despite the differences in the early and later projects, I have opted to engage 
with the elements of the two that I have deemed most applicable for anarchist 
ethics. This approach becomes clearer through my translation of Deleuze’s 
conception of subjectivity in sections 2.4 and 3.3. 
Terminology 
A note on instances where I appear to have reduced complex, multiple 
entities to simple terms (such as the use of the broad term ‘anarchist’): this is 
not an attempt to impose an identity where there isn’t one, but an attempt to 
keep the language as comprehensible as possible. For example, I tend to use 
activist/anarchist/radical as somewhat interchangeable. I take a similar 
approach to the term ‘activist’ as Andrew X in his zine Give Up Activism in 
which he criticises the production of the category ‘activist’ as self-proclaimed 
experts in social change, reserved only for particular people.56 However, this 
is a commonly used word and I have decided to stick with it for purposes of 
clarity. Similarly, I take contemporary social movements/radical social 
movements/activism to mean broadly the same thing (I am aware that there 
are, for example, right-wing social movements, however, they are not present 
in this work). As may become obvious, the commitments of this thesis would 
                                                
54 M. DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, Continuum, London, 2002, p. 202. 
55 R. Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 2010. 
56 Andrew X, Give Up Activism, [zine], 2005, <https://libcom.org/library/giveupactivismps>, accessed 
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require many more words than available to give each of these delineations a 
proper treatment. 
Similarly, when I refer to ‘anarchism’ I generally include both post- and 
‘classical’ anarchist theory, as well as the range of political practices and 
histories which commonly come under the rubric. As Uri Gordon observes, 
“any account of anarchism that remains sensitive to its evolving character” 
needs to involve a “constant re-definition of anarchism itself.”57 In that spirit, 
I will be redefining anarchism as we go through this thesis, winding up with 
a working definition quite distinct from most used today. 
Finally, ethics and morality are two characters which surface in many ways 
throughout this work. Ethics, also called moral philosophy, comprises three 
main areas: meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. The field of 
meta-ethics is usually concerned with the origin of ethical principles or values 
and their meaning, the theoretical side of the field; normative ethics is more 
practical, defining the moral limits of right and wrong actions; and applied 
ethics is when a specific controversial issue is being examined.58 Thus, in the 
traditional sense, ethics and morality are usually taken to mean the same 
thing. However, anarchists have long argued against normative morality, 
especially as deployed by the Church and state as a tool of control. Moreover, 
since this ‘classical’ anarchist critique, most anarchist authors have preferred 
to use the term ‘ethics’ to describe anarchist oughts and ought-nots. The 
difference between the two is often perceived in terms of power. Morality is 
coercive, comes from institutionalised religion or imposed social norms, while 
ethics is a blueprint or guidance for how to lead a good life (and one that 
corresponds to anarchist values). For most of the postanarchists, the meaning 
of ethics and morality is reconfigured to signify that morality is a set of rules 
of conduct that stipulate what is good and evil, while ethics is the study of 
why certain things are good and others evil. This use will be preserved in our 
                                                
57 U. Gordon, ‘Anarchism and Political Theory: Contemporary Problems’, p. 81. 
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discussion of the works of postanarchist authors, even though it is not one 
that I wholly subscribe to. The third and final layer of the distinction, through 
which I understand my own project, comes from Deleuze’s study of Spinoza. 
Deleuze also conceives of ethics and morality as distinct, but now in terms of 
immanence and transcendence. The redefinition of these two terms becomes 
clearer as the thesis progresses. 
1.2 Defining anarchism 
1.2.1 An anarchist canon? 
Having established our engagement with the theory/practice debate and 
situated ourselves in the field of postanarchism (understood broadly as the 
intersection between poststructuralism and core anarchist principles), it is still 
unclear what our working definition of anarchism might be. Our options 
might include taking anarchists as united under the umbrella of 
‘contemporary radical activism’,59 as social movements against neoliberal 
hegemony,60 as political ideology61 or “decentralised networks of 
communication, coordination and mutual support among autonomous nodes 
of social struggle”62 to name a few prominent approaches. However, 
whatever the merits of these approaches, we encounter an awkward problem 
when delineating what anarchist ethics might be. Whilst it is undeniable that 
anarchism is comprised of ‘activists’ and can be described as a ‘movement’, a 
coherent study of ethics in use would require an ethnographic engagement 
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60 See A. Grubacic and D. Graeber, ‘Anarchism, Or The Revolutionary Movement Of the Twenty-First 
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with countless individuals.63 Moreover, such a method might reveal people’s 
personal or collective decision-making processes but would not necessarily 
expose the meta-ethical dimensions of anarchist thought.  
Another approach might be to take a sample of anarchist writings/theories 
and use them as representative of movement practices. The first problem with 
this approach comes from the difficulty of defining an anarchist ‘canon’. As 
with many other institutionalised fields, only a certain number of people 
‘make it’ into the textbooks. One could argue that it is not possible to include 
and study every person who has ever written on the subject, but the question 
of who selects the texts that are ‘important’ (and how) nevertheless remains a 
problem. Moreover, this is particularly problematic for a movement like 
anarchism that might appear to be opposed to hierarchies between 
knowledge legitimised by authority and other forms of thinking – the 
anarchist movement itself is strongly dependant on ‘propaganda’, zines, 
collective discussions and other forms of knowledge that are difficult to 
acknowledge as part of a formal canon. Since anarchism has relied so much 
on collective practice for its development, any attempts to talk about ‘canon’ 
are highly likely to be exclusionary and ultimately misguided. 
As Kinna and Evren point out in their introduction to ‘Blasting the Canon’,64 
the idea of a core set of anarchist texts came to prominence in the 1960s with 
Paul Eltzbacher’s Anarchism: Seven Exponents of the Anarchist Philosophy. 
Similar efforts were later made by George Woodcock and other anarchist 
historians. Before exploring ways to move beyond the canon it will be 
pertinent to briefly examine the ideas and figures associated with it. Broadly 
speaking, anarchism as a political theory has been conceptualised as politics 
directed against the state, capitalism, organised religion, coercive power, 
domination, and exploitation, among others. Anarchists, the story goes, strive 
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to achieve a world where individuals have freedom of self-determination and 
equality through the use of direct action and grassroots organising. 
Historically, what might be called anarchist-oriented sentiments can be found 
throughout human history,65 but as a self-aware or self-identifying movement 
its origin is linked primarily to working class organisation in nineteenth 
century Europe alongside Marxism and other forms of communism. The first 
explicitly anarchist writings, as far as Eltzbacher’s canon is concerned, are 
those of William Godwin, particularly his  Enquiry Concerning Political Justice 
(1793). The Enquiry outlined a division between human society and the state, 
arguing for the abolishment of the latter. However, Godwin decidedly did not 
support the idea of a revolutionary vanguard, as: 
Either the people are unenlightened and unprepared for the state of 
freedom and then the struggle and the consequence of the struggle will 
be truly perilous; or the progress of political knowledge among them is 
decisive, and then everyone will see how futile and short lived will be the 
attempt to hold them in subjugation.66 
Anarchism did not gain popularity until another theorist took up a central 
role in working class organising – the ‘father of anarchism’, Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon. Proudhon, heavily involved in the worker’s movements of the 19th 
century and the French Revolution, expanded on anarchist philosophy, 
coining still popular slogans such as ‘Property is Theft’ and ‘Anarchy is 
Order’. The list continues with Proudhon’s contemporary Mikhail Bakunin 
and later Peter Kropotkin, whose contributions developed anarchism as a 
rational political theory reliant on mutual cooperation and voluntary social 
structures. It is worth also mentioning a few of the countless women who 
were involved in producing anarchist theory. Emma Goldman was one of the 
first to incorporate gender into anarchist politics and contributed to militant 
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action and anti-prison theory. Her colleague Voltairine de Cleyre advocated 
for unity among anarchists in the form of ‘anarchism without adjectives’. 
By tracing the story of the anarchist canon, Kinna and Evren argue that the 
tradition of anarchism derived from these movements and texts still 
resonates, and more, has never been divorced from anarchist practices, 
propaganda or informal writings. Evren elaborates further in his doctoral 
dissertation: by asking ‘how to tell the story of the anarchist past’ he aims to 
show the problems in the currently dominant historicisation of anarchism. He 
shows that it is not enough to merely expand the canon to include theorists 
who have not been included previously.67 We might need to take a lesson 
from Foucault and consider whether the process of canonisation might in 
itself have oppressive or detrimental effects on the anarchist movement. 
The postanarchist thinkers have a complex relationship to this notion of 
canon. Saul Newman portrays postanarchism as moving beyond ‘classical’ 
anarchism, which he holds to correspond more or less to the canonised 
version of anarchism critiqued by Kinna and Evren. The composition of 
postanarchism as a field itself, however, remains unclear. The history of the 
label ‘postanarchist’ is divorced from many other attempts to combine 
poststructuralist insights with anarchism, most of which we might consider 
part of the same broad project. Rather than attempt our own canonisation of 
poststructuralist anarchist ideas, I have chosen to engage primarily with those 
authors who are explicitly engaged with the philosophical questions this 
dissertation is interested in.68 The definition of anarchism we will start with, 
then, is one that is simultaneously broad and specific – anarchism as specific 
practices and ways of relating that are historically contingent and yet their 
genealogy is traceable. However, as we build on our understanding of 
anarchism, this definition will come back under scrutiny and be reformulated.  
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1.3 (Post)anarchist ethics 
The argument contained in the rest of the chapter proceeds through three 
stages. First, I explore the postanarchist rejection of ‘classical’ anarchist 
metaphysics. This rejection is largely based on the poststructuralist critique of 
essentialism, universal morality and representation. Even though their 
reading of ‘classical’ anarchism is somewhat reductive, I argue that their 
critique is still valid. Poststructuralists have managed to sufficiently 
problematise essentialism and universalist postulates, which therefore 
stipulates conditions that need to be met by any future anarchist ethical 
theories. 
Secondly, I contend that this rejection has had the effect of (or has been part of 
a move to) shift away from metaphysics into epistemology. By rejecting the 
ontologies of ‘classical’ anarchism, postanarchist authors have become 
reluctant to explore their own metaphysical assumptions. This is part of a 
larger trend in political theory towards ‘weak’ ontologies. However, rather 
than solving the problems posed by essentialism and universals, this trend 
results in a lack of explicit engagement with metaphysics. Subsequently, I 
argue that this lack of engagement is detrimental for politics and ethics 
because without metaphysics we cannot make a critical analysis of the 
conditions by which we can understand our present situation. 
Finally, I defend the claim that the epistemological problems of essentialism, 
representation and universal postulates emerge as a result of transcendent 
metaphysics. Moreover, I propose that the solution of these problems is not a 
critique of their symptoms but the formulation of a metaphysics of 
immanence. The original contribution to knowledge of this thesis is, therefore, 
to provide and defend such metaphysics utilising the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze and his collaborative works with Guattari and thus to suggest a 
specifically anarchist form of immanent ethics. 
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1.3.1 Stage 1: Postanarchist epistemology 
This section outlines the main features of postanarchism. It starts by setting it 
in the historical context of the movement, as well as outlining the theory it 
responds to. I then draw out the postanarchist critique of ‘classical’ 
anarchism, the rejection of ontological foundations such as essentialism, 
universal ethics or representation. Finally, I present the first major part of the 
thesis’ argument by claiming that postanarchism has not sufficiently 
established an ontological grounding that satisfies the conditions for non-
essentialist, non-universal and non-representative politics/ethics. This is part 
of a general trend in political philosophy, often exemplified by the division 
between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ ontologies. Weak ontologies, such as 
postanarchism, tend to provide an epistemological critique without engaging 
with ontological questions. Frequently, this is in an attempt to reject ‘strong’ 
ontological foundations of universalism or essentialism. I argue that even 
though the postanarchist critique of ‘classical’ anarchism is valid, without an 
explicit engagement with ontology anarchist ethics lack a normative ground 
on which to reject a politics of ‘anything goes’. Furthermore, I argue that the 
implicit ontological claims found in postanarchist texts are problematic 
because they do not necessarily contribute to the type of politics 
postanarchists have argued for. 
The context of postanarchism 
Even though some postanarchists claim a direct connection with the activist 
practices of the 1990s and 2000s, especially around Seattle, it is difficult to 
pinpoint the precise impetus behind the development of postanarchist theory. 
Most of its main proponents saw it as responding to the need to update 
‘classical’ anarchist theory, a feeling that was growing even before the new 
alliances of Seattle had taken to the streets. Hakim Bey’s highly controversial 
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1987 essay ‘Post-Anarchism Anarchy’69 paved the way with claims about the 
“staleness” of the anarchist movement, its inability to relate to other anti-
authoritarian struggles and its reliance on stiff and rigid doctrines that didn’t 
correspond to then-contemporary practices: 
Like Sinbad & the Horrible Old Man, anarchism staggers around with 
the corpse of a Martyr magically stuck to its shoulders . . . Between tragic 
Past & impossible Future, anarchism seems to lack a Present.70 
This critique of old methods was developed by Bey into a new type of 
activism, a variety of personal revolts, under the names of ‘ontological 
anarchism’, chaos, postanarchism anarchy among others. The style of the 
essay is polemical, but also highly artistic, adopting poetic language, a sort of 
embodied creative political statement.  
This need to move beyond the stale debates that dominated anarchism and 
the critique of ‘classical’ anarchism was subsequently taken up by other 
postanarchists. Most notably in the Anglo-American context were Todd May, 
Simon Critchley and Saul Newman, who attempted to develop its 
foundations as well as offer a new direction for anarchist organising. Though 
their aims differed in many ways, in effect they were grouped together under 
the mantle ‘postanarchism’ because of their proximity to radical politics, but 
also their attempts to rework the foundations of such forms of resistance. 
Eventually, they also became a target of the same critique. The works of these 
three authors in particular have been widely contested due to a perceived 
misrepresentation and/or lack of acknowledgment of the ‘classical’ anarchist 
tradition. Here I am referring to the number of anarchist theorists who have 
convincingly argued that these postanarchists tend to reduce the anarchist 
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tradition to their preferred straw-man.71 Simon Critchley, for example, seems 
to largely ignore a good deal of the philosophical and practical tradition of 
anarchism when he uses the term. Infinitely Demanding met with criticism 
that, although it is possible to reach anti-authoritarian egalitarian conclusions 
through many different lines of thought, as Critchley does with Levinas and 
Badiou, to then label them ‘anarchic’ without further reflection on that 
tradition is to reinforce the philosophical ignorance towards anarchism as a 
specific political tradition.72 
Similarly, the main criticism Newman faced for From Bakunin to Lacan, which 
he tried to address in his later book Politics of Postanarchism, centred on his 
reading of ‘classical’ anarchism. Newman’s presentation of classical 
anarchism based on a benevolent view of human nature has been forcefully 
disputed by a number of theorists claiming that, on the contrary, some 
‘classical’ anarchist theorists in fact adopt a (limited) social constructivist view 
by perceiving different ways humans relate to the world and seeing 
subjectivity as a blank canvas upon which society draws.73 Indeed, by 
introducing this context, critics of Newman claim that Kropotkin’s view of 
subjectivity opens up the possibilities of ethical self-determination rather than 
limiting them, since his view was a rejection of the essentialist Darwinist 
position that competition and survival should be the driving forces 
organising society. This view of the anarchist project construes cooperation 
and competition as two tendencies among many on which to build human 
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relations and societies.74 As Newman’s reading fails to acknowledge this and 
stands accused of contrasting postanarchism with a falsely essentialised 
classical anarchism, it seems to some critics that the whole of Newman’s 
project is rendered redundant.75 
Even though I agree with Newman’s critics that many of the works of 
‘classical’ anarchism do not necessarily succumb to Newman’s identification 
of essentialism (for example, the work of Kropotkin or Goldman), this 
discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. For our purposes it will suffice to 
acknowledge the debate but not follow Cohn, Wilbur and others in 
dismissing postanarchism. For me, what is significant about the postanarchist 
project is that it introduces a poststructuralist framework and critique that 
anarchists cannot ignore if they are to continue being actors in the struggle 
against oppression. In this context, whether Newman has accurately depicted 
the form of anarchism he is departing from is neither here nor there and, as 
we see in 1.3.3, the critique of transcendence further reinforces these 
arguments. 
Historically, postanarchist writings in the USA interrupted an anarchist-
activist milieu dominated by a disagreement between Zerzan and Bookchin 
on the future of anarchism. Zerzan, who advocated for primitivist anarchism 
through the abolishment of technology and human society as we know it,76 
and Bookchin, known for his social anarchism based on Kropotkin, are two 
authors with prominent places in contemporary anarchist theory. Despite 
their differences, however, both have expressed strong feelings towards 
poststructuralist (or postmodern) versions of anarchist politics, dismissing 
them as shaky foundations on which to build a new society. Bookchin, for 
example, famously condemned ‘lifestyle anarchism’ that only feigns political 
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action, a philosophy that he argues produces nihilism and hopelessness. His 
main fear is that these individualistic tendencies are “antithetical to the 
development of serious organizations, a radical politics, a committed social 
movement, theoretical coherence and programmatic relevance.”77 
Arriving in this Anglo-American context, Newman’s From Bakunin to Lacan 
attempted to give fresh blood to anarchism studies by reflecting on the new 
type of political action that activists were doing on the streets. Primitivism 
and social anarchism, important strands as they are, do not take as central a 
place in this contemporary radical practice as intersectional, more inclusive 
and fragmented affinity structures have – ones which don’t necessarily 
identify with Marxism or anarchism as theoretical positions (probably partly 
because of their rigidity and inability to keep up with praxis). Newman’s 
work is an attempt to bridge the gap between these contemporary radical 
movements that seem to incorporate poststructuralist theory with anarchist 
theory through a variety of practices. Regardless of whether or not From 
Bakunin to Lacan offers a comprehensive view of classical anarchism, it 
successfully manages to show that an essentialised view of human nature is 
destructive for anarchism and a more poststructuralist approach could benefit 
anarchists. Perhaps, then, it becomes unnecessary to label ‘classic’ and ‘post-‘ 
anarchism as two completely separate theories, a question Newman seems to 
be more aware of in Politics of Postanarchism, where he actively tries to trace 
the continuity between Bakunin, Kropotkin, Godwin and his own theoretical 
works.  
Thus, regardless of whether ‘classical’ anarchism was entirely guilty of the 
charges presented by postanarchists, the epistemological concerns they raised 
were both timely and valid. If, in ‘classical’ anarchism, ethics needed to 
respond to the challenge of social Darwinist competition and a reconciliation 
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of means and ends,78 contemporary anarchist ethics have identified a new set 
of challenges. Problematising the ontological foundations of deontology, 
consequentialism and ‘classical’ anarchist ethical positions, Newman, 
Critchley, May, Call and Koch, among others, have tried to show that ethics 
based on a universal telos or universal authority can result in oppression and 
inequality. This critique of universalism is now an unavoidable question 
when considering anarchist ethics as we will address later. Even critics of 
postanarchism such as Benjamin Franks are mostly united in their agreement 
that deontology and consequentialism do not fit with anarchist values. 
Around the same time as Todd May was writing the seminal Political 
Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism in 1994, Andrew Koch wrote 
‘Poststructuralism and the Epistemological Basis of Anarchism,’79 in which he 
argued that “a new theory of anarchism cannot be based on the ontological 
assumptions contained within the classical anarchist literature.”80 Koch’s 
argument rests on three critiques: a critique of representation, of human 
nature and of universal truths, all of which he extends to ontology itself: 
“Post-structuralism challenges the idea that it is possible to create a stable 
ontological foundation for the creation of universal statements about human 
nature.”81 
Koch explores the ‘classical’ anarchist metaphysical foundations of Godwin, 
Kropotkin and Proudhon, finding common threads in the way they have 
constructed the philosophical grounds of anarchism. The ontological claims 
rejected by Koch, and later other postanarchists, revolve around the validity 
of representation and the status of universal ‘truths’, thereby also rejecting the 
legitimacy of representative democracy or state power and exposing their 
contingency. This provides the grounds for a critique of the state rather than 
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an ontological understanding of human beings as benign and cooperative – 
what Koch calls an epistemological defence of anarchism, one that “questions 
the processes out of which a ‘characterization’ of the individual occurs.”82 
Thus, Koch’s fundamental move is to reject ontologies that rely on the a priori 
of epistemological perspectives. In other words, any given ontological 
position is always already based on a particular epistemological orientation, 
implying that there is no starting premise which is not representative of one’s 
own subjective understanding of the world. 
To draw out the similarities among the postanarchists further, this reluctance 
towards ontological questions is traceable in Lewis Call’s works, as well as 
Richard Day’s and Todd May’s. Both Koch and Call reject classical anarchist 
ontology on the basis of it being always representative, as does May also 
through his critique of traditional Marxism. May introduces a division 
between tactical and strategic political philosophy. Marxism, an example of 
the ‘strategic’ mode of thinking, carries a view of distribution of power that 
relies on representative ontology.83 This epistemological position is 
juxtaposed with ‘tactical’ political philosophy (including that of the 
poststructuralists), which instead carries a view of “power as decentralised, 
the sites of oppression as numerous and intersecting,”84 and is best 
exemplified in the works of Foucault, Deleuze and Lyotard. Anarchism, May 
continues, sits ambivalently between the two because it has a more 
decentralised view of power but at the same time relies on an essentialist 
understanding of human nature.85 
This leads May to emphatically reject “the type of philosophical and political 
perspective”86 out of which strategic philosophies emerge and embrace 
tactical political theory in a form of politics that is not grounded on all-
encompassing stable metaphysics. This could be seen as the root of May’s 
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problem in the final chapter where he struggles to find the foundation of 
ethical action, asking the question “can [poststructuralist discourse] be 
ethically grounded?”87 May does not seem to be able to sufficiently answer 
that question and ends up suggesting a form of rational-universalist ethics 
completely at odds with his own analysis and his affinity with 
poststructuralism. We shall look into his critique in more detail later. 
In a similar vein, Saul Newman rejects ontologies based on 
human essence, a certain view of historical development (whether 
dialectical, materialist or evolutionary) and a rationalist vision of social 
relations – which were seen to be part of a natural order outside the 
world of power.88 
‘Classical’ anarchists, he claims, are guilty of these and he instead opts to start 
his analysis from a position of anarchy, rather than end with it.89 He follows 
Todd May’s account to the point of recognising the importance of difference 
for poststructuralists and claims that postanarchist ethics need to be based not 
on a spurious notion of human essence or rationality, but on constant 
questioning, a “refusal to accept anything on its own terms.”90 Rather than a 
morally-authentic self – a notion of the self dialectically subordinated to 
universal moral and rational laws – he posits the idea of the self being 
ethically authentic, precisely through the questioning of this very idea of 
authenticity. This latter interpretation implies an identity that is “structurally 
open, contingent, and morally-autonomous,”91 and instead of grounding itself 
in essential human identities it is based on an empty signifier that is open to a 
multitude of struggles.92 We shall return to Saul Newman’s ontological 
foundations later, along with Simon Critchley’s, but for now it is enough to 
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acknowledge that the imperative to reject universalism and essential identity 
categories is also a central premise of his work. 
Given these points, it is evident that by rejecting the metaphysical 
foundations of ‘classical’ anarchism, postanarchism attempts to constitute a 
radical break with other anarchist conceptualisations of ethics. Whilst their 
use of poststructuralism has lead them to question universal statements about 
human nature, this is the point at which I side with Duane Rouselle to claim 
that “post-anarchism is the realization of traditional anarchist meta-ethics . . . 
but it is an incomplete project insofar as it has focused only on the 
epistemological dimension of meta-ethics.”93 Indeed, Rouselle takes Koch’s 
argument to show that postanarchists have been unable to conceive of the 
possibility of an ontology that is neither representative nor essentialist, thus 
never explicitly engaging with ontological questions of their own.94  
This problem is indicative of a larger trend in political studies which is not 
only applicable to postanarchist theory. As Nathan Widder remarks, political 
theory of the ‘60s and ‘70s sought to avoid ontological discussions about the 
nature of human beings, politics and society and instead used two main 
strategies to minimise reliance on metaphysics: a minimalist conception of the 
self and the use of generally accepted ‘common knowledge’ statements as a 
starting point.95 The ontological turn in political theory in the 1980s rejected 
this dominant normative bias and turned towards Nietzsche-inspired 
theorists for alternative metaphysics, resulting in a split of ‘weak’ versus 
‘strong’ ontologies by the 1990s. Motivated by the “dissatisfaction with both 
mainstream theory’s ‘disengaged subject’ (the subject of Rawl’s original 
position) and the relativism that seems to follow from this subject’s 
deconstruction,”96 weak ontologies were designed to both affirm ethico-
political positions and avoid recourse to universal metaphysical statements 
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about the world. They acknowledge that an ontological foundation is needed, 
but at the same time make explicit the contestability of their own ontological 
assumptions through practices of self-reflexivity and disclaimers about the 
normativity of their suggestions. Strong ontologies, on the other hand, rely on 
metaphysics grounded on an external principle and produce a strong ethical 
commitment to a normative set of ideals.  
At the core of this division between weak and strong ontology is a deeper 
philosophical disagreement, which Levi Bryant calls ‘the problem of 
hegemony of epistemology’. The crux of his argument is that there are two 
opposing poles in philosophy, based upon different starting presuppositions 
around the division between nature and culture, which also correspond to 
subject/object. Epistemological realists are concerned with producing 
knowledge that represents the world as accurately as possible – the most 
accurate mirror of reality. This was, in a way, the goal of the Enlightenment 
project – discovering the true nature of a world which is objective and not 
biased by cultures, societies, religion, etc. The anti-realists, on the other hand, 
would argue that representation falls entirely within the domain of the subject 
and there are no criteria by which we can determine if representation is 
accurate or merely a product of our imagination. This constructivist position 
also leads to an understanding of truth as residing in the shared 
representation itself rather than a direct correspondence between 
representation and reality.97 The result of these two approaches, Bryant 
argues, is that the question of the nature of objects, of what they are 
(ontology), becomes a question of how we know objects (epistemology).98 
Moreover, the question of how we know things, he claims, has long been 
dominated by representation as the primary relationship between the mind 
and what is outside of it.99 Thus, the division between the two different types 
of political theory becomes a division on the nature of truth, and more 
                                                
97 ibid., pp. 14-16. 
98 ibid., p. 16. 
99 L. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, Open Humanities Press, London, 2011, pp. 13-14.  
36 
 
specifically, whether it is possible to ever reach a shared, universal truth. 
That this disagreement about universal shared reality becomes a problem for 
ethics is famously exemplified by the debate between Michael Foucault and 
Jurgen Habermas.100 Foucault, along with other poststructuralists, was 
subjected to criticism from several critical theorists, most notably Habermas 
and Fraser, for never explicitly articulating his ethical position, thereby 
creating the impression that he did not consider it to be present in his work. 
Subsequently, this lack of an ethical position or commitment to a specific type 
of ethics was branded a ‘crypto-normative’ ethical position in itself. As 
Habermas points out, in order to make evaluative judgments about social 
conditions and act on these analyses we must seek a recourse to a stronger 
normative theory which lays out clear goals against which our practice can be 
evaluated.101 Foucault’s genealogical method, he tells us, is guilty of rejecting 
the possibility for such a space where politics is grounded, thus creating a 
performative contradiction: 
Genealogical historiography emerges from its cocoon as precisely the 
presentistic, relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science that it does not 
want to be… it follows the movement of a radically historicist extinction 
of the subject and ends up in an unholy subjectivism.102 
The Habermasian critique, in this sense, takes the side of ‘strong’ ontologies 
by discerning that Foucault in particular – and poststructuralism in general – 
provides an epistemological critique based on (dangerously) ‘relativist’ ethics 
since they reject any possibility for ‘objective’ truth. For Habermas, and later 
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May, this rejection precludes the possibility of any coherently grounded 
collective action.  
The crucial aspect of this critique for the argument proposed here is 
Habermas’ assumption that politics, and political action, can only be based on 
a unified, rational, modern subject, and that, therefore, subjectivism would be 
detrimental. Unfortunately, this is the assumption that also underpins Todd 
May’s Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism. On one hand, together 
with other poststructuralists, he embraces a critique of Modernity and its 
transcendent metaphysics, and on the other, he seems to hold objectivity and 
universal values to be necessary components of collective action. I argue that 
Habermas is right to claim that there is an implicit ethical position in 
poststructuralism103 and that this should not be taken lightly or sidestepped. 
However, I disagree with him about where this leads. As Braidotti puts it, 
“[t]he response to this challenge is neither the exaltation of neo-universalism, 
nor the retreat into relativism, but a neo-materialist discursive ethics based on 
non-unitary subjectivity. Poststructuralist philosophers provide such a 
response.”104 In other words, the initial formulations of postanarchist ethics 
and their rejection of Enlightenment-based approaches fall prey to the general 
critiques directed towards poststructuralism. Rather than embracing and 
constructing new forms of metaphysics which are compatible with the 
postanarchist project, Koch and May opt to minimise any engagement with 
questions of ontology. 
While Widder is critical of the binary categorisation into weak and strong 
ontologies, calling it ‘forced’ and reductive,105 he is right to identify that 
certain strands of political theory have sought to redefine their foundations in 
such a way that they avoid dogmatism, grand narratives and are open to 
fallibility. This redefinition is correctly taken to be an anti-metaphysical 
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one.106 In this example, Habermas’ position rests on a firm metaphysical 
foundation, while postanarchism could be seen as one of the ‘weak’ 
ontologies, occupying a middle ground between stable universalism and 
poststructuralism. By refusing to draw a direct connection between its 
ontological claims and the moral/political principles that could be derived 
from them, postanarchist theory rejects metaphysics (in the traditional sense) 
which is seen to lead inevitably to dogmatism. 
The position of this thesis is that, on the contrary, metaphysics is a crucial 
aspect of anarchist politics. More specifically, I claim that it is possible to have 
our (metaphysical) cake and eat it. I argue that all political positions imply a 
certain view about the nature of reality – the belief that issues such as 
equality, freedom or solidarity ‘matter’ contains an ontological claim, rather 
than a ‘purely’ ethical one. It is the subject’s position in relation to everything 
else that produces these beliefs. The question of what we take to be real and 
important becomes a significant political question. Thus, ethics and 
metaphysics are not two separate lines of inquiry, applicable to two 
discernible spheres of human life, but part of a continuum. Anarchism, as the 
multi-layered struggle we defined, brings with it a particular type (or types) 
of understanding of the world, effectively resulting in the selection of 
particular (political) issues and problems we deem important. The main 
difficulty stemming from the anarchist need for metaphysics draws on two 
main postulates, which are explored in the rest of the chapter. On one hand, 
by taking seriously the critique of essentialism, representation and 
universalism presented by postanarchists, it becomes impossible to ground 
political action in human nature or representative democracy. On the other 
hand, without problematisation of its own metaphysical assumptions, 
postanarchist theory cannot make a critical analysis of the conditions by 
which we can understand our present situation, or the conditions for change. 
Thus, crucially, what is needed is a particular type of metaphysics which does 
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not lead to dogmatism and is able to constantly problematise its own limits by 
producing an ethical practice without creating an ‘anything goes’ situation. In 
other words, a metaphysics that is simultaneously ‘strong’, but also responds 
to the challenges raised by the ‘weak’ ontologies. 
Before moving on to expand these points, let us briefly recapitulate. I started 
this argument with the claim that postanarchism rejects classical anarchist 
ontology based on a poststructuralist critique of human nature and the 
universal rational subject. Despite their (mis)representation of anarchist 
theory, this remains a valid position, which we need to take seriously in 
future radical politics. Moreover, we built on this statement with the 
argument that postanarchists have largely focused on epistemological 
problems due to their inability to conceive of non-representational, non-
essentialist metaphysics. This was situated in the larger contexts of political 
theory and philosophy and exemplified in relation to ethics with the 
Foucault-Habermas debate. Finally, I put forward the claim that this question 
of metaphysics needs to be addressed if we are to understand the possibility 
for ethical action that is neither dogmatic, nor relativist. Not engaging with 
the foundations of postanarchist theory does not simply result in a lack of 
metaphysics, but in a lack of their problematisation. 
The postanarchist meta-ethical critique 
In this rest of this section we will explore the three main authors of 
postanarchism in more detail. The aim is twofold. First, I present the 
postanarchist critique of ‘classical’ anarchist ethics in more detail, more 
specifically their critique of meta-ethical foundations. I argue that the 
problems of essentialism, universal ethical claims and representation do 
indeed need to be taken into consideration in radical anarchist politics. Thus, I 
aim to analyse in depth the problems postanarchist literature sets out to solve 
in relation to ethics. Secondly, I present the implicit metaphysical 
assumptions underlying the type of politics postanarchists argue for. I am 
looking at the main ontological conditions that post-anarchists rely on for 
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their new understanding of ethics – ethics that are non-essentialist, non-
universalist and anti-representational. I draw out some similarities and 
differences between their theories and briefly outline some postanarchist 
conceptualisations of ethical subjectivity.  
In doing this, we address the two main statements of the argument above, 
namely the validity of the postanarchist critique of ‘classical’ anarchism, and 
the claim that metaphysical assumptions underpin the postanarchist political 
project. This section utilises narratives that have emerged from postanarchist 
writings in the last twenty years. For this reason, the chapter focuses on three 
postanarchist writers in depth but also considers various others. Todd May, 
Saul Newman and Simon Critchley are the three figures most strongly 
associated with the theory of postanarchism, though people such as Hakim 
Bey, Süreyyya Evren, Lewis Call, Bob Black, Jamie Heckert and Duane 
Rouselle have also had a finger in the postanarchist potluck. My interest in 
the first three is their engagement with ethics, specifically the problems they 
identify with ‘classical’ anarchist ethics and the solutions they propose. The 
meta-narrative that these men have created about anarchist ethics will serve 
as a starting point for the second part of my argument, leading us to identify 
transcendent metaphysics as the root of the problems posed by 
postanarchists. Methodologically, this first section will attempt to flesh out 
the problems postanarchists identify with ‘classical’ anarchism, and the set of 
premises postanarchist ethics need to fulfil in order to avoid these problems. 
Non-essentialist ethical subjectivity 
Hakim Bey’s demand to ‘update’ anarchism and bring it closer to the streets 
was one of the earliest battle cries of the new turn in anarchism, but Todd 
May was the first one to properly take up the task of theorising the 
connections between anarchism and poststructuralism. The Political Philosophy 
of Poststructuralist Anarchism is written from a poststructuralist perspective 
and is explicitly concerned with postanarchist ethics. Laying a path that other 
postanarchist theorists would later follow, May leads with an analysis of 
41 
 
Marxism and its decline following the failure of national communist 
experiments in the twentieth century. In light of the end of the Soviet Union 
this was, of course, a heated subject and as much as anarchists could wag 
their finger and shout “I told you so,” it was a dark time for the whole left 
spectrum. However, May’s aim with this opening discussion is not to rub salt 
into the wound, but to distinguish Marxism as a ‘strategic’ political 
philosophy, which sees power centralised in the state and capitalism, and 
eventually the proletariat, while conceptualising anarchism as a ‘tactical’ 
philosophy that identifies various loci of power in society.107 
On this basis, the book draws a parallel between several ethical principals in 
poststructuralism and notes their similarities with anarchist thought.108 May 
begins by identifying several problems with classical anarchism, making a 
point that most postanarchists will repeat later: many anarchist theorists 
assume the existence of an innately good human nature that will support a 
society of mutual aid and cooperation if humans can be liberated from 
oppressive structures of power. This view is mostly based on the works of 
Kropotkin and Bakunin and is taken to provide an ethical basis for the 
anarchist project, liberating a repressed human essence.109 
However, as May is concerned to show, in the light of the poststructuralist 
critique of human nature, it seems that anarchists cannot rely on essence to 
provide the foundation for ethics any more. Colin Ward, for example, is one 
of the anarchists who recognised this problem by calling for fragmented, 
decentralised networks as a mode of organising society, together with Emma 
Goldman who followed Nietzsche in calling for a re-valuation of values.110 
May terms the issue of human nature and the assumption that power is 
suppressive the ‘a priori’ of anarchist thought, a problem that haunts it but is 
not derived from an analysis of political situations. Instead, May sees the pair 
                                                
107 T. May, Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, p. 36. 
108 ibid., p. 130. 
109 ibid., p. 34. 
110 ibid., p. 35.  
42 
 
of assumptions as hampering anarchism by imposing themselves from the 
outside, rather than being needed or derived from within.111  
About ten years later a similar thought informed Saul Newman’s initial 
writings on postanarchism. Anarchist theory, he claims, relies on a set of 
philosophical premises that have been undermined by poststructuralism. 
Newman’s From Bakunin to Lacan presents the narrative of a ‘classical’ 
anarchism which does not fit with contemporary activist practices, thereby 
setting the task of reinventing anarchism through the insights of 
poststructuralism. Newman’s argument, mostly articulated in the second 
chapter of the book, is that ‘classical’ anarchism offers an essentialised, 
authoritative foundation that does not appeal to contemporary radical 
movements. This morality, he claims, “has its basis in human nature, not in 
any external source.”112 
Based on a reading of Kropotkin and Bakunin, Newman claims that ‘classical’ 
anarchists saw the individual as a pure being that has been contaminated by 
power. The purpose of the anarchist political agenda was therefore to resist 
that power from a position outside of it and restore the oppressed human 
subjectivity to its rightful state.113 However, Newman alerts us that there is a 
trap contained in this position, namely that essentialist notions of human 
nature could be the basis of reproducing domination, as seems to be the case 
with Marxism.114 
One major difference between Marxism and anarchism, he claims, is that in 
anarchism both the means and the ends need to be libertarian, leading to a 
specific type of prefigurative politics.115 This need arises from the tension of 
using authoritarian means to achieve revolutionary goals, which would carry 
an untenably high risk of leading to an authoritarian, hierarchical structure in 
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any future society. Newman advocates for an anarchism which is aware of 
this trap and rejects essentialism in favour of a Foucauldian conception of 
power and post-colonial and feminist discourses on human subjectivity. It is 
important for him that this should not lead to nihilism and an inability to 
structure resistance, but instead to the formulation of a new place ‘outside of 
power’ which allows for a non-essentialist notion of the outside.116 
The argument that ‘classical’ anarchist thought relies on an essential, benign 
human nature has, as mentioned previously, been criticised and rejected. 
Regardless of whether Kropotkin and Bakunin’s view of subjectivity was 
indeed irrevocably essentialist (exploring this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis), exposing human nature as a set of contingent, socially constructed 
practices is at the heart of the poststructuralist project. Both Foucault’s 
explorations of power and Deleuze’s concept of individuation problematise 
the idea that there even is such an entity we could recognise as ‘self’. 
Furthermore, feminist and intersectional approaches compel us to 
acknowledge the ways gender, race and class cannot be separated from the 
production of social bodies as always already gendered, racialised and class-
bound, scrutinising the attribution of essentialist characteristics to these 
bodies. In this sense, postanarchists are in good company with their critique 
of essentialism. However, if benign human nature is no longer to be a stable 
foundation for anarchist ethics, what kind of conceptualisation of human 
subjectivity is required for radical (anarchist) action?  
Constructing an ethical subjectivity that does not rely on an essentialist 
understanding of human nature and simultaneously serves as the basis for 
political action has been the main task of Simon’s Critchley postanarchist 
project. Infinitely Demanding is primarily focused on exploring possibilities for 
both universally applicable and contextually particular ethics. The book 
focuses on the problem of ethics as a political concept, divided into two 
aspects: meta-ethics, or the theory surrounding ethics, and normative ethics, 
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which refers to the application of ethical rules. The central question of his 
book concerns the impetus to act politically, the motivation behind ethical 
subjectivity. Critchley opens his argument by presenting the ‘problem of 
disappointment’ and the active and passive nihilisms it produces. Passive 
nihilism, stemming from disappointment in modernist humanism, is the 
belief that no one can change anything and is translated into practices for 
“discovering the inner child, manipulating pyramids, writing pessimistic-
sounding literary essays, taking up yoga, bird-watching or botany.”117 The 
active nihilist, on the other hand, departs from the same moment of 
disappointment, but instead focuses on destroying the world and creating a 
new one, believing that the fault is with current political institutions, rather 
than the political order itself. It emerges in the agendas of various political 
and terrorist groups, with al-Qaeda as its zenith. Infinitely Demanding tries to 
conceptualise an ethical experience that avoids these two extremes through a 
framework of ethical subjectivity based on infinite demands. 
Critchley makes three concepts central in his quest: Badiou’s fidelity to the 
event, which Critchley links to the concept of commitment, Logstrup’s 
formulation of the ethical demand as unfulfillable, radical and one-sided, and 
Levinas’s idea that “the unfulfillability of the ethical demand is internal to 
subjectivity,”118 defining ethical subjectivity through a constant demand that 
cannot be met. To spice things up, Critchley also adds a bit of Lacan with his 
notion of trauma and claims that the ethical subject is always divided 
between itself and an infinite demand that it cannot meet, simultaneously 
producing the subject as it is and dividing it. Critchley’s formulation begins 
with a meta-ethical discussion of the process through which the subject 
commits itself to a specific framework of good and bad based on its approval 
or rejection of a demand – what Critchley calls ‘ethical experience’. He makes 
an interesting point here, differentiating between ethical and factual 
statements. An ethical statement always calls for approval, while a factual one 
                                                
117 S. Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance, Verso, London, 2014, p. 4. 
118 ibid., p. 10. 
45 
 
supposedly presents only empirical information. He describes how a fact can 
also contain an implicit ethical demand, for example in the statement “The 
bomb is going to explode.” However, he doesn’t elaborate on this claim. His 
focus remains the way ethical experience structures subjectivity in a constant 
process of demand and approval. Critchley sees this as a circular pattern 
where both the demand and the creation of the subject are internal, and the 
demand requires an action from the subject which is constituted through the 
act of granting approval. The first chapter ends with a discussion on Kantian 
ethics and their hegemony in the study of ethics when it comes to the impetus 
for political actions. This hegemony can be traced through Kant to Fichte, 
Marx and Heidegger in the form of what Critchley calls ‘autonomy 
orthodoxy’. Here, the experience of an ethical demand is always divided into 
internal and external, with priority given to the internal as the individual 
appropriates an external demand. This results in experiencing moral claims 
‘as externally compulsory, but not internally compelling’.119 
The main problem with Kantian ethics, Critchley claims, is that they are 
supposedly universal but need to be equally relevant for particular situations. 
Therefore, the ethical demand seems to arrive externally as a fact placed upon 
an already-constituted subject. In an attempt to resolve this without falling 
into relativism, Critchley introduces an aspect of the ethical demand called 
‘situated universality’.120 The ethical demand, following Badiou’s reading of 
Levinas, is both contextual (or singular) and universal, being a direct response 
to a specific context with claims to be applicable universally. In practice, this 
is exemplified by an individual reacting to an event, let’s say a murder. The 
ethical demand for action is not reducible to only one individual, only one 
murder or only a specific place. The demand is thus, in principle, universal. 
Critchley goes on to introduce more of Badiou’s philosophy to conceptualise 
his idea of ethical subjectivity and the way it is constituted. Similarly to 
Nietzsche, Badiou sees ethics as active and not reactive – the commitment to 
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ethics already exists when the demand is issued. However, that does not 
imply that ethics are general; on the contrary, they are only ethics of 
processes. Thus, the concept of commitment, or truths, becomes vital. Truths 
in Badiou’s terms are ‘durable non-relativistic maxims’ that are not scientific 
statements that can be tested, but rather refer to being true to something. In a 
confusing spiral of demand-subject-demand, the subject commits itself to an 
ethical framework which in fact cannot be based on a pre-given subject since 
the subject is always becoming and being called into existence by an event 
which takes the form of an ethical demand. Tracing this ethical subjectivity 
through a reading of Levinas and Badiou’s theories, Critchley introduces 
Logstrup’s ethical theology through the concept of ‘infiniteness’. An ethical 
demand, he claims, is infinite – it can never be fulfilled. It is the demand Jesus 
issued when he said “Love thy neighbour as thyself”, entrusting people with 
a radical demand that they could not possibly fulfil unless they happen to be 
a deity themselves. Regardless of where the demand comes from (a divine or 
non-divine source), Critchley chooses to focus on the fact that this demand is 
unfulfillable to anyone who is not God and therefore serves as a permanent 
drive to become more god-like, thus shaping our subjectivity. In addition, the 
unfulfillability of the demand produces a certain psychological trauma, as 
Critchley tries to show using Lacan. 
Critchley’s model of ethical subjectivity so far only sets the foundations of his 
argument without explaining how the divided, traumatised subject is actually 
motivated to commit to political actions. In chapter three, he introduces 
sublimation via humour as a means for moving away from the autonomy 
orthodoxy, where a heroic-tragic line of thought was dominant. Humour, in 
the form of self-irony, allows the super-ego to laugh at the subject and 
thereby take the unfulfillability of the demand not as a punishment, but as a 
self-reflective learning experience. In the last chapter, Critchley wraps up his 
argument by translating his ethical and meta-ethical theory into political 
practice. One of the most interesting points he makes is that not only is the 
revolutionary vanguard not the proletariat, but neither is it simply going to 
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appear ‘naturally’ as Marx might have thought, and can instead only be self-
consciously constructed as such.121 Taking an anti-statist political stance, 
Critchley advocates for a position that is distanced from the state, creating 
spaces that will allow for the construction of that political subject. With the 
infinitely demanding ethics he presents providing the motivation for political 
action, humour is seen as the anarchist model of resistance, with examples 
such as the WOMBLES and protesters in Seattle who use street theatre and 
performance to disrupt police oppression. Critchley ends on a positive note, 
with hopeful excitement about carnivalesque resistance practices.122 
The publication of Infinitely Demanding marked a shift in the thinking of a 
number of radical political theorists. Somewhat revising his views on 
essentialism ten years later in The Politics of Postanarchism, Newman addresses 
some of the criticisms of his first book with a more in-depth reading of classic 
anarchism and once again makes the argument for the relevance of 
postanarchism today and its differences with classic anarchism (including its 
contemporary advocates Zerzan and Bookchin). The primary task of this book 
is to theorise (anarchist) radical politics outside the state, or rather, beyond 
the state, and explore their place in the political world. The next section will 
briefly outline the changes in Newman’s views on ethical subjectivity and 
discuss it together with Simon Critchley’s as they both focus on the infinite 
demand of ethical subjectivity. 
In his usual polemical style, Newman strides forth with the claim that 
contemporary activism seems reluctant to commit itself to theories of classic 
anarchism, but at the same time adopts a kind of politics that resembles 
anarchist principles, at least from out of the corner of the eye. It rejects power 
and authority and challenges political and social institutions such as the state, 
patriarchy, etc. At the same time, it adopts various forms of action such as 
unionism, direct democracy and horizontal organising, practices ranging 
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across the whole left spectrum, as well as incorporating queer theory, post-
colonial theory and poststructuralist insights. For Newman these are some of 
the many reasons to call contemporary activist practice postanarchist. 
Newman’s book is entirely oriented towards providing a framework for 
understanding postanarchism and its practices, using authors such as 
Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri, Laclau and Mouffe, as well as 
anarchists like Zerzan and Bookchin. Similarly to Critchley, Newman tries to 
find the motivation behind political actions, focusing on the way the subject 
can overcome power and act in exteriority to it so as not to replicate its 
structures.123 For both of them, the problem of ethics seems to be the point of 
departure, and even though Newman is not committed to Levinas, he also 
conceives of postanarchist ethics based on an infinite demand to the other. 
However, in Politics of Postanarchism this demand is towards the state, not the 
individual, advocating for more and more changes in government policies so 
as to implicitly call into question its sovereignty. This position echoes  i ek’s 
critique of Critchley,124 emphasising the significance of the distance between 
the two postanarchists on this issue.125  
Moreover, Newman’s use of Levinas seems not to cohere with one of the 
main tenets of classic anarchism he wants to preserve, namely that of equal-
liberty, or Bakunin’s “I am free only when all human beings surrounding me . 
. . are equally free.”126 The Levinasian subject is not necessarily free or equal 
with the others, but could assume a martyr-like position towards authority 
and therefore negate some anarchist practices. The Levinasian ethical subject 
appears frequently in the ontologies of radical politics today, and we shall 
address them and my critique of them later on in the chapter. 
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Rejecting universalism 
The problem of essentialism that postanarchists have identified is, in some 
writings more explicit than others, inevitably bound up with the problems of 
moral universalism and moral relativism. We have seen how taking up the 
notion of essential human nature and making it a universal basis of ethics has 
been problematised, but this section will try to situate this problem in a 
broader framework.  
For much of what comes under ‘classical’ anarchism for Newman and the 
other postanarchists, an appeal to universal rules in ethics comes either in the 
form of deontological or consequentialist ethical frameworks.127 Both of these 
approaches have been problematised by other anarchists on the basis of either 
amoralism (in the form of acknowledging moral law exists but rejecting its 
binding power), or subjectivism, which is the line taken up by Newman. As 
Benjamin Franks has observed, the postanarchists identify and critique three 
forms of universalism as it appears within meta-ethics.128 These forms are: 
naturalism, a belief in objective standards fixed by nature; rationalism, the 
notion that universal rules can be identified with reason, as is the case with 
Kantian rationalism; and intuitionism, which is the conviction that universal 
moral rules are derived from a special sense or intuition. Dedicating a whole 
book to the topic, Newman is our first choice to exemplify the postanarchist 
critique. I quote at length: 
Universal political positions and strategies are seen as inherently 
authoritarian because they not only fail to confront more diffuse, hidden 
forms of domination – at the level of discourses, social practices and 
institutions – but also because they are based on essentialist conceptions 
of subjectivity and rationality, and they therefore deny perspectives and 
forms of subjectivity that do not fit into this paradigm.129 
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What Newman seems to be putting forward here is the idea that universal 
rules promote hierarchies of power and that, concomitantly, there is no 
epistemological basis on which these rules can be founded. Let us examine 
these two aspects in more detail. 
The fact that universalist forms of morality lead to hidden forms of power 
and are coercive has been recognised as a problem by anarchists as far back as 
the early rejections of religious (church) morality as oppressive. As Franks has 
observed, most anarchist arguments against morality boil down to two main 
objections. Firstly, some anarchists adopt an economic or social deterministic 
position, thus rejecting moral behaviour as means for achieving social change. 
Secondly, ethics/morality is often conceptualised as a tool of the upper 
classes to silence political resistance, exemplified by the phrase attributed to 
Brecht: “Bread first, then ethics.”130 The latter position is closely bound to the 
notion of universal ethics as hierarchical, while the former is arguably a 
complete rejection of morality. 
Secondly, there is a meta-ethical rejection of the foundation of universal 
ethics. Stemming from the critique of essentialism presented earlier, Newman 
draws on Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida to reject universal norms as 
“grounded in a particular epistemological and cultural paradigm.”131 He 
argues that, on one hand, the poststructuralist critique of human nature 
reveals the role of discourse as constitutive of the subject and therefore 
contingent, thus questioning the foundations of universalism. A similar 
critique is applied to reason or moral intuition as the universal grounding of 
ethics. As Newman argues, with Foucault, different social practices have their 
own discourses which are normalised to appear universal. Neither reason nor 
intuition are essential attributes of humans. On the other hand, he claims, “life 
in post-industrial societies is too complex, diverse and heterogenous to be 
explained within the rational and moral categories of the Enlightenment 
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paradigm, and that therefore these categories can no longer serve as the 
foundation for social and political consensus.”132 Thus, universal ethical 
frameworks are rejected on the basis of the lack of a legitimate foundation for 
their universality and because they fail to describe the complexity of 
contemporary life. 
This rejection of coercive universal morality is solved by Newman through 
establishing a distinction between ethics and morality. Morality is taken to 
refer to a strict normative code which is applied (universally) without 
question and therefore has the greater potential to be oppressive, while ethics 
refers to recommendations or blueprints for praxis along certain lines or 
principles. The postanarchist contribution, then, is to return ethics, instead of 
morality, to the forefront of political thought. These emerge in Newman’s 
claims that anarchism is first and foremost an ethical position and Critchley’s 
paraphrasing of Kant that “ethics without politics is blind.”133 
To exemplify this point, Saul Newman’s position is a good starting place. He 
claims that there are ethical limits to what we can and should do regarding 
oppressive behaviours. Ethics is supposed to provide a method for discerning 
which political actions are justifiable.134 However, he is against an ethical limit 
“imposed from a metaphysical place that transcends discourse”135 and instead 
calls for embracing uncertainty and instability. Morality, conversely, forces 
the individual to conform to a particular identity, thus eliminating any trace 
of difference and otherness. The motivation behind this differentiation is to 
construct ethics that are not coercive, but instead serve as a blueprint for 
action. Newman contends that such ethics still need a foundation of 
rationality but proposes instead applying Laclau’s logic of the ‘empty 
signifier’, where rationality and morality are empty signifiers not based on 
ideas of essence or humanism, but remain open to an endless series of 
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signifieds: 
…anarchist morality and rationality no longer have to remain tied to a 
certain conception of humanity or nature. They can be freed from such 
essentialist grounds and become free-floating signifiers, structurally open 
to a multitude of different struggles.136 
In this way, Newman can simultaneously criticise universal ethical rules from 
an anarchist viewpoint of them being coercive whilst at the same time 
offering ethical principles that avoid this problem. 
The division between morality and ethics is not employed in the same 
manner by Todd May, arguably because he does not conceptualise 
universalism as strictly problematic the same way Newman does. May 
recognises the fact that Deleuze, Foucault and other neo-Nietzscheans make a 
distinction between ethics and morality, but doesn’t align himself with this 
position, preferring the more traditional use of the terms as interchangeable137 
(he does not provide reasons for this choice). May also recognises Foucault’s 
rejection of morality, Lyotard’s suspicion of it and Deleuze’s reformulation, 
but nevertheless, for him, the distinction between the two is only superficial 
as, he contends, the poststructuralist stance against morality is itself an ethical 
position: “What I would like to argue here is that despite themselves, 
Deleuze, Foucault, and Lyotard predicate much of their political work on 
several intertwined and not very controversial ethical principles.”138 These are 
the principle of anti-representationalism and a commitment to difference that 
we will examine later. An anarchism which is to be poststructuralist therefore 
needs to acknowledge these ethical principles and critically evaluate their 
ability to provide us with guidelines for political action.  
It could be argued that what is missing in May’s work is a suitable critique of 
universalism, something others had found in the move to distinguish ethics 
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from morality which he rejects. Although May presents poststructuralist 
critiques of essentialism and representation, by not subscribing to a 
corresponding critique of universalism he ends up with postanarchist ethics 
that are still somehow universal in scope, and subsequently not quite 
convincing. As a result, he is left in the same quandary as Critchley, who we 
shall return to next. Downplaying the importance of the poststructuralist 
break with traditional ethics leads May towards the assumptions of critical 
theory, to the extent that he assumes a universal subject position as a starting 
point for his ethics. The reformulation of ethics suggested by Foucault and 
Deleuze is vital for the rejection of such an ethical subject, as well as for a 
poststructuralist anarchist project as Newman argues. May is left seeking a 
more traditional form of morality that gives the ‘possibility of ethical 
judgement,’139 concluding in a form of multi-value consequentialism that will 
be addressed later.140 
Critchley’s first book on ethics, Ethics of Deconstruction: Levinas and Derrida, 
was one of the first works of poststructuralist ethics which was explicitly not 
relativist. Critchley outlines the Levinasian difference between ethics and 
morality, conceptualising ethics as a “non-totalizable relationship with the 
Other.”141 Levinas’ theory serves this purpose well as it is not really 
concerned with questions of right and wrong, but questions of meta-ethical 
importance, such as the moment of the emergence of ethics and political 
subjectivity. This moment, he claims, is always already there in the form of 
responsibility to the other (person). Even before making any conscious ethical 
commitment the individual is obligated to their neighbour. Thus, the moment 
of the emergence of ethics is the moment this demand to be responsible is 
placed on the subject, a demand that is always present and can never be 
fulfilled. The parallel that these Levinasian ethics have with Derrida’s 
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poststructuralism is precisely that deconstruction starts with the same 
demand, almost creating a sense that poststructuralism produces ethics a 
priori. Critchley elaborates on the problem of ethics more in his later books, 
and in Infinitely Demanding he does not shy away from universality. 
Rejecting Kantian approaches based on universal reason, Critchley 
nevertheless posits the infinite demand itself as a universal.142 Moreover, he 
contends that it is the task of politics to unite together different forms of 
resistance in shared political subjectivity: 
What is going to allow for the formation of such a political subjectivity – 
the hegemonic glue, if you will – is an appeal to universality, whether the 
demand for political representation, equality of treatment or whatever.143 
In summary, the legitimacy of universal ethics seems to be quite contentious 
for postanarchists. Newman and Critchley both reject Kantian rationality as 
universal, while Todd May seems to still hold onto some of its utility. Despite 
their differences, postanarchists seem to be united in their suspicion of meta-
narratives and the epistemological foundation of universal ethics. Newman 
attempts to move beyond the relativist/universalist framework and Critchley 
explores a Levinasian way of constructing ethics that are simultaneously 
universally applicable but not founded on essentialist notions of ethical 
subjectivity. My own contribution also attempts to escape this dichotomy. 
Insofar as universal ethics are based on the notion of human essence and 
rational subjectivity, I agree with Newman that these are epistemologically 
questionable bases on which to claim universality. However, I believe that the 
key to navigating this problem lies in the nature of the distinction between 
ethics and morality proposed by some poststructuralist authors, and more 
specifically, the reformulation by Deleuze. The important distinction to be 
made in this sense is not between morality as coercive, and ethics as a 
blueprint or as radical subjectivism, but of morality as transcendent and ethics 
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as immanent responses. We shall return to this division later in the chapter on 
Deleuze as we unpick how fundamental this shift should be for anarchism. 
The anti-representation principle 
Closely bound to questions of essentialism and universal morality is the last 
central tenet of the postanarchist critique of ‘classical’ anarchism: the anti-
representation principle. Starting with the famous split between Marx and 
Bakunin, the key to understanding anarchism, Todd May argues, is 
acknowledging as its central theme the rejection of representation.144 
Following a discussion of Foucault’s ethics, May identifies two main ethical 
principles of postanarchist ethics, the first of which is anti-representation. 
This is framed as: “people ought not to engage in practices of representing 
others to themselves, as much as possible.”145 Representation, he claims, is 
problematic on both an epistemic and political level.146 First, it is 
epistemologically unfounded because of the poststructuralist critique of 
human essence. Through the rejection of human nature, representation is also 
eschewed as a ‘false’ way of understanding humanity – representing people 
to themselves is equated with “telling them who they are.” However, if there 
is no human essence that limits what people can be, representation becomes 
oppressive in itself because it falsely restricts the possibilities of what or who 
people can become. Here May seems to be implicitly referring to Platonic 
Forms, which serve as a paradigm for what individuals are, thus taking each 
person to be a ‘representation’ of such an ideal form. This, however, has not 
been made clear in May’s discussion. Politically, this form of epistemic 
representation is taken to be oppressive. 
Second, anti-representation coincides with the “indignity of speaking for 
others”147 drawn from the works of Foucault, Deleuze and Lyotard. 
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‘Representing others to themselves’ reinforces oppressive social relations by 
upholding the social structures of inequality, such as economic exploitation. 
148 Again, May is not very clear on how such relationships operate, but hints 
towards something like Foucault’s practices of normalisation: 
[A] practice of defining what is normal in a group and attempting to hold 
people to that norm . . . [The power of the sovereign] is a representation 
designed to discourage deviance and to ensure obedience; and it is 
presented by Foucault with no more sympathy than modern practices of 
normalisation.149 
Similarly, May cites Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus as a project to 
“demolish current representational barriers between people and who they can 
become.”150 Anti-representation, in that sense, seems to be both a micro and 
macro level critique of  political structures which, for May, translates into the 
ethical maxim that representing others, regardless of how accurate that 
representation is, ought to be avoided. However, even though May calls one 
of them epistemic and the other political, both of these types of representation 
seem best understood as political rather than through a linguistic or 
philosophical notion of representation. 
Interestingly, though, this is the principle May blames for the poststructuralist 
failure to escape the Habermasian performative contradiction: 
It is precisely the commitment to this principle [of anti-representation] 
that is at play in the reticence the poststructuralists have shown toward 
promoting general ethical principles.151 
This is a particularly relevant point, as positing anti-representation as an 
ethical principle is at the core of the problem May will run into later. 
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Anti-representation is thus seen as a principle which underpins 
poststructuralism and, for May, is derived directly from a second ethical 
principle, the commitment to difference. The principle of actively promoting 
difference and diversity, May argues, can be seen in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
What is Philosophy? and Foucault’s later writings on alternative practices of 
being.152 May characterises it thus: “alternative practices, all things being 
equal, ought to be allowed to flourish and even be promoted.”153 This is 
presumably referring to alternative practices to the ones that are ‘normalised’ 
via representation, and therefore oppressed. Crucially, for May, this principle 
does not provide a value-system for poststructuralists (and by extension 
postanarchists) that ensures the promotion of non-oppressive practices. For 
instance, through the promotion of difference, we might fall into the trap of 
promoting fascism, which will then result in oppression (we expect). Thus, it 
is clear that only some different practices need to be encouraged, which May 
extrapolates into his version of consequentialism. Since that approach moves 
more or less outside the territory of poststructuralism, we shall explore it 
further in the next section. For now it will suffice to say that May fills this gap 
with the broadly anti-capitalist values held by the poststructuralists, claiming 
that capitalist (and, for Lyotard, fascist) tendencies towards unification and 
universalisation contradict the first two principles, so practices that favour 
anti-capitalist organisation are preferable within a poststructuralist 
framework.  
In a similar vein, Newman draws a critique of representation from his reading 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and the work of Foucault. Recognising 
their differences in terms of how they conceptualise desire,154 Newman 
nevertheless finds a uniting thread: “[Deleuze and Guattari’s] critique of 
representation in psychoanalysis is similar to Foucault’s attack on various 
discourses – political, medical, psychiatric, etc. – which attempt to speak for 
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the individual.”155 Indeed, Newman acknowledges his indebtedness to May 
by referring to anarchism as a critique of political representation – which is 
always “a relationship of domination.”156 Following from this, anarchism 
should never accept vanguardism of the party or proletariat, leading to 
inevitable conflict with certain strands of Marxism. Later in his argument, 
Newman goes as far as to claim that “representative thinking is a domination 
of thought, in the same way that the anarchists argued that representative 
politics was a domination of the individual.”157 Moreover, he claims, the 
poststructuralist attack on certain norms of truth and rationality is what 
enables postanarchism to expose ‘classical’ anarchism’s reliance on 
representational forms of thought such as essentialism or a commitment to 
universals. In fact, all representation, Newman continues, is based on 
essentialist thinking – the notion there is an authentic object that thinking 
refers to, or a truth, or place, constructed dialectically through binaries.158 
Relying heavily on Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand 
Plateaus, Newman extends the anarchist critique of vanguardism as a form of 
oppressive representation into a broader, ontological idea of representation. 
Representational thinking, he claims, is dependent on essential truth or place 
– thinking is supposed to ‘reflect’ or ‘represent’ truth that we find in nature. 
Instead, we can liberate thinking through a rhizomatic model that “eschews 
essences, unities and binary logic.”159 Similarly, linguistic representation is 
also rejected in the form of pragmatic utterances that “only have meaning in 
the context of power relations,”160 although Newman does not make it clear 
what form of linguistic representation he is referring to. He does not return to 
this problematisation of representation in his proposals for postanarchist 
ethics or suggest what it might imply in practice beyond expressing a 
dissatisfaction with oppressed groups’ demands for ‘political 
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representation’.161 
It would seem that for May, political representation is categorically 
unacceptable in anarchist politics as it is both oppressive and reinforces the 
status-quo. For Newman, on the other hand, this critique extends to all types 
of ontological representation, including representational thinking in the form 
of Hegelian (or other) dialectics. Both of them seem to tie up the question of 
representation with the poststructuralist critique of essentialism, thus 
implying a position against Platonic idealism. Other postanarchists like Lewis 
Call, for example, take the failure of political representation to be 
foundational for postanarchist politics. Political representation in the form of 
elected governments or a Leninist vanguard, he claims, is challenged through 
Baudrillard’s critique of the real.162 It has failed because it can no longer 
represent the masses. They are a black hole sitting outside the order of 
representation; they are too diverse, too incoherent, and this is precisely what 
gives them their revolutionary force. 
Conclusion 
To conclude this section and recapitulate, the main threads we have identified 
in postanarchism in the reconstruction above are: a commitment to non-
essentialism, a rejection of universals and critique of representation in various 
forms. Even though we haven’t specifically discussed them, it is worth noting 
that postanarchists also critique the ‘classical’ anarchist view of power as 
centred upon the State, as well as conceptualisations of an uncontaminated 
place ‘outside’ capitalism where the revolution would begin.  
In Saul Newman’s work, the trigger event for postanarchist ethics is the 
poststructuralist rejection of essential human nature. For him, both the 
critique of universals and representation stem from this shaken foundation of 
essentialism. For Todd May, on the other hand, poststructuralism implicitly 
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promotes two main ethical principles – not representing others and 
promoting difference. Representing others to themselves is a practice of 
oppression, of creating a limit to what they can be. It creates practices of 
normalisation and ignores particularities. Thus, the second ethical principle of 
poststructuralism, namely the emphasis on difference that May identifies in 
Lyotard, Deleuze and Foucault.163 This takes the form of recognising 
particularities among individuals and groups and not generalising them into 
categories of representation. Following a similar line, Newman posits the 
linked rejection of political representation and representation of thought as 
one of the main tenets of postanarchism. His quest to defeat essentialism also 
brings him to recognise the poststructuralist principles of plurality and 
difference and translate them into a postanarchist ethical framework. Finally, 
the question of ethical motivation and subjectivity appears both in Newman 
and Critchley in the form of an infinite demand, closely bound to anti-
authoritarian and anti-capitalist sentiments, forming an implicit ethical 
scheme taken up by postanarchism.  
Even though we haven’t engaged with them in detail, a similar 
epistemological critique can be traced in the works of Lewis Call, Richard Day 
and Jesse Cohn, among others. For instance, Cohn starts with the premise that 
anarchism rejects representative democracy, moving towards an analysis of 
representationalism and anti-representationalism in philosophy, art and 
politics.164 Call, on the other hand, in his cyberpunk Postmodern Anarchism, 
uses Foucault, Baudrillard and Haraway to offer a set of connections for 
radical politics through a ‘postmodern matrix’. Finally, Day approaches 
‘contemporary radical movements’ through a much broader framework of 
anarchist, Marxist and poststructuralist intersections.165 Less engaged with 
the meta-dimensions of postanarchist ethics, he nevertheless articulates 
themes and solutions that are applicable to defining and advancing activism. 
                                                
163 T. May, Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, p. 131.  
164 J. Cohn, Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation: Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Politics. 
165 R. Day, Gramsci is Dead, Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements. 
61 
 
1.3.2 Stage 2: Strong ontologies 
If we are committed to going beyond epistemology, it is worth now looking at 
the impact the postanarchist critique of ethics based on universal truth and 
human nature has had on anarchist proponents of ‘strong’ ontologies. The 
critique, in targeting the metaphysical foundations of ‘classical’ anarchism, 
posed a particular problem for other contemporary theories of anarchism 
which subscribe to the need for normative anarchist ethics using more 
traditional approaches. In particular, we will address consequentialist and 
virtue ethics, both of which offer strong normative accounts usually 
associated with the Enlightenment paradigm the postanarchists rejected. 
To foreground this exchange, we begin by exploring a critique targeting the 
lack of normative grounds in postanarchism. The arguments put forward by 
the postanarchists have inspired attempts to formulate anarchist ethics which 
do not rely on essentialist views of human nature, or forms of political 
representation, but at the same time allow for the possibility of collective 
action. The aim of this section is to explore the possibilities for ethical 
normativity based on ‘modern anarchist’166 reformulations of classical ethical 
approaches. In other words, before we arrive at Deleuze we should see if 
there are any already-existing anarchist frameworks which would suit our 
purpose. 
In What’s Wrong with Postanarchism, Cohn and Wilbur point to a major 
deficiency in postanarchist ethics,167 namely that their reliance on 
poststructuralism brings with it a strong tendency towards relativism.168 The 
lack of a universal foundation for ethics, they argue, results in a lack of 
normative grounds for establishing any collective action. For example, 
Andrew Koch admits that “the relativity of both ontology and epistemology, 
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the plurality of language systems, and the impossibility of communicating 
intended meaning” results in the impossibility of reaching agreement without 
deception or coercion.169 Since postanarchism is unable to distinguish 
between “free agreements and instrumentalist manipulation,”170 it inevitably 
results in the subjective politics of ‘anything goes’. Interestingly, another critic 
of the type of ethics proposed by Newman is Todd May, who, in a review of 
From Bakunin to Lacan, confides that he has moved away from Derrida and 
Lacan precisely because such an approach leaves “no room for the kind of 
collective action that seems necessary for political success.”171  Indeed, May is 
a proponent of exactly the type of Enlightenment-based ethical paradigm 
Newman rejected, as we shall see later.  
Nevertheless, this potential descent into relativism has not diminished the 
importance of the critique of essentialism and universal truth proposed by 
postanarchists. In an attempt to respond to both challenges, Todd May 
proposes a form of multi-value consequentialism, while Benjamin Franks 
offers a reworking of McIntyre’s virtue ethics as prefigurative politics. Such 
responses seek a foundation for ethical normativity which simultaneously 
grounds collective action and avoids the ‘coercive trap’ that morality is 
susceptible to. This section will explore these two ethical theories in more 
detail and argue that attempts to solve the problem laid out by postanarchists 
through a recourse to ‘strong’ ontology have been largely unsuccessful. Both 
of the proposals considered remain internally inconsistent without an appeal 
to an external telos, which, I argue, is incompatible with the demands 
established by the postanarchist epistemological critique. 
Prefiguration 
First, we turn to the works of Benjamin Franks. One of the most prominent 
critics of postanarchism, he nevertheless aims to answer the challenges posed 
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by it, grounding his ethics in a particularly anarchist ontology. Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s early works provide Franks with a basis on which actions can be 
judged, but one which is not morally universalising and therefore not 
coercive. Since Franks’ approach differs slightly from MacIntyre’s, I shall 
focus mainly on Franks’ treatment as it is more relevant for our purposes. 
Franks shares the common anarchist worry that any ethical framework that 
proposes universal rules or guidelines has the potential to be oppressive. He 
defines prefigurative virtue ethics as those that “[identify] goods as being 
inherent to social practices, which have their own rules, which are negotiable 
and alter over time. [They stress] the immanent values of particular practices 
rather than the externally decided (consequentialist) values that will 
accrue.”172 Franks acknowledges Newman’s argument against universalism, 
starting with the premise that a universal morality would limit agency, a type 
of coercion that anarchists fight against. Following Bakunin and CrimethInc., 
among others, he builds a case against using any externally derived rules or 
morality. Moreover, he holds that applying the same universal rules to 
everyone and ignoring the context could result in more profound social 
hierarchy, rather than reducing it.173 Finally, he examines Newman’s critique 
of the epistemological foundations of universal ethics and, even though he 
seems to be in general agreement with these, he nevertheless disagrees with 
the proposed solution of utilising Stirner’s ego to replace essentialist 
ontology. He argues, with Karl Marx, against Stirner, claiming that the radical 
subjectivism of Stirner is internally inconsistent.174 In abstracting the ego from 
social order, Stirner does not acknowledge that the individual needs material 
resources to be ‘free’, while being placed back in the material and social world 
immediately compromises that freedom. This creates an irreconcilable 
contradiction for anarchist practice. 
The alternative proposed by Franks takes the form of prefigurative virtue 
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ethics. Prefigurative virtue ethics, he claims, avoids the trap of universalism 
by simultaneously serving as a blueprint for action but not claiming authority 
on the basis of a greater telos.175 This is possible through multiple immanent 
telē, evaluating every practice on its own terms. Franks argues that this 
reconciles the anarchist value of personal autonomy with an ethical 
framework that still provides a normative foundation in the form of 
evaluating actions. Moreover, he suggests that these ethics collapse the 
distinction between means and ends – they require people who can fight to 
end their own oppression in pragmatic, localised ways, without claiming to 
represent others or other struggles. “Anarchist methods,” he writes, “are 
associated with seeking immediate results. Anarchist actions are aimed at 
achieving useful results.”176 In contrast to instrumentalist strategies oriented 
towards achieving an ultimate goal, the contemporary anarchist ideal is for 
“tactics to embody the forms of social relations that the actors wish to see 
develop”177 in a contextual way. For him, this ultimately eradicates the 
distinction between ends and means. 
One possible critique of this approach is offered by Thomas Swann’s analysis 
of the ontological foundations of virtue ethics.178 First of all, he observes, the 
suggestion that anarchist practices are evaluated as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ only 
within the context of that practice necessitates the rejection of a single unified 
(objective) telos that actions may be judged against. Swann argues that if the 
evaluation is performed on the basis of different telē specific for each practice, 
the inevitable consequence will be moral relativism.179 Unlike MacIntyre, who 
introduces a form of universal telos to support virtue ethics, Franks argues 
that context-specific telē are enough to provide moral guidance. In such a 
situation, Swann suggests, there is no way to avoid moral relativism, whereby 
“statements about what is right and wrong have as much claim to objective 
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truth as statements about what is fashionable in clothing.”180 Even though the 
example Swann suggests is perhaps not the most illuminating, he is right in 
identifying that prefigurative virtue ethics attempts to sit in a middle point 
between moral relativism and moral universalism, and so their validity relies 
on a successful defence of this possibility. Indeed, the problem is not only 
how to prefigure one’s actions so that they fit within an anarchist value-
system, but also how to select which practices one should engage in. If all 
practices are judged on the basis of their immanent normativity and the 
distinction between means and ends is unnecessary, then, as Swann suggests, 
“how do we identify them and, further to this, use the term anarchism at 
all?”181 
Thus, there seem to be two options. If prefigurative virtue ethics operate 
immanently in the form of each individual/collective generating its own 
specific ‘self-rewarding’ practices, then their normativity would have to come 
from a broader framework of anarchist values in the form of telos. If we reject 
the telos, then these values have to turn either towards relativism, or be 
somehow universalised to remain normative. Franks seems to have opted for 
the first one, which I will address again in the final argument of this chapter. 
Finally, I would add that Franks posits the creation of ethical standards and 
norms as almost naively “open to those entering these practices; they are 
open to critical dialogue and can alter over time.”182 Even though this seems 
to be crucial for his argument that prefigurative virtue ethics are not coercive 
or universal, he does not provide an account of the mechanism by which this 
might happen. 
It remains, then, to engage with Franks’ definition of virtues and the 
possibility for anarchists to foster them. In ‘Virtues of Non-Domination’, he 
claims that it is not possible to create an exhaustive list of all virtues – and 
that it would be undesirable anyway because it increases the danger of 
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creating a dogmatic ethical framework, whilst virtue theory should promote 
one’s own thinking and identification of new virtues.183 Nevertheless, Franks 
uses three of Aristotle’s virtues as an example of how virtues can be adapted 
to be compatible with anarchist principles. 
Firstly, he focuses on bravery, the golden middle between the vices of 
rashness and cowardice. Bravery, he argues, is the virtue of confronting 
legitimate fears, which for anarchists transforms into something that 
undermines structures of domination, rather than reinforcing them. Fascists 
who beat up foreigners, for example, or soldiers sent by a world power to kill 
civilians, do not show bravery in terms of the modified Aristotelian virtue. 
Anti-fascists, on the other hand, are brave when they face up to racial 
bullying or help migrant organising. Justice and its related concept of fairness 
is the second virtue that Franks identifies.184 Being just or fair, for Aristotle, 
was closely linked with distribution of resources, while a contemporary 
anarchist understanding would be related to the notion of rights. Finally, 
Aristotle’s virtue of wisdom is translated into anarchist practices of education. 
Wisdom is building knowledge and expertise, which are then dispersed and 
used to bring down hierarchies between student and master.185 However, 
Franks makes clear, these three virtues, and others, should not be examined in 
isolation from one another. They constantly inform and support one another – 
for example, it is important whilst conducting brave scientific experiments, 
pursing knowledge and wisdom, to consider being just and fair to the objects 
being studied. By doing this one can avoid or solve moral dilemmas such as 
whether testing on animals is acceptable or not. 
This short account of the virtues demands a few important clarifications. To 
begin with, neither McIntyre nor Franks have provided a reason as to why 
one should strive to lead a virtuous life. Even though providing an account of 
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ethical motivation is not necessarily part of an ethical framework, in the 
anarchist virtue ethics Franks has constructed there is an implicit assumption 
that one is already striving for equality and the diminishing of oppression. 
For example, if one is not already in opposition to wars where hundreds of 
civilians die in the interest of nation-states and corporate bodies, it might be 
hard to swallow the claim that soldiers do not show bravery. To construct the 
virtue of bravery as such, only insofar as it is positioned against oppression, 
appears to require another implicit ethical framework against which these 
virtues are measured. Regardless, the question remains: what are the criteria 
for deciding these anarchist virtues and thus delineating and categorising 
which actions will foster them? Relating back to Swann’s criticism, 
prefiguration does not provide us with a way of identifying which virtues 
arise from each situation so that we are capable of fostering them, or how 
these virtues might be decided – collectively, individually or by a higher 
authority. Without this mechanism it is hard to see how this system is able to 
manage consensus between differing individuals, which seems to be a 
condition for prefigurative virtue ethics.  
To conclude, Swann argued that Franks’ conceptualisation of virtue ethics 
does not sufficiently balance relativist and universalist ethical demands. 
Moreover, even though prefigurative virtue ethics do not rely on notions of 
human nature as benign or universalist coercive moral rules, it nevertheless 
sees individuals as rational, unified subjects capable of self-determination. It 
is the universality of this view of subjectivity that prevents Franks’ virtue 
ethics from fully responding to the conditions set out by postanarchism. 
Multi-value consequentialism 
Another approach that aims to offer an anarchist normativity is 
consequentialism, in particular the version Todd May has put forward as the 
implicit moral theory of the poststructuralists. Consequentialism is a 
teleological ethical position – it holds that the result/consequence of an action 
determines whether it was a morally right or wrong action. Descended from 
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classical utilitarianism (a form of hedonistic act consequentialism), this broad 
field of moral philosophy takes as its primary assumption the maxim that 
moral rightness derives primarily from consequences and not necessarily 
from anything intrinsic to actions themselves. Moreover, it is reliant on an 
evaluative practice that is quantitative and usually also qualitative, requiring 
the relative weighting of moral concerns. In the Anglo-American tradition the 
focus for consequentialist practice is usually constrained to the evaluation of 
individual (though not necessary isolated) acts or decisions without appeal to 
a broader or more distant telos.186 As a result, one of the appeals of 
consequentialism is that, given an agreed value framework, it facilitates 
rational debate and offers the possibility of consensus on complex moral 
questions. Since consequentialism is oriented towards consequences there 
tends to be a strong prioritisation of ends over means. Usually the only 
restriction on means is that their consequences do not override the net ‘good’ 
of the given enterprise. Different forms of consequentialism have different 
ways of expressing this, for example rule consequentialism which considers 
actions right only where they do not violate the general needs of a community 
or equal consideration consequentialism where all affected persons are treated as 
of equal importance.187 This illustrates another tendency, which is to evaluate 
the success of a particular version of consequentialism by how well it aligns 
with ‘our’ moral intuition, a kind of validity test which works backwards 
from the logical consequences of the theory to see if the foundations are 
constructed correctly. In anarchism this form of means-ends relationship is 
often expressed in the insurrectionist tradition and to an extent the work of 
Godwin.188 
Preserving the principle of anti-representation we discussed earlier, Todd 
May proposes a form of multi-value consequentialism,189 which ameliorates 
some of these concerns by providing multiple means for evaluating the 
                                                
186 J. Driver, Consequentialism, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011, pp. 5-7. 
187 ibid., pp. 86-93. 
188 W. Godwin, The Anarchist Writings of William Godwin, Freedom, London, 1986, pp. 64-65. 
189 T. May, The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism, Penn State Press, Pennsylvania, 2010. 
69 
 
desirability of a given set of consequences. The different weightings each of 
these values is given allows for a more nuanced evaluation of a situation and 
is necessary to avoid contradictions between different values. The seeds for 
this approach are found in Moore’s ideal consequentialism and it is typically the 
form that human rights-based ethics takes today, promoting rights, 
distributive justice and other goods in a hierarchy of priority. This form of 
consequentialism is more compatible with a deontological approach, insofar 
as it can take the values underlying duties or obligations and recast them as 
rights. 
May’s argument is that the problems of consequentialist ethics are usually 
derived from the identification of a single value as their universal principle.190 
Single-value consequentialism usually takes something akin to happiness, 
which can be measured across the whole field of human actions in order to 
evaluate the moral rightness of any given conduct. This principle is usually 
made to incorporate its negative – pleasure and pain for example. Most single-
value consequentialisms struggle with the problem of how to identify a 
criterion which allows for interpersonal comparisons in such situations. G. E. 
Moore is credited with raising this point – moral goodness cannot be 
identified with ‘natural’ mental phenomena such as happiness without 
problematising the formal method of quantifying and qualifying the 
production of the primary value. Classic utilitarianism has thus had to 
formulate more complex modes of analysis, developing a tendency to 
introduce thresholds, for example, a certain magnitude of pain rendering an 
action wrong regardless of the level of happiness achieved. Since such forms 
of consequentialism are subject to the postanarchist critique of universalism 
as oppressive, they do not fit the requirements we have established. 
However, May’s multi-value consequentialism is able to avoid these 
criticisms by proposing a reformulation of values from “goods that somehow 
constitute a good or even satisfying life”, to “goods to which people ought to 
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have access”191 in the form of a right to physical safety, a fair distribution of 
social advantages, etc. He prefers consequentialism to virtue theories or 
deontological ones because those risk positing certain lives or people as 
intrinsically better, thus breaching the anti-representational principle, while 
consequentialism focuses on the action and the consequence, which anybody 
can, in theory, achieve. Moreover, the new conceptualisation of value allows 
for universal applicability of this morality without it becoming coercive, thus 
avoiding the conundrum of relativism. Multi-value consequentialism is likely 
to promote and embrace a multiplicity of values, which would result in a 
diversity of lifestyles as well. Thus, he claims, such an ethical framework is 
best suited for those wanting to align themselves with the ethical 
commitments of the poststructuralist project. 
However, it seems that May’s presentation of multi-value consequentialism 
rests on some shaky premises regarding its fidelity to poststructuralism. First, 
May tends to construe ‘poststructuralism’ as a unified body of theory, failing 
to adequately acknowledge the disparate and historicised nature of its 
various contributors and concepts. Taken, then, in a homogenised state, an 
implicit moral theory is attached to poststructuralism, ignoring the important 
differences between the main authors he refers to (Foucault, Deleuze and 
Lyotard). By taking this as a starting position, he disregards the potential of a 
radical break with the tradition of morality, remaining focused on their 
epistemological concerns with universal rules.  
Finally, a common criticism of consequentialism from anarchist proponents of 
the prefigurative approach is that, in consequentialism, even oppressive 
means could be justifiable if they lead to ‘an anarchist society’.192 Indeed, this 
is a more general criticism levelled at consequentialism as well – that ‘bad’ 
actions can produce ‘good’ consequences.193 Vice versa, some actions are in a 
sense ‘right’ even if they do not produce the desired consequences. This 
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appears to be in conflict with the assumption at the heart of consequentialism 
that virtues do not reside in the person performing an action but in the action 
itself. In anarchism, consequentialist approaches are exemplified by Sergei 
Nechaev’s justification for the murder of Ivanov, as well as his general 
attitude towards achieving the revolution through any means necessary, a 
sentiment expressed in Malatesta’s “The end justifies the means.”194  
As a moral theory responding to the type of ethical criteria postanarchists 
proposed, multi-value consequentialism must be rejected on two main 
grounds. Firstly, it does not necessarily respond to critics of coercive morality. 
The anti-representational principle is posited as an absolute rule, thus having 
the potential to result in oppression. Even though May argues that this is not a 
fault with the principle itself, but with the role of moral theory,195 in practice it 
functions as a categorical imperative, thus precluding the possibility for 
individual decision-making processes. Secondly, Benjamin Franks’ critique of 
ends-based approaches is also applicable here, namely that consequentialism 
relies on a form of moral intuition, or perhaps moral knowledge, which 
makes it possible to discern which actions are likely to lead to which 
consequences.196 This is also applicable to multi-value consequentialism, 
which has rationality and a unified human subjectivity at its heart. As Todd 
May himself argued of Foucault, there are no epistemological foundations for 
establishing universal ethical principles, at least not ones based on universal 
reason.197  
Difference as lack 
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that all political positions carry 
specific metaphysical presuppositions. Regardless of whether these are made 
explicit, the metaphysics of, for example, postanarchism might include an 
understanding of power operating in a more or less Foucauldian way, the 
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importance of an ethical subject for postanarchist politics, and the formulation 
of the infinite demand in Critchley, among others. I also argued that by not 
sufficiently problematising these metaphysical presuppositions, the 
conditions for non-essentialist, non-universal and non-representative ethics 
have not been adequately outlined by postanarchists. As we have established, 
the postanarchist rejection of ‘strong’ ontology is part of a larger trend in 
philosophy. The main divide seems to be between those, like Foucault, who 
refuse to accept the universality of reason, human nature and political 
structures, and those who, like Habermas, believe that such a refusal implies a 
situation of political chaos, where no normative rules or ethics can be 
established. In anarchist studies, on the other hand, this is exemplified by 
Newman, Call and Critchley on one side, and modern reformulations of other 
ethical theories such as those by Franks and May on the other.  
Having introduced the main ethical challenges posed by postanarchism and 
the responses of other modern anarchists, in the final two sections of this 
chapter I will focus in more detail on the ontological foundation of the 
postanarchist ethical approaches of Saul Newman and Simon Critchley. Both 
of them rely on Levinas and Lacan, an approach taken by other radical 
political theorists as well.198 True to their rejection of Enlightenment 
metaphysics, they have embraced an ontology that understands difference as 
being never truly captured by identity. Tønder and Thomassen frame this 
context in relation to the Marxist legacy: 
Theorists of radical democracy object to three things in particular. First, 
they criticise Marxism for its economic determinism, which not only 
forecloses human agency, but also eliminates the autonomy of political 
organization . . . Secondly, they criticise Marxism for its essentialism . . . 
finally, they criticise Marxism for eradicating historical and philosophical 
heterogeneity, claiming that this risks aligning Marxism with the 
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paradigms of thought it sought to overcome.199 
They argue that at the heart of these objections is a rejection of dialectical 
modes of production of difference, such as the binary of identity/difference, 
and their replacement with the notion of radical difference, one which 
“constitutes the difference between the two identities.”200 This makes 
difference firstly a primary ontological category and, secondly, constitutive of 
identity. Among theorists that subscribe to that position, however, there is a 
fundamental split. On one hand, there are those whose basic ontological 
assumptions are based around lack (the Lacanian/Levinas approach), such as 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and on the other hand are those whose 
ontology follows the path of ‘abundance’, such as Deleuze-inspired theorists 
like Paul Patton, Rosi Braidotti and Nathan Widder. Critchley and Newman’s 
reliance on Levinas and Lacan places them on the side of radical politics 
reliant on an ontology of lack at the heart of difference. In what follows, I will 
examine these two in more detail.  
Firstly, the conceptualisation of subjectivity found in much of Western 
philosophy and theorised by Freud and, later, Lacan understands the subject 
as constituted through lack – we desire what we do not have. The repression 
of these desires, it is supposed, causes the subject to split between itself and 
the symbolic order, and it is at this point that representation fails: “there is a 
lack or gap between the subject and its representation.”201 For Lacan, this lack 
is non-symbolisable, as language fails to provide a signifier to express the 
particularities of the subject fully. Thus, the subject develops through an 
infinite process of attempting to fill this lack. In radical political theory, the 
taking up of lack results in the critique of politics based on essentialised 
identities, but also the drive to destabilise structures by revealing the inherent 
lack at their core. Most often, such theories conceptualise a form of Otherness 
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that is impossible to represent, positing lack as ontological.202 
To begin with, Newman’s own solution to the problem of an anarchist 
ontology utilises a combination of Lacan’s psychoanalysis and Max Stirner’s 
egoistic anarchism. This allows him to avoid essentialism, as the subject in 
Stirner is set up to not have a fixed identity or essence but provides the space 
for creating its own subjectivity.203 Using Stirner’s anti-humanism, Newman 
conceptualises a non-essentialist notion of the self as ‘becoming’, as 
producing power by being bound to social norms and destroying this power 
with self-reflexivity: 
The self, or the ego, is not an essence, a defined set of characteristics, but 
rather an emptiness, a “creative nothing”, and it is up to the individual to 
create something out of this and not be limited by essences.204  
Newman’s argument then leads him to Lacan, where he discovers what he 
had been looking for all along, namely that (non)place outside of power 
where resistance is possible. This non-place is produced by power itself, by 
the inevitable transgression of coercive practices.205 Newman’s ontology relies 
on Lacanian lack to avoid representation – “[t]here is always something in 
language that cannot be signified, a gap or blockage of some sort . . . The lack, 
then, is always part of the process of signification.”206 The subject is split by its 
inability to achieve its desires, which Newman sees as the core of the subject – 
but rather than an essentialist core, it is one of non-signifiable lack.  This 
results in a paradoxical place outside of power where resistance can take 
hold.  
Secondly, in the other theoretical camp, both Critchley and Newman draw on 
Levinas for the concept of the infinite demand. As an ethical theorist, Levinas 
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is quite unusual, as he does not offer particular rules or methods for deciding 
what an ethical act is but posits responsibility to the Other at the heart of the 
ethical encounter. This encounter happens through the recognition of the 
Other’s face. For him, the face is infinite transcendence, something that cannot 
be captured by reason or representative thought or language. Everybody 
experiences the call of the face and we are all equal before it. In Levinas, ethics 
is prior to ontology. That is, the infinite demand appears with the appearance 
of the face of the other and with it our desire to be with others. This also 
renders the infinite unknowable, irreducible to any sort of moral knowledge 
and cognition – the only faculty that is engaged in the conception of ethics is 
thus the faculty of recognition of the face. The face, Levinas claims, is pre-
discursive and universal. His conception of the ethical is, thus, not an applied 
or normative account, but one that explores the transcendental conditions of 
ethics. 
The main political paradox resulting from ontologies of lack is the constant re-
negotiation between the object of desire (the Other) and the identity of the 
subject. As Toril Moi aptly demonstrates in her critique of Lacanian 
subjectivity, this understanding of lack is inherently based on binary 
oppositions, of femininity as defined in relation to the phallus (or more 
specifically, its lack).207 The Other is always negating identity by exposing its 
incompleteness but, at the same time, the existence of identity is taken to be 
necessary for the possibilities for collective action. The paradox, thus, is the 
constant attempt to conceptualise “temporary collective unities established 
through friend/enemy antagonisms.”208 Following Laclau, Newman argues 
“any attempt to fill the social lack is ultimately doomed to failure because this 
lack cannot be overcome, and is constitutive of society itself.”209 He proposes 
ethics ‘without ground’, the ethics supposedly responding to the paradox by 
being “free-floating signifiers, structurally open to a multitude of different 
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struggles.”210 
It is beyond the scope of this work to address the breadth of the 
lack/abundance debate and its ongoing developments, but I argue that 
neither Newman nor Critchley have offered convincing examples of an 
ontology of lack. To begin with, Newman’s only articulation of the 
application of such ethics of uncertainty is based on a constant concern “to 
know why one should accept a particular moral condition,” and a “refusal to 
accept anything on its own terms.”211 The application of this seems to be 
somewhat narrow, as the examples Newman provides involve questioning 
the necessity of women-only spaces, feminism or other “definitely boring” 
identity politics.212 The lack of criteria on the basis of which this constant 
questioning happens suggests the relativist position of ‘anything goes’. The 
role of the conflicted subject, structured by its lack, is not visible in Newman’s 
postanarchist ethical framework, though it played a central role in his critique 
of anarchism. Moreover, the Lacanian subjectivity he previously advocated 
for is inconsistent with his later claims that anarchism should move beyond 
‘unimaginative’ binary identities. This is a criticism that Simon Critchley 
escapes to an extent since he has not problematised binary thinking or 
essentialism. Nevertheless, the matrix of subjectivity that Critchley does 
adopt fails to make clear the basis for the universality of the infinite demand 
of the Other, the traumatised subject or sublimation. In other words, he lacks 
a convincing methodology for justifying that the experience of ethical 
responsibility does indeed take such a form across times, cultures and places. 
To assume that all ethical activity always necessarily operates in this manner 
is to pre-emptively exclude a range of activities that might also be considered 
‘ethical’. 
Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning the criticism of Lacanian subjectivity 
from the perspective of the ontologies of abundance. Most relevant for us will 
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be the critique of Lacanian lack contained in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-
Oedipus. It will be briefly expounded here and developed later (in chapter 2) 
in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of desire. In Anti-Oedipus, 
Deleuze and Guattari provide an analysis of contemporary society (and 
capitalism), uniting Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Lacan, among others, and 
producing a method (or part of a method) for understanding reality and what 
constitutes it. According to them this method, schizoanalysis, is a “materialist 
psychiatry” – an unconventional ‘liberation’ of Marxist labour theory and the 
Freudian concept of libido from “determinate systems of representation.”213 
Desire as lack, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is based on a form of 
representation that distorts desire – by questioning what our desires ‘mean’ 
we use representation to explain the unconscious.214 Drawing on Nietzsche, 
Deleuze and Guattari claim that desire is in fact productive – it does not deal 
in imaginary objects which we lack, but ‘it’ produces the real world. Desire 
becomes repressive only (and necessarily) when it is placed in social 
configurations. Daniel W. Smith provides a good example: 
Someone may have an interest, say, in becoming an academic, so he or 
she applies to the university, takes courses, writes a thesis, attends 
conferences, goes on the job market in hopes of securing a job, finding an 
academic position. You may indeed have an interest in all that, which 
you can pursue in a highly rational manner. But that interest exists as a 
possibility only within the context of a particular social formation, our 
capitalist formation. If you are capable of pursuing that interest in a 
concerted and rational manner, it is first of all because your desire – your 
drives and impulses – are themselves invested in the social formation 
that makes that interest possible. Your drives have been constructed, 
assembled, and arranged in such a manner that your desire is positively 
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invested in the system that allows you to have this particular interest.215 
The political implications of this conceptualisation of desire will be explored 
later in this thesis. Nevertheless, as we mentioned earlier in our presentation 
of new materialist philosophies, the Lacanian approach suggests privileging 
the symbolic at the expense of the material. The primacy put on the symbolic 
order is a significant element of many feminist theories, queer theory and 
newer Marxisms. Thus, this is a debate which we will be returning to in the 
rest of the thesis. I have here assumed a position that this form of desire as 
lack becomes wholly problematic when placed in the heart of anarchist 
radical politics. Furthermore, Rosi Braidotti charges the Lacanian notion of 
lack with a hidden essentialism which, if granted, would compound its 
incompatibility with postanarchist politics: 
[t]he concept of memory that Lacan renders through his vision of the 
unconscious is that of an essential black box that allegedly records the 
central data of psychic life. That is a very one dimensional and rather 
despotic notion of how memories work, which testifies to Lacan’s psychic 
essentialism and to a static vision of psychic life.216 
Moreover, she claims, an ethical subjectivity based on a split subject leads to 
melancholia and negativity and is incapable of creating the conditions for the 
new to emerge.217 In summary, a central argument of this thesis will be that 
the conceptualisation of desire as lack used by both Newman and Critchley is 
inherently representative and essentialist, subsequently requiring precisely 
the type of ontology postanarchists rejected and precisely the problems they 
wish to avoid. 
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1.3.3  Stage 3: Transcendence 
So far with the postanarchists we have established a need for ethics that are 
non-essentialist, non-representative and not coercive (even if universal). The 
subsequent challenge, as presented by modern anarchists, is that anarchist 
ethics also need to be normative to allow for collective action. I have argued 
that the ontologies presented by modern anarchists to fulfil that task are 
either inconsistent or insufficient for satisfying the conditions we have 
posited. Finally, I have argued that postanarchist ontological presuppositions 
based on Lacan and Levinas are contestable from a Deleuzian perspective and 
ineffective in practice. However, this has not been sufficiently described or 
linked to our alternative – ontologies of abundance. This will be the purpose 
of the current section. In what follows I outline the form of traditional 
metaphysics based on transcendence and argue, with Deleuze, that 
productive metaphysics can exist without this grounding on external 
elements (a claim that defies orthodox notions of metaphysics). Moreover, I 
assert that in order to support the non-representative, non-essentialist ethical 
claims of postanarchism and avoid a descent into relativism, what is needed 
is a metaphysics of immanence. Justification for using a particularly 
Deleuzian version of this metaphysics follows in Chapter 2. 
Transcendent ethical frameworks operate on the premise that there is 
something that transcends human existence – a set of values or ideals or 
duties that are independent of humans. These can be universalised, as is the 
case with deontological or utilitarian ethics, or, if we were to accept 
prefigurative virtue ethics, of which Benjamin Franks is a proponent, we can 
utilise practice-specific telē where only the values are transcendent. In all of 
these approaches, a person’s actions (and the results) are always scrutinised 
in relation to whether they fit a transcendent standard. It could be said that it 
is almost irrelevant what these ideals or values are – what is important is that 
operating in this transcendent framework requires us to see means and ends 
as separate and subjugate one or the other to a transcendent ideal. It is this 
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that I argue is at the root of the normative tension found in postanarchist 
ethics. 
Both in ‘classical’ and ‘post’ anarchist debates there appears a struggle to 
reconcile means and ends, to overcome the separation and hierarchy between 
the two. If seen as a political ideology with demands for internal consistency 
and a need to reconcile its values with its methods, anarchism inevitably 
creates tension over which practices are closer to this anarchist ideal and 
which are not (leading either to moral universalism, which postanarchists 
claim is the case for classical anarchism, or moral relativism, which Newman 
exemplifies with Stirner). Attempts to create anarchist ethics that avoid 
swinging between the two (or dispense with the question entirely) must start 
by questioning the need for a standard – the ideal serving as the standard, 
and reality as ‘lower’, that which needs to be elevated to meet the standard. 
An example here would be the much-discussed pacifism versus ‘radicalism’ 
debate, which The Invisible Committee highlight in To Our Friends.218 Both 
pacifists and radicals, they claim, strive for purity (either of violent action, or 
of non-violent action), even reaching the point of handing each other over to 
their common enemy, the police. They write: 
Since the catastrophic defeat of the 1970s, the moral question of radicality 
has gradually replaced the strategic question of revolution. That is, 
revolution has suffered the same fate as everything else in those decades: 
it has been privatised. It has become an opportunity for personal 
validation, with radicality as the standard of evaluation . . . What 
happens instead is that a form is extracted from each [revolutionary 
act].219 
Thus, a transcendent measure by which revolutionary acts are rated as 
‘radical’ emerges and people come to aspire to a level of radicality rather than 
to real world change. There seems to be a similar intrusion of transcendent 
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standards in queer and intersectional organising, particularly in recent 
debates around ‘oppression olympics’. Abbie Volcano exemplifies this with a 
sketch that many activists might find familiar: 
“As a working class person, I have to say…” (a few nods of agreement) 
“As a poor woman, it seems to me…” (even more nods) 
“As a poor lesbian of color, I think…” (even more furious nodding, 
making sure everyone registers each other’s frenetic agreement).220 
In the same way that there is a quest here for the most ‘authentic’ voice or the 
most oppressed person, the quest for radicality can become yet another search 
for the ‘ideal’ anarchist, who has the moral high ground and whose opinion 
therefore matters most (indicating a certain distribution of power). Volcano 
continues: “[o]ften this tactic of agreeing with ‘the most marginalised in the 
room’ will be used as a substitute for developing critical analyses around 
race, gender, sexuality, etc.”221 Without wishing to take up a position on these 
particular debates at present, it seems to me that there are many more 
examples we could suggest with a similar structural framework. 
Essential to this transcendent framework is a particular type of epistemology 
that prioritises those fixed and stable identities which are representations of a 
universal standard. In the example above, this is reflected in the construction 
of ‘queer’ as an identity with its own implications and limitations. To be 
perceived as the bearer of a queer identity, one needs to act in certain ways. 
These could include going to queer events, engaging in non-heteronormative 
sexual practices, dressing in certain ways, and so on. Moreover, what follows 
from this mode of thinking is that the rest of the world is also composed of 
stable and fixed identities – humans, nature, animals and cultures are all seen 
as clearly defined and separable from each other, relating only through the 
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medium of a standard ideal. Finally, this ideal needs to be more or less 
permanent (or at least presented as such), universally accepted and 
unchanging so that other people can aspire to achieve it. The difficulty of such 
transcendent frameworks is not necessarily that they result in an essentialist 
understanding of identities, but that they result in new types of norms where 
the existence of these assumptions and limitations cannot be easily 
challenged.  
I would argue that this presents a twofold problem for anarchist ethics. On 
one hand, it is possible to claim that having an ontological hierarchy between 
means and ends and subjugating our reality to a higher standard is in 
opposition to the value of non-hierarchy, as is the case with certain types of 
ontological anarchism which Saul Newman discusses.222 However, this claim 
is already an ethical stance that presupposes an (anarchist) position against 
hierarchy on all levels, including the ontological, a move we wish to avoid. 
On the other hand, we could say that measuring life against a transcendent 
ideal requires us to evaluate our embodied knowledge of the world according 
to an imposed standard (even if it is one created by ourselves; even if it’s an 
anarchist one). For example, we know that not all women are gentle, meek, 
helpful and so on, but we may nevertheless expect (or demand through our 
actions) women to behave according to this ideal. This refers particularly to 
situations where various socially accepted practices are presented as 
historically unchangeable and universal, a problem which Foucault exposes 
in his critique of the treatment of sexual practices. If we were to accept that 
most (or even some) practices, structures and identities are socially 
constructed, then construing our actions as grounded in ahistorical truths or 
an ideal model is simply errant. Without repeating Foucault’s entire 
argument, it is possible to draw on his conclusion that most human societies 
revolve around such historically contingent ‘truths’ that have nevertheless 
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been presented as universal and normalised.223 If – and here we might refer to 
Benjamin Franks’ idea of prefigurative ethics based on various telē – we are 
aware of these ‘truths’ and accept them as valid only in our own immanent 
reality, as Swann suggests, then the possibility of even having a telos to 
compare them to is exposed as another contingent concept that cannot be 
evaluated as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ without appealing to a transcendent 
framework.224 
This will lead us to reject the ethical framework we reconstructed earlier from 
Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding on the grounds of its appeal to 
transcendence. Critchley outlines a split, traumatised ethical agent constantly 
swinging between the desire to fulfil their ethical role and the unfulfillability 
of the ethical demand. His use of Levinas, ‘the prince of transcendence’, posits 
an ethical subjectivity where the subject comes into existence through the 
ethical demand – it is simultaneously produced by it and divided by it. The 
ethical demand is both universal and particular, but most significantly, it is 
transcendent. In an attempt to escape deontological and utilitarian ethical 
frameworks, Levinas wants to ground ethics in experiences, but without the 
disavowal of transcendent principles by which it is possible to evaluate 
action. This is motived by a desire to find a ‘pure beginning’ where the 
constructive and normative aspects of one’s ontology are neither supported 
nor suppressed by ethics, the place ‘outside’ being that “which precedes 
essence.”225 Thus, he grounds his ethics on responsibility. Levinasian 
responsibility is transcendent, infinite, but also fluid to the extent that its 
content changes in response to the uniqueness of the Other. 
This question leads us to our final critique of deontological, teleological, or 
even postanarchist ethical frameworks. Here I am referring to the so-called 
poverty or weakness of applied ethics that most ethics teachers will 
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immediately recognise. Sitting in a classroom and applying a set rules to a 
given problem, abortion for example, is a common methodology in these 
classes. Similarly, in anarchist meetings or discussions it is not uncommon to 
find ‘anarchist’ rules, expectations or limits established and people defending 
positions with reference to them. However, the problem often arises that one 
can defend virtually any position with ethical rules, within certain contextual 
boundaries. For instance, on the topic of abortion, we might apply Kantian 
deontology but find ourselves able to express opposing views equally well. In 
one instance we would check if the action is universalisable. If we encounter 
no contradictions and the action is still possible, then it is an ethical action, 
and this holds for both sides of the common debate. We are required to look 
at the action as detached from its context and probable outcome purely in 
relation to its universalisability. For Kant, a prime example is whether or not 
we should tell the truth. To decide, Kant suggests we check if it is possible for 
that action to be applied to everybody all the time. In a situation when lying 
becomes the universal rule, it becomes impossible to lie – the conditions 
which make telling a lie possible are gone (the conditions being that people 
ought to tell the truth).226 The paradox for an issue like abortion is that we 
could reach either moral conclusion through reason – contra Kant, reason is 
not sufficient to guide our ethical decision making. Similarly, we could use 
utilitarian ethics to weight the right to abortion and arrive at completely 
different conclusions. But none of these frameworks contains an imperative to 
perform the moral action unless we already subscribe to this particular 
framework. Franks attempts to fill this space through a prior commitment to 
anarchist values with contextual rules stemming from them,227 but, 
unfortunately, it is still possible to continue with the mental gymnastics 
within a value-based prefigurative framework. Of course, this critique was 
already suggested by Spinoza: “we do not endeavour, will, seek after or 
desire because we judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we judge a thing 
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to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after and desire it.”228 The saving 
grace of this exercise is to stipulate a transcendent ideal or duty which never 
changes. This epistemology of transcendence relies on sameness as its 
fundamental ontological category and difference as its derivative. To match 
people to a standard or fit them into categories implies that they are in some 
way comparable to each other, that they are similar on some level. This error 
resides in the conceptualisation of difference, as Deleuze would argue. 
Difference constructed as the negation of the same, and thus as inferior to it, 
automatically creates the categories of the ‘one’ and the ‘other’. 
The alternative approach to metaphysics established in what follows 
prioritises difference and constructs ethics of immanence. Exposing the 
transcendent as just another contingent practice problematises any ethical 
framework that relies on an ideal standard. The immanent mode of thinking I 
propose is inherently materialist – it focuses on what is produced, where, 
when, how, but also it understands the world as processual. Instead of 
moving from one fixed stable identity to another, identity is in flux/it is 
constantly becoming. There is no division between appearance and reality 
(appearance is reality); there is no opposition between One and Other, 
everything contained in one Being; nothing is outside, in a position of ‘higher’ 
existence. However, this does not imply a straightforwardly relativist 
position. Instead of ethics of ‘anything goes’, anarchism needs ethics that are 
able to conceptualise the conditions for change, a similar demand to that 
made by Braidotti in Nomadic Ethics.229 What will be constructed in the 
following pages does not necessarily reject essentialism and normative 
universals, and especially not from an ethical position. Instead, following 
Deleuze, I take an approach that starts with immanence and thus is able to 
critique and explain these concepts, perhaps seeing them differently and 
having a different approach to putting them to work. 
                                                
228 B. Spinoza, Ethics, III, P9 Schol. 
229 R. Braidotti, ‘Nomadic ethics’ in D. Smith, & H. Somers-Hall eds, The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze, 
pp. 170-197. 
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Before beginning, the choice of Deleuze should be explained since he is not 
traditionally seen as either a moral or anarchist philosopher. Deleuze’s 
overriding concern with metaphysics singles him out from other 
poststructuralists who also develop a critique of representation, universals 
and human essence. Siding with Levi Bryant, I believe that the rejection of 
representation, essentialism and transcendence is not a primary concern for 
Deleuze’s ontology but a consequence of it.230 This is a very important 
distinction insofar as it allows us to critique these elements and understand 
their genesis in a way that would allow for new configurations to emerge, 
rather than starting from an ethical position already committed to their 
opposition. Deleuze’s philosophy responds to the question of what happens 
when representation and identity are taken as the basic premises upon which 
philosophy is constructed – the results, for example, include thinking in terms 
of binary oppositions such as particular and universal, being and thinking (of 
which theory and practice is a derivative) etc. 
To break away from this mode of thinking, which Deleuze calls the dogmatic 
image of thought, Deleuze challenges Kantian transcendental idealism by 
reconfiguring it. Instead of trying to find the limits of possible knowledge, he 
wishes to identify the limits of real experience. This specific methodology 
(transcendental empiricism) contests the image of thought as 
representational, as what ‘everyone thinks’, linking the concepts ‘common 
sense’ and ‘good sense’. Thought, as Deleuze shows, is more often based on 
common assumptions than an affinity to ‘truth’ – a statement which is 
paramount for the construction of pragmatic ethics. Consequentialism, for 
example, is an ethical position that attempts to bridge the gap between 
common sense and morality, providing a basis for ethical action that 
corresponds to people’s moral intuitions. Moreover, ethical positions that 
assume we can decide on the basis of an ethical blueprint or code first and 
foremost assume that we are capable of rationally making this decision – in a 
                                                
230 L. Bryant, Difference and Givenness, p. 4. 
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sense, that we have the capacity to self-determine. Without denying this 
capacity, Deleuze shows that desire and notions of ‘common sense’ are much 
more influential in our decision-making processes than we might have 
previously acknowledged. To be able to exercise any self-determination,231 we 
need to understand our desires and the influence society (among other 
structures) has over them; we need to know how our selves are constructed to 
be able to enlarge our power (to ‘open up the virtual’). Moreover, to 
acknowledge the influence of desire, habits and common sense in relation to 
ethics does not imply rejecting ethics as a basic structure of political action – it 
implies we need ethics that are pragmatic and take into account the 
limitations of human subjectivity and knowledge. Of course, elements of this 
trajectory run through postanarchist thought, but, as I have argued, they all 
hesitate at the moment of adopting a full ontology of immanence. What 
follows is an attempt to perform this task. 
                                                
231 The concept of self-determination is one which we will revisit and readdress later on since Deleuze’s 
philosophy radically reconfigures it. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 Introduction to immanent metaphysics 
2.1.1 Reading Deleuze (and Guattari) 
In the introduction to the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia,232 
Deleuze and Guattari advise approaching the book as if you are listening to a 
music album – listen to your favourite songs first, skip the ones you don’t 
like, listen from the beginning to the end or listen to only a couple of songs 
from the whole album until you get sick of them. The idea here is that there is 
no clear or easy way of approaching their work so that it follows naturally 
from one chapter to the next and there are different paths for finding a 
meaningful or useful way to read the book.233 
However, this approach generates a dilemma when writing using Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ideas. The concepts they create are so intertwined with each 
other that any given passage is unlikely to be fully understood without 
reference to various different sources from all over Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
oeuvre. Their collaborative works relate to each other rhizomatically, with 
concepts setting the ground for others that appear much later on. Together 
they present a ‘plane of immanence’. The approach I have utilised here aims 
to be consistent with Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that all concepts are 
                                                
232 It is probably worth briefly mentioning the use of mental health terms such as ‘schizophrenia’, which 
have arguably travelled a long way in their deployment since Anti-Oedipus. In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis, Holland makes it clear that “schizophrenia is not the disease 
or mental disturbance characterizing or defining schizophrenics” (p. 2), instead signalling a kind of 
“’unlimited semiosis’” which emerges as an objective tendency of the capitalist mode of society. 
Deleuze and Guattari defend this distinction in ‘On Anti-Oedipus’, Negotiations, pp. 23-24. Since I feel it 
likely to generate consternation in the contemporary anarchist milieu, and since this particular concept 
does not feature significantly in this thesis, I have generally steered clear of this terminology and leave it 
to the reader to decide whether it might still be considered an appropriate analytic term. Recent 
treatments can be found in H. A. Skott-Myhre and C. Taylor ‘Autism: Schizo of Postmodern Capital’, 
Deleuze Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2011, pp. 35-48 and K. Kokubun, ‘How to read Deleuze – neurosis, 
schizophrenia and autism’, paper presented to Deleuze Workshop in Seoul, Seoul National University, 
23 Jan 2018. 
233 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 21-43. 
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responses to problems and thus cannot be properly understood outside of the 
conditions for their creation. 
In the opening of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari explain what 
they mean by rhizomatic thought. A rhizome is a horizontal network of 
seemingly unrelated and disparate objects – it creates offshoots of itself to 
produce new plants, with no clear centre or meaningfully ‘original’ plant; this 
mode of connection cannot be fixed or fully mapped out. Rhizomatic thought 
is opposed to what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘arborescent thought’, a Karl 
von Linneus-type of classificatory tree-like structure. They argue that the 
rhizome should not be thought of as a metaphor, but rather as a way of seeing 
all entities in the world as related and constructed by one another. In that 
sense, rhizomatic thought allows us to see ‘regimes of signs’, rather than 
relying on signification. This includes organic and non-organic beings: their 
routes of relations cannot be determined or predicted.234 At the other pole, the 
arborescent scheme, on the other hand, is a hierarchical structure with a 
(usually) transcendent concept at the top such as the Platonic forms or (for 
Kant and Descartes) the subject, with all other concepts deriving from it in a 
tree-like fashion. It is thus a closed system where concepts are not free to 
interact, a system that supports fixity and aims to preserve the arrangements 
of the dogmatic Image of Thought. The relationality of the rhizomatic 
network, on the other hand, has no single origin, and as such rejects binary 
oppositions such as those found in the Cartesian body/mind duality and 
Platonic transcendence. The result of this rhizomatic way of thinking where 
relationality and processes are recognised marks a break with the symbolic 
order (and thus representation). 
The focus of the first major section (2.2) is to outline the features of the 
metaphysics of difference in Deleuze’s work, as well as elements arising from 
that foundation which are relevant for anarchist ethics. It begins with 
Deleuze’s diagnosis of Western philosophy as plagued with transcendence 
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and moves into a rejection of Platonism, essences and subjectivity in the form 
of a purely immanent conception of difference and repetition as primary 
ontological categories. In 2.3, I analyse the role of the Event for immanent 
ethics, as well as related concepts such as ‘series’ and ‘sense’. The final 
section, 2.4, discusses two strands of thought in Deleuze’s collaborative works 
with Guattari which prove important for the construction of immanent ethics 
– a critique of representation in linguistics, and desire as a substitute for 
ethical intentionality. These also introduce the concept of production and 
productivity as vital for our project. 
In doing this, the chapter at hand will at times present and engage with 
Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s thought descriptively. I am by no 
means exempt from “the natural tendency . . . to preference or isolate 
particular aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s work in order to defend existing 
political affiliations,”235 but I have attempted to remain true to problems his 
philosophy responds to. In this sense, I think it is difficult to completely 
separate ‘is’ from ‘ought’ in the way Ian Buchanan seems to think possible.236 
Nevertheless, I attempt to present the significant elements of Deleuze’s 
metaphysics as clearly as possible before I move towards my own ‘strong 
misreadings’237 in the next chapter. For this reason, the secondary literature 
on Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari used in this chapter is (mostly) 
confined to commentaries of their work, rather than philosophical trends 
inspired by them.238 Where I have used any ‘Deleuze 2.0’239 commentators in 
this chapter, it is in service of exemplifying or elucidating Deleuze’s and 
                                                
235 Eloff. A., ‘Children of the new Earth – Deleuze, Guattari and anarchism’, paper presented to Deleuze 
and Guattari and Africa conference, 2015, <http://meme.co.za/?p=152>, accessed 12 May 2017, para. 
20. 
236 I. Buchanan, ‘Desire and Ethics’, p. 8. 
237 J. Bell, ‘Whistle While You Work: Deleuze and the Spirit of Capitalism’, in N. Jun and D. Smith eds, 
Deleuze and Ethics, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2011, p. 13. 
238 When referring to commentators of their works, I have tried to stick to generally well-received 
interpretations, such as those by James Williams, Daniel W. Smith, Ian Buchanan and Eugene Holland, 
though I concede the problem here of playing into what could be considered a ‘Deleuzian canon’. The 
Deleuze-inspired theories I mention include assemblage theory, object-oriented ontology, and actor-
network theory. 
239 I. Buchanan, ‘Assemblage Theory and Its Discontent’, in Deleuze Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, 2015, p. 387. pp. 
382–392. 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts. 
Though Deleuze is not often seen as an ethical theorist, he appears to have 
been interested in ethics from the beginning of his writing career – he read 
Nietzsche and Kant extensively, as well as the works of Spinoza, to whom he 
dedicated two books. Moreover, his collaboration with Guattari in Anti-
Oedipus produced what Foucault described as “the first book of ethics to be 
written in France in quite a long time.”240 Despite all of this, Deleuzian ethics 
seem to have remained a relatively minor field. Deleuze’s commentaries on 
earlier philosophers are frequently (and often uncritically) taken to represent 
his own philosophical position, and the difficulty of engaging with his ethical 
philosophy is exacerbated both by his style of writing and the absolute 
uniqueness of what he offers in ethical discussions. Moreover, as with most 
poststructuralists, accusations of nihilism or moral relativism have been hard 
to shake off. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to justify this work’s 
engagement with what might be termed ‘Deleuzian’ ethics. There are a few 
trodden paths that can be taken in this respect – I could echo Nathan Jun’s 
claim that “everyone from  i ek to Badiou is fond of saying that the 
conceptual and methodological tools with which we make sense of this age 
are Deleuzian tools.”241 Alternatively, I could make claims for the political 
and ethical relevance of Deleuze’s thought for activism and social 
movements, which, though valuable, are most likely claims that could be 
made for any prominent theorist.242 But the main reason I pursue Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy in this thesis is in order to present a metaphysical 
foundation that is able to support the type of ethics that I argue anarchism 
needs, that is, immanent, non-representational and non-essentialist ethics on 
the basis of which we can reconceptualise bodies, processes and actions. This 
choice echoes what Braidotti calls “a materialist approach to affectivity and a 
                                                
240 M. Foucault, ‘Preface’, in G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. xii. 
241 N. Jun, ‘Introduction’, in N. Jun and D. Smith eds, Deleuze and Ethics, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2011, p. 1. 
242  A prominent example is M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, USA, 2000.  
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non-essentialist brand of vitalism.”243 
2.1.2 Ethics versus morality 
First though, we need to re-examine the analytic distinction between the 
terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ which was first presented in the previous 
chapter. Morality and its historical genealogies are closely aligned to religion, 
and to the judgment of God in particular (at least in the Western conception 
under discussion here). A huge number of Christian authors were involved in 
developing the concepts of guilt, responsibility, praise and duty, to name just 
a few of the more relevant principles.244 The roots of this mode of thinking 
can be seen in pre-Christian models of human subjectivity. Plato’s chariot 
allegory, for example, describes the human soul as tripartite.245 First, a black 
horse represents negative emotions, desires and instincts, pulling 
‘downwards’. Second, a white horse represents positive feelings and noble 
passions which pulls upwards. These two horses are tethered together in a 
chariot that represents the soul, and they are in constant conflict, each of them 
favouring a different direction. It is the job of the third component, the 
charioteer, to moderate and overcome them. The charioteer, in this case, 
represents reason and intelligence, which are needed to guide human 
passions. 
In Christian theology the division shifts – the black horse becomes the body, 
the urges of the body, the pull of the material world, and anything that has to 
do with bodily pleasures or satisfaction. Moreover, one now has a soul which 
is in need of saving. The soul is capable of reason and should guide/control 
the body. Finally, one has a spirit, which is God’s spirit within us, the spark of 
life which strives to return to the divine. Clearly, the Christian model implies 
stronger determinism and less choice, but it also changes the focus to the 
                                                
243 R. Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, p. 4. 
244 See, for example, U. Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, tr. M. Miller, The Catholic University 
of America Press, Washington, [1995] 2010. 
245 Plato, Phaedrus, Penguin, London, 2005, 246a–254e.  
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conflict between the body and the soul (pleasures and reason) rather than 
positive and negative impulses. Christian morality comes directly from God 
rather than through reason – there is no need to rationally justify good and 
evil, as believers are literally told which actions belong to God and which 
ones to sin. 
This crude sketch provides us with a jumping off point to theorise the 
differentiation of ethics from morality. Rather than using the terms as 
synonymous or conceptualising the difference between the two on a scale of 
how coercive they are, in the history of philosophy morality relies on two 
main conditions – a division between mind and body, and external 
grounding. Deleuze (especially later in his work with Guattari) envisions a 
break with both of these elements of traditional morality. In his works on 
Spinoza, he offers a new differentiation between the two terms: 
Ethics, which is to say, a typology of immanent modes of existence, 
replaces Morality, which always refers existence to transcendent values. 
Morality is the judgment of God, the system of Judgment. But Ethics 
overthrows the system of judgment. The opposition of values (Good–
Evil) is supplanted by the qualitative difference of modes of existence 
(good–bad).246 
Following Spinoza, Deleuze reformulates ‘ethics’ as a rejection of mind/body 
dualism and starts instead with a commitment to avoid judgment based on 
transcendent values. This entails an ontological position based on immanent 
and materialist understandings of the world completely different from (and 
opposed to) deontology, teleology or utilitarianism. Second, replacing the 
notions of identity and essentialism with difference and repetition as the 
foundations of metaphysics leads Deleuze to go beyond binary oppositions 
and dialectical synthesis as a way of understanding the world. My argument 
is that this points in the direction of a non-essentialist productive ethics, a 
position which allows for the amalgamation of theory and practice or, rather, 
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collapsing the distance between them. Moreover, the importance of process-
oriented ontology is complemented with the notion of ethics as ‘problematic’ 
and of philosophy as methodology.  
Such ethics rely on the possibility of defining and applying the notion of 
immanence. Even though Deleuze and Guattari suggest that all philosophy is 
related to the ‘plane of immanence’,247 and all transcendent concepts can be 
read as bound to an underlying notion of immanence,248 describing an 
immanence-in-itself is nevertheless a complex task. Christian Kerslake gives a 
formal definition of immanence as a system which does not appeal to 
anything ‘outside’, where all the elements and relations are internal to the 
metaphysical system they are part of.249 Transcendence, on the other hand, 
privileges something outside. Ontologically, Kerslake continues, immanence 
“promises that thought is capable of being fully expressive of beings; there is 
no ‘transcendence’ of being to thought.”250 Both of these formulations of 
immanence are fundamental elements of Deleuze’s project. As Deleuze 
comments, as soon as we posit a relation as a relation ‘to’ something, we are 
in transcendent philosophy.251 In an immanent philosophy, all relations are 
thought of as ‘in’ something. In ethics, transcendence manifests itself as an 
external body or force that serves as an arbiter for truth. 
For Deleuze, the distinction between immanence and transcendence is all-
encompassing. Transcendent metaphysics rely on fixed identity categories in 
dialectical opposition, such as mind/body, nature/society, passion/reason. 
These pairs are also always hierarchical negations, where one is evaluated in 
terms of the other, and always in relation to an ‘outside’. Further, within a 
transcendent system, philosophers tend to focus on the ‘interior’ of these 
entities, in the form of human nature, or essence, or identity, rather than the 
                                                
247 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, Verso, London, 1994, p. 14. 
248 G. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, MIT Press, London, 1990, p. 322.  
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relations entities enter into with each other. In other words, transcendent 
metaphysics prioritises a fixed and stable interiority within the system, which 
is then put in a relation to a transcendent entity. Conversely, Deleuze is 
interested in the exteriority of these entities and their relations and posits that 
there is no ‘natural’ interiority to beings, such as essence or subjectivity. For 
example, the subject is formed from pre-subjective parts that stay together 
through a network of relations that they are constantly part of. The interior, 
thus, becomes a product of the exterior. In an interview with Claire Parnet, 
Deleuze comments: 
‘Peter is smaller than Paul’, ‘The glass is on the table’: relation is neither 
internal to one of the terms which would consequently be subject, nor to 
two together. Moreover, a relation may change without the terms 
changing ... Relations are in the middle, and exist as such. This exteriority 
of relations is not a principle, it is a vital protest against principles . . . If 
one takes this exteriority of relations as a conducting wire or as a line, 
one sees a very strange world unfold, fragment by fragment: a 
Harlequin’s jacket or patchwork, made up of solid parts and voids, blocs 
and ruptures, attractions and divisions, nuances and bluntnesses, 
conjunctions and separations, alternations and interweavings, additions 
which never reach a total and subtractions whose remainder is never 
fixed.252 
That is to say, for Deleuze immanence is directly linked to his philosophy 
being ‘relational’ and materialist. On one hand, the relations between terms 
become the object of study, while on the other, they are considered to be as 
real as physical entities (hence materialist). Subsequently, this is also part of 
the reason he is so interested in processes. 
When it comes to Deleuze’s thought on immanent ethics, the central ethical 
question attributed to his philosophy is derived from his works on Spinoza 
and framed by the dictum ‘we do not know what a body can do.’ Spinoza’s 
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goal is to problematise the way we speak about mind, consciousness and soul 
as having power over the body, whilst at the same time not knowing what a 
body is capable of. Therefore, the goal of morality to control the body (via its 
physical urges) seems not only unnecessarily limiting but also naïve – how 
could we truly exercise power over it in this manner? Deleuze himself 
elaborates that the assumption that the soul/mind can control the body 
already puts it in a position of eminence over the body – “it has higher 
duties.”253 The body, on the other hand, has the power to execute the actions 
proscribed by the mind/soul, or to lead it astray. Thus, the purpose of 
morality is to provide the soul/mind with the rules to control the body, 
situating them in constant opposition to one another – “when one of these 
acts, the other suffers.”254 The novel alternative provided by Spinoza was 
parallelism – the notion that “a passion in the mind is also a passion in the 
body . . . an action in the mind is also an action in the body.”255 Moreover, 
Spinoza’s concept of conatus (translated variously as ‘striving’ or ‘endeavour’) 
contributes to Deleuze’s own definition of life and immanence.256 The body’s 
striving for joy, Spinoza claims, leads to happiness, thereby increasing our 
power, which in turn increases our knowledge of the world. 
Indeed, from this perspective, we can perhaps glimpse some of the 
motivation behind Deleuze’s rejection of a transcendent ‘outside’. 
Transcendence takes the form of ultimate impotence – especially in the works 
of philosophers like Levinas and Derrida where one can never satisfy the call 
for justice or infinite responsibility.257 Transcendence separates us from our 
capacity to act and represents negative, life-diminishing forces. Yet it is 
posited both as the ultimate basis of ethics and the foundation of politics. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, such ethics or politics ultimately hinder action. 
Deleuze’s own path towards immanence begins in earnest with his doctoral 
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thesis, Difference and Repetition (1968), and Logic of Sense (1969) which both 
address the problem of identity (and essence) and its dominant position in 
Western philosophy. Difference and Repetition, in particular, is both a diagnosis 
of blockages and problems stemming from the search for transcendent 
grounding in philosophy, and a methodology which can resolve them. 
This first section, then, aims to open our engagement with Deleuze by 
establishing his critique of Western philosophy. In discussing the ‘dogmatic 
image of thought’, we follow his analysis of the problem of transcendence in 
the search for pure philosophical presuppositions. This section will take a 
similar route to our discussion of postanarchism – rather than working with 
Deleuze chronologically, we will start by outlining the problem that Difference 
and Repetition is a response to and then continue on to Deleuze’s 
methodology, which will allow us to understand his approach to immanence. 
In a later collaborative work with Guattari, they identify four main errors of 
transcendence: “(1) the illusion of transcendence (a making immanence 
immanent ‘to’ something or discovering a transcendence within immanence 
itself); (2) the illusion of universals (when concepts are confused with the 
plane itself); (3) the illusion of the eternal (when it is forgotten that concepts 
must be created); and, (4) the illusion of discursiveness,”258 which we will 
trace through his oeuvre. Subsequently, we will outline his metaphysics on the 
basis of difference-in-itself as a primary ontological category. Through this 
process I introduce other concepts as they become necessary, outlining 
repetition, individuation, and Deleuze’s understanding of time and space. At 
the end of 2.4.2, we address his explicit remarks about ethics in relation to the 
Event and conditions for change. In the final section, I introduce two more 
elements which are less commonly associated with ethics, namely, the 
concepts of ‘production’ and ‘desire’, taken from Deleuze’s collaborative 
work with Guattari. These two, I argue, provide the necessary steps for a 
complete anarchist conceptualisation of immanent ethics.  
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2.2 Constructing immanence 
2.2.1 The dogmatic image of thought 
Difference and Repetition is the first book Deleuze published explicitly 
expounding his own philosophy, following a series of commentaries of other 
philosophers. It remains his most traditionally ‘philosophical’ text. James 
Williams, for example, claims that Difference and Repetition is central to 
Deleuze’s philosophical project because it puts in motion a ground-breaking 
type of methodology – transcendental empiricism – which defines the form 
and content of the rest of his philosophy.259 As such, it is be a central 
touchstone for this thesis as well. 
In the course of this section, I argue that morality is grounded upon the 
dogmatic image of thought, and that the first step in conceptualising a new 
form of ethics is critique, breaking with this inveigling presupposition. 
Therefore, we start with the eponymic chapter that outlines Deleuze’s 
rejection of transcendent metaphysics and lies at the core of his argument 
against representationalism.260 In an interview in 1988 Deleuze said that the 
Image of Thought chapter was the turning point of the book, his 
“prolegomena to philosophy.”261 It is possible, then, to understand the 
preceding two chapters as Deleuze’s demonstration that he can do 
‘philosophy’ the way philosophy is traditionally done, “doing history of 
philosophy, or transplanting bits of Plato on problems that are no longer 
Platonic ones.”262 In the latter part of the book following the Image of 
Thought chapter, he starts doing philosophy in his own voice, the way he 
thinks philosophy should be done.263 This gives the book a pleasing, 
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260 J. Mullarkey, ‘Deleuze and materialism’, in I. Buchanan ed., A Deleuzian Century, Duke 1999, p. 79. 
261 G. Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 149. 
262 ibid. 
263 See T. Murphy, ‘The Philosophy (of the Theatre) of Cruelty’, Deleuze and The Transcendental 
Unconscious – Pli (Warwick Journal of Philosophy), vol. 4, 1992, pp. 105–135.  
99 
 
symmetrical structure through its differences and repetitions. For this reason, 
we will start with the Image of Thought and, through it, Deleuze’s critique of 
Western philosophy, which is ultimately the justification for his engagement 
with difference as an ontological category. 
From birth, Deleuze claims, we enter into a restrictive and conformist mode of 
thinking, one which relies on implicit presuppositions. Here subject and 
object are pre-established, and so thinking happens by a process of 
recognition and representation. The search for the ‘purest’ place to begin has 
(mis)guided many philosophers and led to a grounding in which it is 
assumed that the subject as thinker is a universal given.264 An image of 
thought, then, refers to the presuppositions of philosophy, defined as the 
form thinking assumes. According to Deleuze, philosophy can either start 
from objective or subjective presuppositions. Objective presuppositions could 
be defined as those which explicitly need another concept to be supported: for 
example, by saying ‘anarchists are violent’, we presuppose two external 
objects: both ‘anarchist’ and ‘violence’. Subjective presuppositions, on the 
other hand, are more implicit, such as the Cartesian ‘I think therefore I am’, 
where the ‘I’ takes the form of a given. Here, it is expected that everyone 
knows, independently of definitions, what it is to think and to be. In 
philosophy, this is taken to be one of the purest possible beginnings as it 
refers all presuppositions back to the empirical self.265 Other examples include 
Hegel’s pure being or Heidegger’s pre-ontological Being. The image of 
thought in Western philosophy, argues Deleuze, is always repeating itself – it 
tries to identify something which does not rely on other concepts for its 
existence. This image of thought then becomes a dogmatic and circular 
method of doing philosophy. The subjective presuppositions, he claims, take 
the form of common sense that “everybody knows…”, that which no one can 
reasonably argue against.266 Common sense has an explicit affinity with 
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universal, objective truth through its empirical claims of general knowledge, 
and it is always based on this particular kind of methodology or way of 
thinking, what Deleuze calls ‘good sense’ – the form of proper engagement of 
the faculties. On one hand, common sense ensures conformity with everyone 
else, and on the other, good sense preserves the established boundaries of 
thinking. Thus, the combination of the two (doxa) maintains the status-quo, 
and the resilience of a particular dogmatic form of thinking. It is this formal 
schema which most Western philosophy is based on, in its varieties of 
‘rationalist’ or ‘empiricist’.267 Finally, by taking common sense as its starting 
position, this image of thought inherently utilises a form of representation.268 
Common sense is supposed to ‘represent’ truthfully that which is universally 
known and acknowledged. Deleuze’s own project is to find a philosophical 
beginning that is without any kind of presuppositions. Genuine thought, he 
argues, is something we engage in rarely, emerging where thought 
encounters its own impossibility. 
Therefore, it seems that to be able to understand his metaphysics of 
difference, the key is to start with Deleuze’s rigorous critique of the Image of 
Thought. He identifies eight postulates as the errors or implicit 
presuppositions:269  
1. Cogitatio natura universalis, the postulate of the good will of the 
philosopher and the good nature of thought. 
2. The Ideal/common sense. 
3. The problem of recognition as the primary faculty which leads all the 
other faculties. 
4. The postulate of representation, difference being subsumed under the 
Same, Similar, Analogous or Opposed. 
5. The one of the negative/error. 
6. The problem of logical function/proposition. 
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7. The postulate of solutions. 
8. The postulate of knowledge. 
It will be instructive to follow Deleuze’s argument through the example of 
Descartes’ cogito. The first postulate, of good will, is already expressed in ‘I 
think, therefore I am’. Starting with a process (thinking), Descartes assumes 
that there is an ‘I’, a coherent self doing the thinking. The process is supposed 
to be universal and relies on what ‘everybody knows’ – it is common 
knowledge that everybody thinks (or at least has the capacity to think).270 This 
capacity to think is taken to be both universal and natural – Descartes 
assumes that everybody is naturally inclined to thought and this inclination 
results in rational thinking which then grounds philosophy. This is the first 
postulate, or implicit presupposition – the capacity to think (good will). The 
second postulate is tightly bound to the first one. Once we have established 
every I’s capacity to think, the role of the philosopher becomes that of 
grounding common sense with empirical facts, which is especially dangerous 
in relation to politics or society. This ideal(ised) common sense presupposes a 
certain distribution of transcendental and empirical knowledge, which then 
results in an image of thought that relies on empty forms (Platonic forms).271 
The third postulate is based on knowledge seen as a product of the faculties of 
the mind – we obtain knowledge through perception, memory, 
understanding, sensations, etc.272 The primary faculty, or the one that the 
others depend upon, is the faculty of recognition, which allows for the rest of 
the faculties to be engaged.273 To give an example, when we encounter 
something, we need to first recognise what it is (a blue dress) before any of 
the rest of our faculties are involved, such as remembering we saw James 
wearing the same blue dress last week. For Descartes, errors in thinking occur 
either in recognition (we are incapable of identifying what something is) or in 
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the faculties (we are incapable of remembering or ordering our knowledge 
around it). Kant, on the other hand, is interested in discovering what the 
limits of the faculties are – what the limits of our possible knowledge are 
(transcendental idealism). Beyond these limits everything is error/illusion. 
Deleuze is suspicious of the primacy of recognition as the overarching faculty 
that enables the engagement of all the rest of the faculties. The problem with 
recognition, he claims, is that it relies on representation, which is where the 
fourth postulate appears.274 In order to recognise something as an object of the 
(other) faculties, we must rely on one of the four forms of representation: 
identity, analogy, opposition or similarity. James Williams elaborates:  
Each of these aspects corresponds to an application of representation to 
different faculties. In terms of the understanding, it depends on the 
identity of the concept (What are its correct predicates?). For judgement, it 
depends on analogy (Is the structure the same here and here?). In terms of 
the imagination, it depends on oppositions (What if this is negated or 
removed?). Whereas, for perception, it depends on similarities (Are these 
the same to you?)275 
The most basic form of representation is implied in the sentiment ‘everybody 
knows’. Thus, Deleuze’s primary objection to recognition is that it claims to 
be the condition for engaging other faculties because everything has to be 
recognised first, but actually it relies on that which is already known, 
recognising new things only on the basis of its previous knowledge. This 
means that rather than constituting a pure beginning the Cartesian cogito 
serves to justify ‘common sense’ and philosophers depending on it such as 
Kant and Hegel become inherently dogmatic as they cannot account for the 
new. Against this is positioned Deleuze’s own philosophical project of 
critique and immanence, imagining “[s]omeone who neither allows himself to 
be represented nor wishes to represent anything.”276 This form of doxa, or 
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common sense, is often opposed to knowledge, or good sense (Eudoxus and 
Epistemon), but both are equally dangerous – it is difficult not to discard one 
dogmatic image of thought for a new, equally dogmatic one. Philosophy 
needs to break with orthodoxy in its general form of rationalised common 
sense, rather than break with particular orthodoxies and replace them with 
other ones. 
The fifth postulate, of error, refers to the general tendency (also exhibited in 
philosophy) to perceive thought as negative – as a method which always aims 
at correcting errors.277 Error, when located in the faculties as with Descartes 
and Kant, leaves the rational orthodoxy of the image of thought intact – if 
only we were thinking rationally we would reach the right conclusion.278 
However, Deleuze points out that such an understanding of error ignores 
other aspects of falsehood, such as nonsensical sentences and incoherent or 
uninteresting remarks, among others. This leads him to question the 
connection between sense and falsity – anticipating Logic of Sense – by arguing 
that false propositions are not necessarily nonsensical. Drawing on 
mathematics and formal logic, Deleuze claims that “[s]ense is defined as the 
condition of the true, but since it is supposed that the condition must retain 
an extension larger than that which is conditioned, sense does not ground 
truth without also allowing the possibility of error.”279 Thus, sense cannot be 
subsumed under the categories of true and false, as it is the productive field 
out of which these categories emerge. Moreover, true and false are seen as 
attributes of problems.280 In this case, sense is ignored in favour of thinking 
oriented towards solving problems. Concomitantly, problems disappear once 
we find a solution for them. Contrary to this, Deleuze argues that it is an error 
to think of problems as negative and that they can be solved (or resolved).281 
This leads us into the seventh postulate: the simple activity of a teacher 
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setting a problem for the students to solve, “and the result is accredited true 
or false by a powerful authority.”282 Later on, Deleuze and Guattari will 
expand this particular critique by arguing that most scientific and some 
philosophical endeavour is oriented towards the orthodox production of 
knowledge by constantly measuring, conducting experiments, or clarifying 
concepts and problems set by ‘masters’, always focused on solving problems 
and finding solutions. 
Finally, continuing the critique of teaching, the eighth postulate deals with 
knowledge. Here, knowledge and learning are separated. Deleuze 
distinguishes between learning with the purpose of acquiring knowledge and 
learning as ‘apprenticeship’. The first type is bound to the orthodoxy of 
knowledge, as part of the dogmatic image. Knowledge is the passive 
possession of solutions, a kind of generality of concepts, while learning as an 
active process is when one confronts a problem and must find a response.283 
An interesting example of learning in this sense is when one starts to swim. 
One has to “conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular 
points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field.”284 Learning 
is finding (and pushing) the limits of knowledge.285 For Deleuze, the problem 
stems from defining knowledge as the end goal of learning. If we take 
seriously the critique of the previous postulates, that problems are not soluble 
and errors of knowledge are not factual, then learning cannot be the practice 
of acquiring knowledge and ready-made solutions. Instead, Deleuze 
advocates for learning as an open-ended critical activity of responding to 
problems; This might be contrasted with the picture of someone learning to 
swim whilst on shore, going through the movements without being actually 
presented with the problematic field of the sea. 
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2.2.2 Transcendental empiricism 
Having identified these postulates of Western philosophy, Deleuze’s 
challenge is to construct a philosophy which does not rely on subjective 
presuppositions, or indeed, on any presuppositions at all, as Toscano 
argues.286 Pre-empting the later development of his philosophy, this initial 
project of finding a ‘pure beginning’ can be seen as the seeds for immanent 
metaphysics. Deleuze remarks that a critique of transcendence was the main 
concern of Kant’s works.287 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason aims at discerning 
reason by outlining the limitations of transcendent metaphysics. A major 
influence on Deleuze, Kant is the epitome of “a thinker who proposed an all-
encompassing critique but who in the end settled for compromise”,288 
creating a philosophy which has the capacity to critique but remaining 
complicit with established values. To identify presuppositions which do not 
fall prey to the image of thought, Deleuze ‘bastardises’ Kantian 
transcendental idealism into a new method, ‘transcendental empiricism’. In 
the following section, I outline this foundation for immanent thinking. 
As Williams observes, Deleuze’s critique and the postulates that emerge from 
it “could not come from radical empiricism, given the categorical assertion 
pertaining to a matter of fact. It is a transcendental claim about necessary 
conditions.”289 The fact that the transcendental is the object of enquiry in 
Deleuze provides the direct connection with Kantian philosophy. Indeed, this 
connection has been extensively explored, not least due to Deleuze’s own 
book on Kant.290  Kant coined the term transcendental to refer both to a 
methodological approach of searching for conditions of possibility and a 
metaphysics that explores the conditions themselves. Kant’s main claim in 
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relation to knowledge is that the mind contributes to our understanding of 
objects and experiences through certain ideal and universal structures, and 
his project was therefore to identify the limits of possible knowledge. In doing 
so he discerns four types of knowledge across four axes: 
 Analytic Synthetic 
A priori Logical Transcendental 
A posteriori Hypothetical Empirical 
 
The categories of analytic and synthetic refer to a statement’s relationship to 
truth, and more specifically whether its constitutive elements produce a 
truthful statement. A priori and a posteriori are the categories relating to 
experience, that is, knowledge acquired prior to or through experience. For 
example, an analytic a priori statement would be ‘all Labradors are dogs’, 
because being a dog is contained in the definition of labrador as a breed. 
There is no need for the person who makes the statement to have met 
Labradors to confirm its (logical) truth. A priori knowledge, for Kant, is based 
on reason. Of much more interest is the synthetic a priori, concerning 
transcendental knowledge. An example of such a statement would be 
‘Labradors like food’, which is a fact about the world that needs to be verified 
externally, i.e. its constitutive elements do not necessarily represent truth. 
Epistemologically, the difference between analytic and synthetic resides in 
whether the truth of the statement could only be known from the constitutive 
elements of the statement or if it requires knowledge about the world. What is 
important to emphasize in this discussion is that for Kant the transcendental 
is opposed to the transcendent. He rejects transcendent metaphysics as being 
beyond human knowledge and instead attempts to investigate the limits of 
possible human knowledge (transcendental knowledge). 
Deleuze, on the other hand, uses transcendental to refer to conditions that are 
immanent to being, building a transcendental ontology of the virtual by 
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rejecting ‘the possible’ in favour of real experience. In Deleuze, all conditions 
are specific to the situation they arise in. Whilst for Kant the transcendental 
are conditions which structure experience a priori, for Deleuze the 
transcendental conditions are those of genesis. Therefore, a Kantian 
transcendental methodology cannot account for the virtual, or the pool of 
genetic conditions where something new can emerge. For Deleuze, Kant and 
Kantians’ biggest error was to understand the conditions (transcendental) by 
mapping them onto the conditioned (empirical), whilst the same conditions 
were supposed to explain the conditioned. This results in a circular argument 
of pre-suppositions, where synthetic a priori concepts are taken from 
experience, but are treated as transcendent. His approach is, in contrast, 
empiricist and pluralist. These derive from the two characteristics by which 
Whitehead defined empiricism: the abstract does not explain, but must itself 
be explained; and the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but 
to find the conditions under which something new is produced 
(creativeness).291 
In this context, Deleuze calls his methodology transcendental empiricism. His 
empiricism, however, even though inspired by Hume, carries some 
fundamental differences. Empiricism for Deleuze is more than an 
epistemology based on the senses, even though it is primarily concerned with 
the given as well. If empiricism analyses and derives knowledge through 
positing the given as a primary epistemological category, Deleuze is 
concerned with what the conditions for the given are: the material and its 
cause and effect.292 Thus, empiricism in Difference and Repetition does not refer 
to the view that all concepts originate in experience, as traditional empiricism 
might argue, explored through scientific methods of experimentation (despite 
the fact that Deleuze does focus a lot on experimentation). It is a method of 
bypassing representation in thinking. Deleuzian empiricism studies reality as 
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‘intensities’ that have been ‘actualised’, drawn from an immanent account of 
genesis.293 
As Williams points out, it is important to realise that Difference and Repetition 
is itself an application of the methods laid out and defended within.294 
Moreover, this allows Deleuze to start from a position in philosophy which 
does not presuppose the concepts it creates. In principle, that leads to a 
methodology which is capable of conceiving of immanence-in-itself, as well as 
reformulating the role of critique to focus on determinability arising from a 
problematic field.  
2.2.3 The role of critique 
At this point it is possible to see a transition of morality from a kind of 
dogmatism of common sense to a specific type of critique, now termed ethics, 
which arises out of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism. In his essay To Have 
Done with Judgment, Deleuze identifies the condition for judgment as “the 
relation between existence and the infinite in the order of time”,295 drawing 
out the connection between morality and transcendent metaphysics. The 
dogmatic image of thought (as the presuppositions of transcendent 
philosophy) is precisely the foundation that maintains the common-sense 
illusion that moral laws are related to objective truth and are based on some 
form of shared universality. Similar to the way it produces a specific way of 
thinking, it also produces a specific relationship to truth and universality, 
which then serves as the basis for moral laws.296 This is particularly well 
exemplified with Kantian deontology. Kant understands the acquisition of 
moral knowledge as occurring through ‘pure practical reason’. Pure practical 
reason is knowledge that comes a priori, as opposed to empirical knowledge, 
which Kant considers to be a posteriori - knowledge gained from an experience 
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that is subjective and linked to a particular person. This a priori synthetic 
knowledge is transcendental and universal and constitutes moral laws.297 
Thus, the move past the realm of judgment and towards immanent ethics 
depends on the success of Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought. In the 
discussion of the postulates, it became clear that Deleuze posited a very 
specific type of critique – for it to be a true critique, it cannot be founded on 
the same postulates it is questioning. Even though he outlines the main 
features of such a critique in his formulation of transcendental empiricism, it 
is not until much later in his collaborative works with Guattari that he returns 
to the question of philosophy as critique itself. In order to understand this 
approach, in this section we look at how Deleuze redefines the method of 
critique in his discussion of ‘problems’, and then examine Deleuze and 
Guattari’s analysis of the role of philosophy as related to truth, universality 
and knowledge. The kind of philosophy they promote is not complicit with 
established values, but suggests the conditions for new ethics to emerge.298  In 
their last collaborative work, Deleuze and Guattari set out to trace an 
alternative history of philosophy – one that does not start with the failure of 
metaphysics. Deleuze and Guattari do not see the role of philosophy as 
unveiling the truth or clarifying ideas, but instead as a creative endeavour 
born out of immanent conditions. This critique is particularly important for 
my treatment of anarchist ethics, as the opposition to a transcendent approach 
to philosophy is applicable to anarchism as well, as we shall come to shortly.  
Let us return briefly to Difference and Repetition where Deleuze outlines the 
method for discerning conditions which lies at the heart of his concept of 
‘problematic’ (or Idea, which he uses more or less synonymously).  Ideas, as 
first conceived by Plato and later by Kant and Hegel, refer to an ontological 
category of mental representations. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Ideas 
allow for relocating reason in relation to abstract ideas. As we discussed in 
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the previous section, Kant discerns four types of knowledge, of which we 
shall examine three. First, there are empirical concepts, such as ‘a mug’, or ‘a 
book’, which are developed through experience; secondly, there are a priori 
analytic concepts, also called categories, which are applicable to any object, 
such as colour, size, shape, etc. The third kind of concept presented in Kant’s 
Critique is the synthetic a priori, concepts that transcend the limits of possible 
experience – the domain of Ideas. For instance, speaking about pure love, or 
an absolute being like God is in the realm of Ideas as these concepts can never 
be experienced. For Deleuze, however, the main question, identified by 
Spangenberg, is what the conditions of real thought are.299 
In chapter four, Deleuze identifies three aspects of Kant’s concept of the Idea, 
which then serve as the foundation for his own concept of ‘problematic’.300 
Ideas are “undetermined with regard to their object, determinable with 
regard to objects of experience, and bearing the ideal of an infinite 
determination with regard to concepts of the understanding.”301 The first 
point means that an object outside of the limits of possible experience could 
not be known, positing problems as transcendent in relation to solutions; the 
second means that it is possible to determine Ideas if we compare them to 
objects of experience; and the last one, that Ideas serve as an ideal according 
to which concepts are judged. Thus, Deleuze goes on, because of their 
undeterminable aspect, Ideas are problematic and thus reason is reconfigured 
as “the faculty of posing problems in general.”302 The faculty of reason for 
Kant has two main applications. On one hand, there is theoretical reason 
which makes it possible to know how to obtain knowledge. On the other 
hand, Kant posits practical reason as the mechanism through which we are 
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able to discern what ought to be.303  
A problem-Idea, according to Deleuze, is an ontological category, rather than 
epistemological or psychological one.304 Although identifying problems (and 
thus making concepts) is the role of the philosopher, the term also designates 
something that is decidedly non-anthropocentric. Problems are the 
transformative field of processes of learning, a “differentiated complex that 
solicits the creation of concepts.”305 Ideas, in this sense, are ‘problems’ that 
organise thought but have no ‘solutions’ per se. They are the productive field 
of the genesis of thought and objects. Moreover, problems are not determined 
universally or subjectively as deficiencies of knowledge, they are connected to 
the state of affairs, and even when solutions appear, problems do not 
necessarily disappear. They are not inherently negative – they have no 
bearing of good or bad, they are merely a system of connections between 
different elements. A feature appears here which introduces a major theme in 
Deleuze’s philosophy: “it is the problem which orientates, conditions and 
engenders solutions, but these do not resemble the conditions of the 
problem.”306 As we will see, this lack of resemblance between a process and 
its product will structure Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to conceptualizing 
the unconscious in Anti-Oedipus, as well as serving as a methodological 
starting position. We will return to Ideas when we discuss Deleuze’s notion of 
the virtual and actual. 
Deleuze thus rejects the categorisation of problems into solvable and 
unsolvable, and, unlike Kant, does not premise his formulation on 
representation. As we discussed earlier, the rejection of Platonic Forms 
against which concepts and objects are evaluated suggests that their 
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‘appearances’ cannot be a representation of a transcendent realm. Drawing on 
the works of Henri Bergson, Deleuze identifies a different method of 
evaluating the philosophical truth of problems: “Apply the test of true and 
false to problems themselves.”307 He continues to claim that in metaphysics, 
just as in mathematics, the formulation of the problem is where most of the 
creative work happens, and the possibility for solving the problems lies in 
how they are formulated. This is a rejection of the traditional philosophical 
approach that what makes a problem true is its solution, i.e. if there is a 
solution, then the problem also has bearing on the truth. For Deleuze, both 
true and false problems can be either soluble or insoluble, and their affinity to 
truth is not in a causal relationship with the possibility of solving them.308  
The error arises, Deleuze argues, when philosophers posit truth as the 
condition of possibility for solving the problem, with false problems 
remaining insoluble. However, following Bergson and Spinoza, he discerns 
the act of identifying presuppositions as the proper test of truth and falsity in 
philosophy. Thus, “a solution always has the truth it deserves according to 
the problem to which it is a response.”309 In other words, one can only achieve 
the solution that the conditions allow for. This inversion of thinking 
emphasises the way in which problems posit the limits of thoughts and 
production of the new – problems become productive when we dispense with 
a transcendent model of truth. To illustrate the concept of the problematic, 
Levi Bryant uses the example of a grape seed.310 The vine is a product of the 
problematic surrounding the seed, its internal milieu of genetics, its external 
milieu of water, sunshine, soil, etc. In the end, if a vine doesn’t produce 
enough grapes, we might perceive that as a problem for our designs of wine 
production, but for Deleuze this would be simply a solution for a different 
problem that the plant has implemented in response to its environmental 
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situation. The same example can be applied to political or ethical situations, 
which unfold as the product of a particular problematic – “the solution 
necessarily follows from the complete conditions under which the problem is 
determined as a problem.”311 This is quite a complex concept, but one which 
frames Deleuze’s attempts to make his philosophy applicable. He is 
concerned with what he sees as incorrect inferences about causal relations – 
symptoms being mistaken for their ‘diseases’, solutions being mistaken for 
their problems, and assemblages being mistaken for coherent ‘individuals’. In 
Deleuze’s work, problematisation is the driving force behind certain activities 
including philosophy. The task of philosophy might be to create problems, 
but prior to this creation is problematisation, the ‘plane of immanence’ which 
produces the need for these concepts. This is the point which we identified in 
the beginning as the marriage of theory and practice – the creation of concepts 
as a response to a problematic. Let us turn towards ‘the plane of immanence’ 
and creation. 
In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the role of the 
‘concept’ to dispense with philosophy’s relationship to truth and 
representation. Concepts, they claim, are complex entities comprised of 
different components – a multiplicity that has an expressive, rather than 
descriptive function.312 Concepts are not definitions or abstract ideas or a 
result of carefully delineated meanings, but are crafted to serve the needs of a 
particular problem: “concepts are connected to problems without which they 
would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or 
understood as their solution emerges.”313 The philosopher’s task then is to 
invent and shape concepts that express (elements of) the event.314 Therefore, 
concepts have a history, but not necessarily a straightforward one – their 
meaning zigzags and changes, they relate to other concepts, they shift around. 
It might be useful to return to the Cartesian cogito as an example. ‘I think, 
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therefore I am’ introduces the concept of the self, the I. It contains three 
elements – the thinking I, the being I and the doubting I.315 We could trace 
precursors to this concept, other concepts that perhaps contain two elements 
that are the same but not the third one, or contain all three elements and a 
fourth one – and we can talk about being a Cartesian philosopher in the 
present by trying to apply this concept to contemporary problems that 
emerged much later.  As Kerslake observes, Deleuze is operating against a 
Kantian framework here. A concept for Kant, such as ‘a hundred thalers’, 
would be something more like Hegel’s idea of “a content-determination of my 
consciousness”316 – a representation. Kerslake continues: 
[A concept] is ultimately and intrinsically neither representational nor 
referential, but expressive of a reality . . . Both Hegel and Deleuze are 
against philosophies of representation because such philosophies claim 
to express what should be genuinely universal within a framework that 
remains relative to subjective representational experience (i.e. which has 
only been justified anthropologically), so that the concept of expression 
doesn't ever gain its full extension, and thought is denied its rightful 
access to being.317 
In other words, what Deleuze and Guattari want to emphasize is that we 
cannot take concepts as transcendent entities which cut through the history of 
ideas. We cannot assess them as being universally right or wrong. In fact, 
“concepts can only be assessed as a function of their problems and their 
plane.”318 
The fundamental implication of this view is that, like other entities in 
Deleuze’s metaphysics, concepts are immanent in themselves, rather than 
immanent in relation to something transcendent. The reason why, for 
example, the concepts from one philosopher feel connected is because they all 
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come from one plane of immanence. The plane of immanence is the set of 
intuitions, questions, thoughts, experiences, etc, that make coming up with a 
certain concept sensical in the first place. The plane is pre-philosophical 
(because philosophy starts with the creation of concepts), but it’s neither a 
concept itself nor the concept that contains all concepts.319 Thus, we can think 
of the plane of immanence as the ‘primordial soup’ of a particular 
philosopher. However, Deleuze and Guattari also recognise the difficulty of 
determining such a plane without a recourse to transcendence: 
Whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent “to” something a 
confusion of plane and concept results, so that the concept becomes a 
transcendent universal and the plane becomes an attribute in the concept. 
When misunderstood in this way, the plane of immanence revives the 
transcendent again: it is a simple field of phenomena that now only 
possesses in a secondary way that which first of all is attributed to the 
transcendent unity.320 
By conceptualising the plane of immanence, and immanence, as a separate in-
itself, Deleuze and Guattari are able to reveal the hidden danger of 
transcendence sneaking in. Immanence is only immanent to itself, it contains 
and captures all other concepts. Positing the plane of immanence as that 
which produces concepts allows us to, firstly, understand how transcendent 
concepts occur and, secondly, to reveal the reverse causality that is often 
taken for granted by philosophers – instead of understanding how a certain 
plane of immanence is the place of origin of concepts (including transcendent 
ones), we take transcendent concepts as being outside of this plane and 
therefore understand immanence as “a prison from which the Transcendent 
will save us.”321 The transcendent, in that sense, saves us through providing 
the basis for objective universal truths.  Deleuze and Guattari’s critique is 
directed against Plato and Sartre, but also Husserl and Kant. Nietzsche and 
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Spinoza are listed among the philosophers who look at immanence-in-itself, 
Deleuze’s precursors. 
Finally, in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari define the role of 
philosophy not as an epistemological endeavour of clarifying and analysing 
but as an ethical activity of creation.322 Ridding ourselves of the 
transcendental ‘ought’ goes hand in hand with critique of philosophy, which, 
as Patton observes, is intended to orient political thought and action.323 As 
Colebrook remarks, we need to recognise that we think in a certain way 
because of the dominant paradigm of the image of thought, so our ethical 
activity is to consider the possibility of acting through ‘thought without an 
image’.324 The primary domain of ethics for Deleuze is the Event, first 
encountered in Logic of Sense. This will be examined in detail in 2.3. Concepts 
are related to the Event, and the depth of our understanding of an Event is 
reliant on the conceptual tools that we produce to understand it. Thus, 
Deleuze and Guattari also define the task of philosophy as ‘becoming worthy 
of the Event’.325 
2.2.4 Difference 
Having established Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought and the 
methodology he proposes to think non-representationally, it is time to turn to 
the content of his critique. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze sets out to 
construct a philosophy of intensive difference. The canonical thinkers of 
Western philosophy, he claims, have almost universally taken the concept of 
identity as fundamental, with difference as its negative. Deleuze is driven by 
a desire to ‘correct’ this constitutive error in philosophy. Difference for 
Deleuze is itself a primary ontological category, not merely the opposition to 
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sameness or similarity. Usually, in the humanist tradition, when we claim that 
two things are different, we presuppose that they are comparable, that there is 
a fundamental level of sameness that allows us to compare them and 
understand them as different (or similar). For Deleuze the appearance of 
similarity here is just that – an appearance – and one that is formed from a 
simplifying imposition of order on a complex reality. No two entities are ever 
the same in any real sense, though, for example, two raindrops may share the 
same processes of production.326 Deleuze thus accepts identity only at this level 
(genesis), and only pure difference at the level of actual existing entities, 
separating out the thing from the way in which it came into being and the 
way it interacts with other things, processes and structures. The two premises 
Deleuze goes on to challenge with this notion are the privilege of Being (by 
developing an understanding of difference-in-itself) and representational 
modes of thought. The aim of this section is, thus, to outline the concept of 
difference that lies at the heart of Deleuzian metaphysics.  
Here, I will draw from the critique of the Image of Thought to claim that 
difference-in-itself is a vital component of the reformulation of ethics as 
immanent. To be capable of opening up the possibilities for something new to 
emerge, ethics needs to be ‘done with judgment’. However, the main 
condition of judgment is that entities can be compared to a standard they are 
measured against, or, in other words, the bare condition of “the consciousness 
of being in debt to the deity.”327 Judgment, then, presupposes a fixed and 
stable identity both in what is being judged and in the standard. Deleuze’s 
project, on the contrary, reveals that identity only comes secondarily to 
difference, inverting the relationship between identity and morality. Rather 
than identity being the foundation for morality, it is through the dogmatic 
image of thought that identity becomes constructed as a primary ontological 
category. To correct this error, the problem is how to determine difference in 
itself without relying on identity or representation as supporting categories. 
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Deleuze starts by analysing four pivotal ways of understanding difference in 
the history of philosophy. This will allow us to see the shape of the problem 
before moving on to tackle it. Initially, difference was perceived in an 
Aristotelian sense, as difference between things – that which defines 
categories of being. An example might define dogs and humans beings 
through their differences; humans walk on two legs, use language to 
communicate, etc. Secondly, Hegelian difference refers to dialectical syntheses 
and antitheses, a process of constant negation of difference. Thirdly, Leibniz 
thought of difference as infinitely small, in a sense that no two things can be 
the same unless they share all properties. Finally, difference in Platonic 
idealism means everything differing from its ideal – this biscuit is different 
from the ideal Biscuit. Deleuze rejects these ways of conceptualising 
difference. He argues that rather than defining difference, these methods are 
always determined by identity and representation as primary. 
Deleuze’s first engagement with Aristotle revolves around the essence of 
difference, which is what Aristotle defines in relation to categories.328 For 
Aristotle, difference is neither diversity, nor otherness. He thinks of true 
difference as that which delineates sets of things or beings and defines 
categories, or, in other words, the essence of difference is captured where 
there is the greatest opposition. The greatest opposition, claims Aristotle, is 
found when we compare objects of the same set, because only then it is 
possible to have a well-determined concept of difference which is neither too 
small or too broad. For example, one can say that in the category of animals 
there are animals with wings and animals without wings. The difference 
between the two is true difference, as anything smaller (the difference 
between a pigeon and a starling) or bigger (the difference between animals 
and mountains) does not actually tell us enough about either of these 
categories that we can properly distinguish between them. Smaller 
‘differences’ are instead best understood as diversity, while bigger 
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‘differences’ are just otherness. In other words, we can only see pure 
difference when we oppose two sets that can be properly compared, like the 
sub-categories of a general category. 
Deleuze’s critique is twofold. On one hand, he criticizes Aristotle for not 
answering his own question of the greatest difference. Rather than this being 
the essence of difference, Deleuze argues that Aristotle has only shown 
relative difference. A full conceptualisation of difference-in-itself would be 
able to also explain differences between general sets. On the other hand, 
Aristotle’s delineation between difference, diversity and otherness, is entirely 
dependent on an initial division of elements into categories, arranged in 
hierarchies of species-genus relations. The ability to categorise and identify 
individuals into sets (what Deleuze calls common sense) and to create a 
hierarchy between these sets (good sense) would not give us a definition of 
difference since it already presupposes that we know what difference is (to 
discern birds from dogs you need to already know what birds and dogs are). 
This implies, according to Deleuze, that the concept of difference in Aristotle 
is predicated on the category of identity – being is said analogously of different 
entities (to be contrasted with Deleuze’s version of univocity). What 
Aristotle’s conceptualisation does, then, is to make difference relative to 
identities (determinations), which are given rather than generated. In turn, 
Deleuze argues, this forces Aristotle to assume a particular conception of 
being as equivocal. 
The key to understanding difference, Deleuze goes on to claim, is to avoid 
treating it as a derivative of identity as Hegel and Leibniz have also attempted 
to do. Both of these philosophers, according to Deleuze, try to re-think 
difference at the core of identity by reformulating the debate in terms of 
infinite limits. For example, for Hegel anything, including identity, is part of a 
process of contradiction. Contradiction is seen as the expression of difference 
– the product of thesis and antithesis. Thus, objects are defined synthetically 
through that which they are not: Being is to exist, so it is not nothingness. 
Pushing these limits further, Hegel is able to claim that difference is infinitely 
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great. Every time we think we are able to identify what a mountain is by what 
it is not, we could find something else to contradict it – ‘A mountain is not 
everything else’. Pure difference, then, is seen in the negation of these two 
categories, for example in the notion of becoming, which incorporates both 
being and nothingness. 
On the other side of this spectrum, Deleuze examines Leibniz’ concept of 
difference and infinity. For Hegel, every time a seemingly final identity is 
reached, it opens up another negation, while for Leibniz one can never fully 
list all the predicates that make something what it is.329 This results in Leibniz’ 
engagement with infinitely small differences, which prevents him from ever 
being able to adequately define identity. Every time a final definition is 
reached, it can be undone by uncovering more tiny differences: This is a dog, 
she is a labrador, she is female, yellow, with orange colouring on her back and 
shoulders, her tail is often wagging, she likes to eat, she has had two 
operations, she likes to swim, ad infinitum. Thus, it becomes as impossible to 
define an object fully as to claim that this is it. Deleuze’s account of the 
relationship between difference and representation will clarify further the 
critiques of Leibniz and Hegel. This is the kind of transcendent metaphysics 
we outlined earlier, one which sees thought as infinite representation, such as 
Hegel’s idea of Spirit. 
To understand the point at which Deleuze’s search for difference enters into 
conflict with the concept of representation, we need to return to Plato, who 
Deleuze charges with establishing the initial relationship between identity 
and representation. For Plato, difference is evident in the way we know the 
world via a hierarchical order: the original on top and its copies beneath it. 
The original is what possesses true identity and everything else is modelled 
on it. This original is in the realm of Ideas, of pure ideal forms, while the real 
world is simulating these Ideas. This naturally supports hierarchy – the closer 
a copy is to the original Idea, the better the copy is, while the further away it 
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is, the less we can actually claim to ‘know’ it.  
Thus, the first form of representation we discuss in this chapter is 
epistemological representation in the form of Platonic Ideas. Representation, 
in this sense, is the ‘mediation’ between things, which makes possible the 
comparison between the Idea and the copy: does the copy represent the pure 
form well? Is it a ‘good’ copy?  Representation, in the form of resemblance, is 
the mechanism that preserves transcendence according to the Neo-Platonic 
triad of participation.330 In the triad, the claimant is validated only on the 
basis of its resemblance with the original, and not just any resemblance, but 
an internal noetic resemblance to the Idea. Of course, this naturally leads 
Plato to the question of essence – the goal of his philosophy becomes to 
detach each object from what it is immanent to and evaluate it in relation to 
the transcendent Idea of its pure essence. To briefly give an example, a ‘table’ 
is not understood through its immanent manifestation of an object where 
food is placed (a table for our picnic was the grass), but in relation to what the 
Idea of a table is in the abstract (‘grass’ is not a ‘table’). This is the error 
Deleuze points at in Plato – difference is again subsumed under identity and 
resemblance. Thus, Deleuze identifies as his task the overturning (or 
reversing) of Plato’s philosophy.331 
The main reason why these philosophers have been unable to conceptualise 
difference, Deleuze argues, is because they have presupposed the inherent 
difference of ‘being’. The move Deleuze sees as necessary for a true 
understanding of difference-in-itself is one towards an understanding of all 
being as equally ‘real’. Existence, Deleuze tells us, is applicable to all 
entities.332 At the heart of Deleuze’s ability to define difference is a notion 
which follows from Duns Scotus, Spinoza and Nietzsche – the univocity of 
Being. These philosophers, according to Deleuze, are united in their 
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recognition that all events, objects and phenomena are equally real and part 
of the same being.333 This is essential for Deleuze’s argument as he posits that 
only in univocity can we see pure difference. Moreover, it is through 
univocity that Deleuze ultimately grounds his metaphysics of immanence. 
Whilst Lambert argues that Deleuze avoids the problem of transcendence 
through the concept of the Other Person,334 I align with a more Spinozist 
approach, which we will explore next. 
In a seminar on Scholasticism from his course of lectures in 1973-1974, 
Deleuze defines equivocity as follows:  
Those who were called the partisans of equivocity, no matter who they 
were, argued a very simple thing: that the different senses of the word 
‘being’ were without common measure and that, in all rigor – and what 
is interesting in theology are always the limit points at which heresy 
peeks out . . . Well then, the heretical point of equivocity is that those 
who said that being is said in several senses, and that these different 
senses have no common measure, understood that at the limit they 
would have preferred to say: ‘God is not,’ rather than to say ‘He is’ to the 
extent that ‘He is’ was an utterance which was said of the table or the 
chair. Or else He is in such an equivocal manner, such a different 
manner, without common measure with the being of the chair, with the 
being of man, etc... that, all things considered, it’s much better to say: He 
is not, which means: He is superior to being.335 
This double bind of, on one side, the necessity for the existence of God, and 
on the other, the impossibility of His existence to be the same as human 
existence, creates an interesting paradox. By positing the incomparable 
difference of ‘being’ at the heart of their theology, Scholastic philosophers had 
to rely on representation to extrapolate difference. Platonism, Deleuze argues, 
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is also supported by the notion of equivocity of being, whereby there is 
always a primary category, an ‘original’ that other beings are subordinate 
to.336 This heterogeneity of being also precludes the possibility of positive 
knowledge of the divine, positing it as transcendent of human experience. 
Equivocity, then, causes an insurmountable problem in Christian theology, 
which Nathan Widder exemplifies with an epistemological dilemma for 
moral knowledge reminiscent of Zeno’s paradox:337 one cannot know 
God/Good if it is so infinitely removed from all being, and if it is impossible 
to know God, then it is impossible to hierarchically structure beings according 
to their relation to God. 
However, Aristotle’s method of analogy provided an answer to that problem. 
This holds that existence is said in different senses in relation to beings, but 
these senses are united under a commonality through relations of analogy.338 
In relation to categories, when we say that something ‘is’, that existence is 
often thought to be different depending on the thing that exists. For example, 
a dog exists in a different way to a unicorn, or the concept of alienation. 
However, it is possible to place ‘dog’ in the category of animals by drawing 
an analogy with other animals, and ‘unicorn’ in the category of ‘imaginary’. 
This example is particularly interesting, because the unicorn is also an animal, 
but would not be conceptualised as such because it is said to ‘exist’ in a 
different way. Categories, both in Aristotle and later in Kant, are groupings of 
the different senses of being, which means they can be either too universal 
(applicable to every possible object, such as in Hegel), or too differential 
(being is said in several senses at once).339 
In Deleuze’s words, this points to a problem where “analogy falls into an 
unresolvable difficulty: it must essentially relate being to particular existents, 
but at the same time it cannot say what constitutes their individuality. For it 
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retains in the particular only that which conforms to the general (matter and 
form) and seeks the principle of individuation in this or that element of the 
fully constituted individuals.”340 Thus, it explains being only insofar as it is 
understood through categories, but is incapable of formulating the difference 
between members of the category, and can only point at their different 
attributes. Even though both members are in the category of ‘human’, one is 
Socrates and the other Aristotle. Thus, the problem of conceptualising 
difference through analogy is that it is reliant on the notion of categories. 
Analogy, in that sense, is in opposition to univocity because it inverts the 
categories of commonality and difference. 
Following Deleuze’s argument, the only ontological proposition that remains 
available is univocity. This notion of univocity is indebted to Spinoza’s 
understanding of attributes, affects and modes as all being part of the One 
(God in his case). Deleuze writes, “[b]eing is said in a single and same sense 
of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of 
difference itself.”341 In univocal systems, rather than existence being 
heterogeneous, all beings are said to exist equally, but are expressed in a 
different sense. In Spinozist terms, all Being is an expression of God. It is all 
the same substance, divided in different modes, attributes and affects. Thus, 
Deleuze is able to claim that, for example, mind and matter are not two binary 
opposed categories where one ‘originates in’ the other, but are attributes of 
the same Being; that, in fact, a human is both a mode of the attribute of mind 
and a mode of the attribute of matter.342 Since all beings are equally ‘real’, this 
precludes the notion that there can be a Being (God or another transcendent 
entity), which is outside of it all. The notion of immanence is thus also 
contained in the univocity of Being. In his later work with Guattari, Deleuze 
would present this in the “magical” formula pluralism=monism.343 Deleuze’s 
overturning of Platonism can only be achieved through a rejection of 
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transcendence.344 
 Equivocity Homogeneity Different being, different 
expression, impossible to 
know 
Analogy Heterogeneity in 
homogeneity  
Different being, but some 
commonality. Knowledge 
possible through analogy 
Univocity Heterogeneity Same being, different 
expression 
 
To return to difference, if univocity is necessary for conceptualising 
difference-in-itself, it also produces particular implications about what 
difference is. Univocity implies that difference is a real (as opposed to mental, 
or abstract) entity and can be conceptualised in itself, not merely as a 
secondary characteristic of each individual being. Instead of, for example, 
thinking of dogs (primary identity) as different in relation to their colour 
(secondary characteristic), it would mean thinking of each dog/colour as 
different in itself. Difference is the multiplicity of existence. Deleuze 
conceptualises it as follows:  
Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. 
The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the 
corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of 
something distinguished from something else, imagine something which 
distinguishes itself – and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does 
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not distinguish itself from it.345 
Levi Bryant gives an illuminating example of this notion: if the universe 
consisted of only one note, at the same frequency, for eternity, then that 
would constitute a complete lack of difference. The note would not differ 
from anything else, neither would it differ to anyone.346 Difference, he claims, 
is anything that ‘makes a difference’. This is congruent with Deleuze’s own 
critique of difference explained through categories. Here being is stasis, 
possible to be ‘fixed’ at either end of the spectrum of universal/differential. 
This analogical model is reliant on representational logic to signify equivocity 
in a univocal fashion. Deleuze’s model of difference, instead, takes it as a 
fluid, active field. As Colebrook observes, “univocity precludes the idea that a 
state of completion or rest will ever come about”.347 
Williams claims that here Deleuze sets the ground for A Thousand Plateaus’ 
later rumination on sedentary and nomadic distribution, aiming to show how 
categorisation operates in terms of univocity of Being.348 For Williams, this 
type of distribution of being corresponds to sedentary distribution, where 
“judgment operates by allocating things to different pre-established 
categories.”349 Nomadic distribution is where things cannot be measured or 
fitted into categories, because we do not have access to the reason why things 
are distributed in such ways. Sedimentary distribution, thus, cannot account 
for the ways in which things change and evolve outside the categories they 
have been assigned. 
To conclude this section, what we are left with after Deleuze’s critique is a 
notion of difference-in-itself, expressed in the pure differentiation of one 
univocal being. The constitutive elements of reality are thus radically 
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heterogenous, but with one common source. However, this conceptualization 
of difference poses a new problem for Deleuze. As Williams has convincingly 
argued, he needs to account for how things acquire any determinacy at all 
given the foundational role of difference.350 This is where the entry of the 
concept of repetition reveals the more process-oriented and materialist 
elements of Deleuze’s philosophy. 
2.2.5 Repetition 
Repetition lies at the heart of difference and also Deleuze’s understanding of 
time. It should not be understood as merely a process of repeating the same 
again and again. Rather, it is a process of re-occurrence, but one that also 
entails variation with every repetition. It is connected to difference in terms of 
being a process of production – producing difference in every repetition, but 
it is also what creates the impression of fixed identities and essence. Similar to 
Nietzsche’s eternal return in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the 
idea of eternal recurrence where entities repeat infinitely in the world is taken 
by Deleuze to complete his proposition of the univocity of Being as it allows 
him to account for new things emerging. The eternal return creates a 
continuation where a final state can never be achieved – everything continues 
to happen infinitely. However, it is not just the same being constantly 
repeated without anything radically new ever happening; the eternal return is 
joyful and affirming of life. In a move away from Hegel, the eternal return 
does not imply the repetition of the same historical moment over human 
development since there is no identity at the heart of repetition. On the 
contrary, if life is a process and everything that ‘is’ is the same Being, then 
difference exists in itself, not as a property of another object. Thus, if each 
event is different and transforms life, then life becomes different from itself 
with every return of the same. This is the repetition at the heart of difference 
which Deleuze discovers. Each repetition of difference is different – the 
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eternal return of difference.  Repetition is conceptualised by Deleuze through 
the three syntheses of time, which simultaneously reveal a complex 
understanding of time and space that is not reliant on narratives. We will now 
examine these in more detail. 
The first synthesis of time is concerned with the relationship between past, 
present and future.351 It emerges from Deleuze’s initial critique of the image 
of thought. It is concerned with whether there is a pure beginning in 
philosophy, with the transcendental conditions of knowledge. The question: 
in a world of pure differences, what is the determined given that repetition is 
based on? Deleuze’s answer to this is, again, the immanent, the ‘living 
present’. This living present takes the form of cases or particular situations 
where something is expected, such as Hume’s example of an AB, AB, AB, A 
series, where we expect B to follow. We also find it in Bergson’s clock 
performing the sequence A’, A’’, A’’’, where the next strike is expected.352 
What Deleuze is trying to tease out is the relationship between repetition and 
expectancy. In traditional models of thinking, repetition would be 
conceptualised as the same event taking place at different moments of time, 
but Deleuze wants to show that repetition is not related to the instances that 
repeat. His argument is that there is no causal relationship between A and B 
explaining them following one another. Repetition, thus, has to be understood 
in the observation of A and B, rather than as a property of them, while 
expectation of B after A is a contraction of all the past into the instance of the 
A, mapped out indefinitely towards the future. Moreover, for the process of 
repetition to occur, the observer does not need to consciously think about 
repetition or expect it – it is an unconscious passive process of projecting onto 
the future through the living present. Thus, it follows that repetition is also 
not dependent on a specifically ‘human’ mind, a fully-formed ‘individual 
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self’, since it takes place in the unconscious.353 For Deleuze, it also follows that 
time is created by this form of habitual repetition: “habit is the foundation of 
time, the moving soil occupied by the passing present.”354 
The second synthesis of time, on the other hand, is about the present itself and 
its transience, occurring simultaneously with the first one. With the second 
synthesis, Deleuze is trying to account for memory – or remembering – in the 
present, but without having to ground it in a fully constructed human 
subjectivity. Again, memory, as it is usually thought of, involves a subject that 
is capable of preserving it. It is the act of remembering that brings the past 
back. However, Deleuze sticks to his materialist roots by arguing that the past 
is something outside of the human mind, existing independently of subjects 
and even physical records: 
It is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past 
in general, as an a priori past, that a given former present is reproducible 
and the present present is able to reflect itself.355  
If habits found time, then memory grounds it. His position relies on a 
transcendental deduction of the present. First of all, the present always 
contains a bit of the past in itself. Every present is ‘passing’, which means that 
an aspect of it is already in the past. Secondly, this aspect of the present is 
always past for the future aspect of the present, but a ‘past’ that is constitutive 
of the aspects of the presents that have not passed yet. In a more 
mathematical sense, if we have two entities, we automatically have a third 
one as well (the sum of the two of them). In the same way, if we take the 
actual past as one of the entities and the past aspect of the present as the 
second entity, we will end up with the present present as the combination of 
both of these entities. So, the present is constituted by all the past events plus 
the immediate past present: “all of the past coexists with the new present in 
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relation to which it is now past.”356 To return to memory and remembering, if 
the present presupposes all the past events and all the past elements of each 
present through the virtue of being constituted by them, that then points to 
the need for a passive synthesis of the past which exists a priori for the present 
to happen. Finally, this synthesis is passive because it doesn’t have to be 
actively ‘remembered’, but it is a condition for memory, or anything else, in 
the present, to exist.  
Both the first and second syntheses of time are about contraction. The first 
regards a contraction of the present, past and future and the second all of the 
past. The third synthesis, however, is of the future and of the eternal return.357 
Following a discussion about Kant’s subject, Deleuze suggests that there is 
another synthesis of time, one which is concerned with the conditions for 
actions that create the new. This drive towards the new suggests a severance 
of the present – to lead to something new, the future cuts the present from the 
past in such a way as to project something new. However, once this cut is 
implemented, it also needs to assemble everything, to connect back the pure 
past with the future. And finally, during the re-assembly, some events from 
the past remain in the past and cannot return, while others are re-connected 
and can be relived. An example of the third synthesis (one familiar to 
anarchists) is to think about revolution as one event that entirely changes the 
present so that the past is structured in terms of that event.  
The third synthesis might seem like a contradiction of the second one – the 
possibility of a cut where time radically changes combined with time as a 
totality of all past and present(s). This is precisely where Deleuze finds the 
eternal return and where the concepts of difference and repetition meet.358 
What keeps returning after every cut in time is made is difference. Essence or 
identities are what disappear when a cut re-orders, but pure difference keeps 
coming back. To go deeper we need to understand reality in terms of 
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something like the virtual and actual – terms that Deleuze argues express the 
complex processes and happenings in the world and the way we experience 
them as limited beings. To take an example of DeLanda’s, a knife can be 
considered to be the actual knife that we can see and touch, but also contains 
the virtual, expressed in what a knife can do – the unfolding possibilities of 
cutting, chopping, blunting, but also, importantly, threatening, killing, 
performing.359 
A common mistake, and one that Badiou makes too, is to map out the virtual 
directly onto the actual in the form of a transcendent pool of possibilities.360 
However, for Deleuze the virtual does not translate directly onto the actual, 
neither does it entail some form of causality. The virtual is the field of 
intensities that is not always accounted for in the materiality of the object, but 
is nevertheless necessary for this object to exist. Thus, the virtual and the 
actual are not balanced. It is straightforward to point out that things that exist 
emerge out of a field of virtuals which is greater than the ones selected for 
actualization, but, more importantly, though many virtualities do not get 
translated in the actual they are nonetheless ‘real’. A knife would not be a 
knife unless it contained these unactualised properties. However, we should 
be careful not to take as our formula ‘virtual=potential’ and ‘actual=realised’, 
as there is more to the virtual than a field of possibilities. The actual, 
containing discrete entities, is opposed to the virtual, containing Events, 
singularities and everything that is part of the pure past – in a sense, the 
virtual is best seen in the example of the second synthesis, where all of the 
past is contained in the present present. In a similar manner, all of the virtual 
is contained in the actual but it can never coincide entirely with it, and in a 
similar manner the virtual brings about the actual, but it does not identify 
with that actualisation. Moreover, that implies that the movement is not in a 
linear direction from the virtual to the actual, but that there is a circular 
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movement from the virtual to the actual, back to the virtual and round again. 
This circular conception of time owes a great deal to Bergson’s formulation of 
time as durée rather than linear.361 It is perhaps best to give an example. 
Similarly to the old philosophical problem of mind and body, today we have 
an unbridgeable (it seems) divide between human experiences and 
neuroscientific observation, where brain scans show us what the brain ‘does’, 
but cannot translate human experiences – we can see which areas of the brain 
light up, but cannot transfer that data into experience. A parallel exists with a 
story written on a computer. On one hand, the story exists as a combination of 
ones and zeros on a magnetic component, but on the other hand is something 
more than just that – it is a story with sense and meaning and, perhaps more 
importantly, contingently in a particular form and container. However, once 
someone begins to read it, it has entered a process of becoming something 
different than just bits. This is clearly not a relationship of causality, because 
there has not been a transition from computer code to human code in a cause-
effect relationship. Indeed, both of these exist at the same time and are 
equally valid methods of ‘understanding’ the story. The virtual is a way of 
recognising this relationship as something in itself and not subsuming it 
under other forms.  
Thus, Deleuze is able to claim that the virtual is also real – that is, the virtual 
properties of things produce real effects even if we cannot know or test them 
simply by examining an object in its current set of relations. These potential 
properties, the virtual, are actualised in a series of repetitions – “intensities 
come into relation with each other through repetition.”362 It is important to 
introduce the notion of intensities here, as they are somewhat eliminated in 
the actual.363 The intensive field is what accounts for the movement from 
virtual to actual. In chapter five of Difference and Repetition Deleuze follows 
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some distinctions from physics to discern intensive qualities from extensive 
ones. Intensities in physics are thought of as forces that cause a change in 
nature, rather than a change in degree. Temperature, for example, is an 
intensive relation, causing qualitative difference of feeling, while an extensive 
relation would cause change in the criterion for quantitative measurement. In 
the example of water, changing the intensive field of temperature past a 
certain threshold will turn water into steam, but will not change the number 
of molecules involved. For Deleuze, intensity is similarly used to refer to the 
intensification of quality, that is, the process through which the quality 
becomes itself.364 That becoming, however, is not the quality itself, as the 
becoming hot of water is not the quality of hotness that water can have. 
Reality therefore emerges from this complex relationship between the virtual 
and the actual, which is produced through intensive becomings. 
Intensities, appearing through processes of repetition, are not a form of 
identity or essence for Deleuze. Repetition, he is clear from the very first page, 
should not be thought of in terms of representation or identity: “Repetition is 
not generality.”365 Repetition, insofar as it is seen as this A sharing 
characteristics with that A, implies that all A’s could be referred to as a form 
of general A. This is why repetition differs from resemblance – resemblance is 
what would allow us to generalise. Deleuze instead claims that “to repeat is 
to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular 
which has no equal or equivalent”366 – a ‘repetition-in-itself’. In that sense, 
repetition is never purely repetition of the same, as a thing can never be the 
same as any other due to (perhaps only slight)367 variations. Therefore, 
repetition and difference always come together, as for one to exist it is reliant 
on the other. The significant difference between representation in a 
framework of transcendence and repetition in an immanent one is the aspect 
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of production/creation. 
To extend the problematisation of representation and move us towards a 
conceptualisation of non-representational ontology, we need to draw again on 
the virtual/actual. As we discussed, for Deleuze the actual and the virtual are 
asymmetrical fields, where “every actuality is accompanied by the virtual 
rather than pre-empted by the possible.”368 In practice this implies that the 
world is not given in advance as a set of possibilities that can be actualised at 
certain moments, or as a set of material re-presentations of true forms that 
exist in the ephemera. All virtualities and actualities come together and come 
at once. Thinking non-representationally therefore means acknowledging this 
immanence and rejecting the hierarchy of media – for example, 
understanding the photograph not as an image-representation of a book, but 
as a photograph in itself, as its own object that does something different to 
representing a book. Surely, this is not to deny that representation happens, 
but to reformulate it as a productive relationship, for example of 
photographing. The focus here then shifts from understanding certain 
practices as representation to understanding their productive aspect. 
The notion that is at the core of Plato’s philosophy, which Deleuze wants to 
overturn, is that representation entails a relationship of signification between 
two different entities, usually termed ‘the original’ and ‘the copy. Plato’s 
effort to discern between reality and appearance, which Deleuze bases on a 
reading of the Sophist, is based on an ontology which prioritises identity and 
the conditions of possible, rather than real experience. Plato’s allegory of the 
cave famously presents representation as simulacra of true objects. As Widder 
explains, here “a physical object is a copy of its Form, while simulacra such as 
shadows, reflections, mirages, and even artwork, are copies of the physical 
object.”369 A simulacrum (representation) is thus merely a copy defined in 
relation to how accurately it portrays the original.  In Plato, time is repetition 
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of the same, sameness always in the form of a representation of Ideas. Ideas, 
in that sense, are Ideal Forms. As Dorothea Olkowski observes, the critique 
provided by Deleuze is that simulacra have characteristics of their own which 
makes them distinct from being merely a ‘copy’.370 Daniel W. Smith’s example 
is that “empirically speaking, a mother is not only a mother, but also a 
daughter, a lover, perhaps a wife; but what Plato would call the Idea of a 
mother is a thing that would only be what it is, a mother that would be 
nothing but a mother.”371 Moreover, with Deleuze’s reformulation of Ideas as 
transformative fields which we discussed earlier, simulacra are not simple 
imitation but “systems in which different relates to different by means of 
difference itself”372 with no prior identity or resemblance which can serve as a 
foundation for representation. The simulacrum is based on internal 
disparity,373 on the differential nature of the Idea which does not come from a 
previous identity. Having already established univocity of being and 
immanence, Deleuze conceives of simulacra not as ‘copies’ of something 
outside this world, but as constitutive of reality. 
In this sense, representation changes from a mediating relationship between 
different entities in the world, such as words and objects, or mediating 
between reality and the transcendent realm (of Ideas, Forms, etc), to having 
an expressive power, becoming co-productive of reality: repetition is a 
productive process of difference, rather than a representation of something 
‘outside’. Moreover, through this ontology of univocity and the 
conceptualisation of difference and repetition, we can also return to our initial 
statement that Deleuze is a materialist – that is, he focuses on bodies and the 
relations they enter.  In the metaphysics of immanence so far, Deleuze is 
compelled to acknowledge that physical bodies are inextricably linked to 
what constitutes a ‘being’, which is itself an effect of processes of repetition. 
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The next step of our argument, then, is to examine his theory of 
individuation, or, to pose it as a question, what is the ‘being’ in which the 
three syntheses happen? 
2.2.6 The theory of individuation 
Deleuze’s challenge in relation to subjectivity is well defined by Constantin 
Boundas: 
A process philosophy, in order to support a purely heterological thought, 
has to be capable of doing without subjects steering the process (or being 
steered by it), without substantive names designating ‘blocks’ in motion, 
and without points of origin or destination marking the allowed 
trajectory. Only a process philosophy where process and product are the 
same can hope to prevent the subordination, in the final analysis, of 
difference to identity.374 
Thus, what emerges from Difference and Repetition is a theory of individuation 
as preceding the individual – the individual as a product of a process of 
individuation. The notion of repetition we discussed earlier rejected an 
understanding of the individual as an agent in relation to time. The process of 
individuation is not simply genesis – it involves a field of intensities which 
becomes what Deleuze and Guattari later term the ‘plane of immanence’. 
Individuation is the function which mediates the relation between the virtual 
and the actual, allowing Deleuze to shift the focus of transcendental 
philosophy from the possible to the real. As we have already discussed, the 
virtual and the actual do not correspond to the possible and the real as they 
are both already in the realm of the real.375 In addition, the virtual/actual 
differ from the possible/real in terms of the process of movement from one to 
the other. The virtual becomes actual through ‘actualisation’, which is 
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comprised of difference and creation while the possible becomes real through 
‘realisation’, a process that includes limitation and resemblance.376  
To expand on this, individuation is a process of actualization that equalizes 
intensities, and even though all intensities are unique to their own field, their 
actualities could resemble one another, which is why we tend to see the end 
product of this process as an identity between, say, all cats, all humans, all 
knives or all eyeballs. To put this another way, an individual is a result of the 
process of individuation, which, because of the processes of actualization, is 
the real process behind what we term ‘representation’ or ‘identity’. The 
intensities that are the condition for actualization are not necessarily obvious 
at the end of the process. Moreover, this account of individuation provides an 
explanation for the appearance of binary oppositions and allows for taking a 
step beyond them. To emphasize Deleuze’s materialism, difference is a 
process – it is not a noun; it is a process of differentiation in the actual and a 
process of differenciation in the virtual. Difference is the name of the process of 
moving from the virtual to the actual and back to the virtual, where we have 
not a linear progression but a constant movement from state of affairs to 
virtual tendencies and then back, into a transformed state of affairs.377 This 
becoming is what the ‘individual’ is – a multiplicity of different intensities 
that constantly shifts as some come into focus and others disappear. 
The theory of individuation is drawn in part from the work of Jacques Lacan 
and his concept of the Other, though Deleuze (with Guattari) will later rail 
against Lacan’s conclusions in Anti-Oedipus. Lacan constructs a theory of 
human subjectivity based on an interaction with the Other.378 An individual 
and their identity is created in a dialectical process of opposing oneself to the 
Other through language. This binary opposition sets the boundary between 
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oneself and the Other, which itself represents the unknown, the frightening 
and, subsequently, the excluded and marginalised. Unlike Lacan’s theory, 
which is limited by always privileging one identity in the process of negation, 
thus constituting, for example, women as negation of men (a problem we 
discuss in 1.3.2), Deleuze’s theory of individuation explains binary 
oppositions like gender (woman as the Other par excellence) as intensities on a 
continuum. The psychoanalytic model of One vs. the Other is replaced with a 
multiplicity of machines with different connections. The appearance of male 
and female gender clusters can be explained as a greater likelihood for the 
actualisation of these identities on a broad spectrum of virtualities – a 
likelihood increased due to the social structures immanent to the process. 
Another example of this production is the formation of a snowflake, where 
certain singularities tend to be more ‘attractive’, thus producing particular 
structural tendencies in the crystalline product. The result is that these 
appearances are taken to be essences, such that the essence of human is to be 
male or female, the essence of a woman is to be a mother, etc. Binaries are a 
simplification of a much wider range of possible outcomes which fail to 
account for the multiple ways people experience gender. In Logic of Sense, 
Deleuze further develops this notion:  
As a general rule, two things are simultaneously affirmed only to the 
extent that their difference is denied, suppressed from within . . . it is 
generally through identity that opposites are affirmed at the same time, 
whether we accentuate one of the opposites in order to find the other, or 
whether we create a synthesis of the two.379  
Difference is thus an essential part of the process of individuation, which 
results in its constant reproduction and demands a recognition of subjectivity 
as dynamic and in a process of becoming. Therefore, instead of discussing 
static subjectivity as a dialectical outcome, Deleuze prefers to engage with 
modes of individuation, as we will elaborate on later using his works with 
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Guattari. 
2.3 Events and series  
Having established the metaphysical foundation of difference, we can finally 
turn to ethics. The first thing to point out is that Deleuze is engaging with 
what is more commonly seen as ‘metaethics’, or the presuppositions of ethical 
philosophy, rather than applied or normative ethics. This is not to say that the 
distinction between philosophical presuppositions and practical ethics holds 
true for Deleuzian metaphysics, as I have already mentioned in relation to 
theory and practice in the introduction. The image of thought comes from 
practices and immediately has practical results. For this reason, it has been 
first necessary to establish the metaphysics of difference, repetition and sense 
as the context in which ethical problems appear both as ‘ethical’ and as 
‘problems’. In other words, the previous section addressed the conditions of 
possibility of an ethical event, while the main question of this section is the 
event itself. 
2.3.1 Singularities and morphogenesis 
Deleuze’s account of what constitutes reality, and in particular his work on 
time and space, is so far both strangely deterministic and chaotic at the same 
time. Difference, encompassed in a univocal Being, is paired with repetition to 
produce a system apparently without scope for either randomness or agency.  
In our presentation so far, we have not adequately accounted for change, or 
the question of how change is possible. Even though there is always 
variation/difference in repetition, this cannot suffice to explain the 
appearance of something new. Indeed, it seems that reality is determined to 
follow a course of repeating patterns. The Logic of Sense, published in French 
in 1969, a year after Difference and Repetition, is concerned with 
conceptualising some elements of agency and the conditions of the new in the 
form of Events and series. It should not be taken to be a book about choice or 
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self-determination, or even about consequences of actions, however, it does 
introduce a crucial concept for our reformulation of ethics: the ‘Event’. Before 
we disappear down the rabbit hole, I will clarify the concept of series, which 
is a useful way of understanding how patterns of repetition come to exist. 
This will enhance our understanding of genders from the previous example 
(as patterns of repetition), but also human subjectivity in general, as well as 
the production of social and environmental tendencies. 
The production of series is a result of repetition and the way it forms 
structures of relations. Series, then, are repetitive patterns which are 
disrupted by events that introduce difference. Rather than seeing the world as 
a chaotic set of connections and bodies, the concept of series serves to explain 
the processes through which singularities become visible. Deleuze’s own 
definition of singularity seems quite elusive, as exemplified in his claim that:  
[s]ingularities are turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, 
knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion and condensation, and 
boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 
‘sensitive’ points.380 
Singularity, in a way, could be taken to replace the concept of particularity, 
emphasizing the same focus on uniqueness. Manuel DeLanda points to the 
influence of the differential calculus of Gauss and Riemann on the Deleuzian 
notion of singularity.381 Singularities in physics serve as attractors in a 
manifold (“a geometrical space with certain characteristic properties”).382 To 
explain manifolds, DeLanda gives an example: speed and space are two 
possible ways of understanding how an object (or system) can change. A 
pendulum (a relatively simple system) can only change in these two ways – 
momentum and position – while a (simplified model of a) dog, which has 
four paws, a tail, a head and a torso, can change in fourteen ways as each 
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different element can change position and momentum relative to the others. 
Thus, a pendulum would have two degrees of freedom and a dog would have 
fourteen. Each degree of freedom becomes a different dimension of the 
manifold, and can be mapped onto a possibility space, describing all possible 
relative positions of the elements.383 In a manifold, there can be any number 
of degrees of freedom and their trajectory could be completely random. Yet 
there are certain tendencies that emerge more often than others in models 
with more than two degrees of freedom. This recurrent behavior is due to 
topological features, which the mathematician Poincare named 
singularities.384 When modelled in this way, the tendencies of a system reveal 
themselves as attractors, causing certain distributions of probabilities which 
would be obscure in any static ‘snapshot’ of a system at any given point in 
time.  
When it comes to non-mathematical patterns, singularities operate much the 
same way. They are still pre-individual, that is, preceding the composition of 
human subjectivity. Singularities, in that sense, serve to explain why certain 
features of bodies appear more often than others, instead of the completely 
heterogeneous system implied by difference and repetition. Thus, if we take, 
for example, subjectivity to be the effect of a problematic field, singularities are 
the focal points around which solutions are organised.385 We can apply this to 
the example of a snowflake, which, due to the tension and variety of forces 
between different particles, always ends up being hexagonal. The snowflake’s 
shape is a direct result of surface tension and the constitution of water 
molecules in ice. Rather than understanding this feature to be the ‘essence’ of 
a snowflake, the notion of singularity allows us to understand the causal 
relationship between the environment and certain tendencies (i.e. to be 
hexagonal) appearing more often than others. The notion of singularity, 
moreover, does more than explain patterns, as it is directly related to the 
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Event, which we turn to next.  
2.3.2 Willing the Event  
An Event, introduced in The Logic of Sense, is a concept Deleuze intially 
borrows from the Stoics. It is an incorporeal entity which refers to the totality 
of the effects of different bodies.386 It runs through series and transforms the 
relations of sense in them, thus being also a singularity. Sense, another 
concept Deleuze introduces, is also incorporeal, and is best understood in 
relation to linguistics. Drawing on Bertrand Russell’s three linguistic elements 
of denotation, manifestation and signification, Deleuze proposes that these 
are not sufficient to explain all elements of language. He explains sense as the 
attribution of importance on propositions. The role of sense is “to include 
changes in the relations of value-terms we associate with events.”387 Thus, 
series are conceptualised as neutral systems of repetitive patterns in which 
sense brings in meaning or value. The Event breaks this series by creating the 
possibility to transform the collective, returning us to the realm of ethics.388 
This transformation, however, is often structured in accordance with various 
points of attraction (singularities), which create certain tendencies towards 
which changes gravitate.  
Rather than thinking about Events as something that occur in the mind, 
Events are ”jets of singularities”389 that encompass a multiplicity of bodies, 
virtual structures, physical bodies and elements of signification such as 
language and morality. They are not necessarily limited to a period of time, 
but they always happen on two levels – the moment of actualisation of the 
event, when it is embodied in the state of affairs (both personally and 
collectively), and the future and past of the event which are not bound to the 
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state of affairs.390 All bodies are causes in relation to each other. Deleuze goes 
on to say that: 
[t]he distinction, however, is not between two sorts of events; rather, it is 
between the event, which is ideal by nature, and its spatio-temporal 
realization in a state of affairs. The distinction is between event and 
accident.391 
The ‘ideal Event’, however, does not refer back to Platonism, but puts an 
emphasis on the fact that events are “the necessary conditions for thinking of 
the constitution of new states of affairs, as well as for thinking the constitution 
of the states of affairs which will be understood as past in relation to these 
latter.”392 It is also for this reason that Deleuze suggests that Event is a verb, 
since it refers to a state in the past and the future, but its present is elusive. As 
in the example of Alice and the mushroom, ‘to grow’ is in both directions at 
the same time – it is to become larger than Alice is, but also smaller in relation 
to future Alice. This problematisation of there always being a determinable 
direction of becoming points to Deleuze’s concern to reverse the common 
sense direction of cause and effect: “to be punished before having committed 
a fault, to cry before having pricked oneself.”393 Thus, Deleuze binds the 
Event to Aion, infinite time, the time of the eternal return, which cannot be 
reduced to Chronos, the historical linearity of time in which events occur. 
Events, then, substitute Platonic essences as singularities that repeat 
indefinitely in time, suggesting a process-oriented ontology. Deleuze does 
this to move the Event from the domain of phenomenology into a pre-
individuated state and thus become able to collapse individual/collective or 
particular/general distinctions. 
The Event-singularity, therefore, is a central concept in Deleuze’s thinking 
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about ethics. The Event is experienced both collectively and individually, 
encompassing both actual and virtual structures. But it should also not be 
understood as simply a new beginning or a radical break in a series – it is an 
alteration, a change in the series of processes. Unlike Badiou’s reformulation 
of the Event, for Deleuze to “simply declare the event to be the rupture of a 
continuous state is not only to grant an unwarranted normative status to that 
state, but also to posit the break with it in terms that are both blind and 
transcendent.”394 That is to say, the Event does not lose its virtual elements 
when it becomes actualised. The multi-levelled view of reality we presented 
earlier is preserved in relation to the Event. An Event runs through different 
series in a non-linear way, making it impossible to map out or predict. In this 
sense, series should not be taken as sequences, and their ‘logic’ is not formal 
and deductive, but fluid and changing. 
Deleuze suggests the instance of a battle as the quintessential Event.395 The 
battle is an immanent combination of spatio-temporal arrangements, actors 
and actions, each of which are only able to grasp its actualisation but not its 
entirety. The battle is present, it hovers over the field, even though it is not 
tangible and material in the same sense as a weapon is. The two separate 
manifestations of the event, ideal and spatio-temporal, refer to its virtual and 
actual state, and each of them is manifested as both universal and particular, 
personal and collective. It is also in this sense that the battle is a process. Even 
when the physical battle is over, the Event-battle remains as an indefinite 
extension of this battle in the future, such as the lingering power of D-Day or 
the Battle of Hastings. The battle, however, is an easy example, as we might 
think of it as an ‘event’ in the common sense of the word anyway. Other 
examples Deleuze gives are a chair, a garden and the Great Pyramid.396 Chair 
as Event, for example, is the process of repetition of a singularity (which 
could be confused as essence), which has arisen out of a problematic field, in 
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the Deleuzian sense of problems discussed earlier. In less Deleuzian language, 
somebody one day had the need for a chair, invented a four-legged platform 
to sit on, called it a ‘chair’, and since then we have been affirming it as the 
solution of the sitting-down problem through a continuous reproduction of 
chairs and the Idea of ‘chairness’. The process of movement from ideal event 
to its spatio-temporal appearance is what we have referred to as actualization, 
and the reverse process of the event dissolving back into time is what Deleuze 
calls counter-actualization.397   
At this point the role of actors within the Event becomes important. Deleuze-
inspired onticologists such as Levi Bryant suggest that since it is relations that 
constitute collectivity, we can break away from anthropocentrism.398 
Therefore, any object/individual/material or immaterial thing can be an 
actor, as long as it “modifies a state of affairs by making a difference.”399 The 
example provided by Latour is the remote control, which modifies the state of 
affairs by turning someone into a couch potato. In this line of thought, the 
Event itself becomes one among a pool of actors. The importance of accepting 
objects, or even things such as the environment, as actors, according to 
Bryant, is that it allows us to understand how an event can also become an 
actor within a collective400 and change it in subsequent states of affairs. To go 
back to the example of the battle, it would exemplify how a battle can change 
one’s life long after the fighting has finished – the event of the battle may 
have disappeared, but the actor-Battle has remained in the experiences of 
other participants.401 Even if Deleuze does not explicitly align with this 
position, this seems to be mostly congruent with the way he talks about 
‘actors’ in his later works with Guattari through the concept of machines. 
Finally, this compels us to acknowledge that the event is something that 
actors find themselves in, something that binds all actors together and 
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reorganizes that bond so that the collective is no longer what it was.  
We have now arrived at a position in which we can refer to Deleuze’s 
statement that, for his philosophy, ethics is concerned with “willing the 
event.”402 Keeping in mind that Deleuze does not conceive of ethics in the 
traditional way as predetermined principles applied to a certain situation, it 
would seem a bit anti-climactic to conclude that this statement means to 
simply will what happens, in a sort of passive acceptance. Instead, Deleuze 
suggests affirming the event, which is active, opposed to ressentiment, the 
reactive force drawn from Nietzsche’s philosophy.403 In fact, active and 
reactive forces play such an important role in Deleuzian metaphysics that it is 
worth looking at how he conceptualises them in his analysis of Nietzsche. 
Through this it will become clear what ‘affirming the event’ might mean for 
us. 
For Nietzsche, ressentiment is directly linked to his formulation of slave 
morality, to vengefulness and impotence. That is not to say that the individual 
cannot act, but that they always act in response to something. In other words, 
they are reactive rather than (pro-)active. This is the experience of being 
powerless, bitter towards the masters and their will to power. Slave morality 
is always defined through its negation of master morality, reactive to the 
positive forces of action, thus always negative and resentful. Ressentiment is, 
thus, a rejection of affirmation, of becoming, as it comes from negation and 
lacks creativity. For the sake of brevity, we will have to précis the related 
discussion on guilt.404 Nietzsche saw guilt as an expression of ressentiment 
constructed by Christianity and rejected the notion of God in favour of a more 
affirmative and creative approach to life. Taking this, Deleuze reminds us that 
“to will is to create new values.”405 The meaning of ‘willing the event’, then, 
seems to be something akin to the Nietzschean will to power, affirmative and 
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creative – in other words, an ethical situation is an opportunity to create new 
values, to positively affirm the collective/individual. 
Following this, we are led to the question of how we might go about 
affirming the result of the Event (whilst avoiding the resignation which 
would belong to ressentiment). To be able to fully answer that question, we 
start with Deleuze’s remark that “the mode of the event is problematic”, that 
is, a productive field of genesis. Rather than an ethical subject who is faced 
with a dilemma of which way to pull the lever, solved through the 
application of moral principles,406 the moment of ‘ethics’ is transformed into 
the moment of a production of values. Affirmation, in this sense, is the act of 
production itself, and this is why it is understood as ‘active’. Unlike Hegel 
and Lacan, Deleuze sees the role of negation as a creative force insufficient to 
explain the creation of the new. Thus, when Deleuze talks about affirmation, 
it is in opposition to the role that has been attributed to negation in 
philosophy, rather than negation itself. 
Indeed, in this conceptualisation of the Event, affirmation is active, while the 
method adopted by traditional ethical theories is a passive relation of 
representation. In a representative ontology, the elements of a moral problem 
are accounted for in an abstract, general way according to a set of universal 
rules by which the event is judged. However, to affirm the Event means to 
understand its significance and sense, to balance representation with 
expression, to make the event productive. At this stage it might be helpful to 
map out the image of thought and ‘thought without image’ as active and 
reactive forces. Conway, for example, uses Nietzsche and Philosophy as a 
starting point for understanding other works by Deleuze in terms of 
affirmative and negative powers, utilised through the mechanism of 
repression. Repression, he argues, can be traced throughout all of Deleuze’s 
works – in Nietzsche and Philosophy it takes the form of the repression of active 
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forces, in Anti-Oedipus it is the repression of desiring-production and in 
Difference and Repetition and What is Philosophy there is a repression of 
philosophy, where repression is both negative in a sense that it creates the 
postulates (or paralogisms in Anti-Oedipus) and positive, whereby it produces 
useful inventions (such as Platonic transcendence).407 
[Figure 1]408 
To interpret the division of the above table, the image of thought can be 
framed as ‘reactive’, whilst Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of 
philosophy as creation of concepts is affirmative. We can clearly draw a 
parallel with morality based on the image of thought, and ethics as an act of 
production. It is also clearer how, at the heart of both philosophy and ethics, 
is the Idea-problem, or the ability to discern the presuppositions that result in 
the posing of a problem in a particular way. In that sense, affirming the Event 
is both an act of critique which is not based on established values, and the 
creation of new values itself. This is the activity at the heart of Deleuze’s claim 
that ethics is to become worthy of what happens to us with (or not to be 
unworthy).409 
2.4 Theory of the unconscious 
Finally, the Cartesian distinction between active mind and passive body, 
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where the role of morality is to dominate the passions of the body, has to be 
reformulated in Deleuze’s move from idealism to materialism. The theory of 
individuation discussed in 2.2.6 offers an account of subjectivity that is 
formed by attraction to singularities and organised around patterns, but we 
have yet to complete an immanent account of the subject. Thus, the argument 
of this section is that even though Deleuzian metaphysics appear to privilege 
processes of production and, to an extent, a form of determinism, the 
possibility for an ‘ethical agent’ can be conceptualised in immanence. This 
step is important for a consistent philosophy of immanence, because it allows 
for an answer to the question of how the mind can constitute itself without 
first of all having an idea of itself. In other words, a theory of the unconscious 
is vital for anarchist ethics, but it has to be understood in a way which is 
immanent. Unlike Kant and Hegel’s solution of turning towards a 
transcendent category that is able to explain a priori understanding, such as 
the mind or Spirit, Deleuze and Guattari propose unconscious syntheses that 
are productive, an agent or individual coming a posteriori. The seeds for this 
understanding of subjectivity are visible in Difference and Repetition: “[s]elves 
are larval subjects; the world of passive syntheses constitutes the system of 
the self, under conditions yet to be determined, but it is the system of a 
dissolved self.”410 However, it is only in the later works with Guattari that 
Deleuze establishes a fuller understanding of the unconscious processes that 
he is hinting at here. This final section of this chapter outlines the concept of 
desire in Deleuze’s first collaborative project with Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 
which I take as containing a more comprehensive formulation of the 
traditional moral concept of ‘subjectivity’. Moreover, a Deleuzian-Guattarian 
conceptualisation of ‘subjectivity’ allows us to move beyond categories of 
‘individual’ and ‘collective’ as fundamentally distinct and diffuse the tension 
between them. 
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2.4.1 Critique of psychoanalysis 
The first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia is unique in the approach it 
takes towards blending theories of the unconscious with revolutionary 
political philosophy. Unlike other works at the time, Deleuze and Guattari 
were not focused on liberating desire from bourgeois/capitalist repression.411 
Indeed, the ethical proposition Anti-Oedipus takes as its starting premise is the 
production of individuals as a result of processes of repetition and asks, given 
these, what are we capable of doing? In reference to Spinoza, Deleuze 
develops this question further through an analysis of the problem of desire. 
Similar to the move to reject the primacy of rationality in Difference and 
Repetition, Anti-Oedipus argues that actions and subjectivity are driven by 
desire, the flows of which are codified and stratified. Desire, in this sense, is 
similar to Spinoza’s conatus, or Nietzsche’s drives, as a force of production 
which is at the core of all being. Through this definition, Deleuze and Guattari 
reject the Platonic understanding of desire in the separation of body/mind 
introduced earlier in this chapter. The role of morality in controlling the 
desires of the body is therefore also rejected. In this sense, the formulation of 
desire both contains a critique of Freud and Lacan and builds on their 
insights: “The great discovery of psychoanalysis,” Deleuze and Guattari 
write, “was that of the production of desire, of the productions of the 
unconscious”.412 However, as we have seen, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
desire is negative, inevitably repressed and denies the possibility for action. 
Moreover, desire is located exclusively in the subject – the only social or 
collective aspect of desire is control over it. Conversely, Deleuze and Guattari 
develop desire as positive and productive, in opposition to desire conceived 
as ‘lack’ or regulated by law. The figure of ‘Oedipus’, in this sense, is the error 
they want to correct, as a representation of both of these contested aspects of 
desire – the prohibition and regulation of desire, as well as an understanding 
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of desiring that which we do not possess (desire as lack). 
Before we engage with Deleuze and Guattari’s own understanding of desire, 
it is important we address their criticisms of Lacanian (and Freudian) 
psychoanalysis. Though they seem less explicit in the practice of 
psychoanalysis today, ontologies of lack continue to be one of the major 
strands in radical political theory. Both Saul Newman and Simon Critchley 
incorporate elements of Freud and Lacan in the theories they present. 
Moreover, with this critique I intend to show that transcendent metaphysics 
are a core element of the concept of lack, and thus reject its applicability to 
this project. The approach here will be critique first and establishing 
immanent conditions second, arriving finally at a critique of representation 
and a model for the unconscious. We begin by identifying five erroneous 
conclusions (paralogisms) in Lacanian psychoanalysis described in Anti-
Oedipus.413 These paralogisms are at the core of the production of 
transcendent(al) illusions, but also support the dogmatic image of thought in 
relation to studies of the unconscious.414 
There are different presentations of the order of the paralogisms,415 but we 
will follow Deleuze and Guattari’s own argumentative steps. The paralogisms 
are expressed alongside Anti-Oedipus’ formulation of the unconscious 
through three passive syntheses. This model will be addressed in due course. 
The first paralogism they identify is the paralogism of extrapolation – 
extrapolating the product of the principle as its cause.416 Ian Buchanan gives 
the following explanation: “psychoanalysis converts a detachable partial 
object – e.g., the penis – into a detached complete object, namely the phallus, 
from which all subjects then derive by the power of its attribution of lack.”417 
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This object is then elevated into a transcendent signifier that starts to organise 
meaning around itself (thus becoming a despotic signifier such as Oedipus). 
The figure of Oedipus, in that sense, refers to something broader than the 
Freudian complex. Oedipus as a despotic signifier is not limited to desire but 
extends to a whole system of social production. Schuster, for example, claims 
that it “creates subjects adequate to a world ruled by money and labor.”418 In 
other words, Oedipus is used to describe a particular social-historical subject 
formation, where one is always subjugated under another ‘master’, even if it 
is in the form of an all-encompassing signifier. As such, Deleuze and Guattari 
do not credit psychoanalysis with the invention of Oedipus but use it to 
explain the formal cause of Oedipus.419 It makes the whole of sexuality shift 
into an Oedipal framework of desiring what we don’t have, e.g. women are 
envious and want a penis, while men are constantly apprehensive of the loss 
of their penis. The primacy given to the symbolic object simultaneously 
denies other sexual organs their variety and constructs desire in terms of lack.  
The second paralogism concerns the double bind.420 It is the method of 
Oedipus, as it constitutes a choice between two equally undesirable outcomes. 
This is an illegitimate use of the second synthesis of the unconscious 
(inclusive disjunction), expressed in the maxim ‘either… or…’, whilst the 
second synthesis actually implies a continuation of ‘either… or… or…’, as we 
explore later. Deleuze and Guattari discuss the opposing demands placed on 
desire (want to have sex, but not too much, or only in the right circumstances; 
love your mother, but only in such way), which limit the possibilities for 
identification with anything else but the two exclusive choices. It points to the 
production of both genders and the nuclear family – you can be like Mummy 
or Daddy, but not in the middle, and certainly not like anyone else. This leads 
to a choice of either ‘dealing’ with and regulating one’s desire and all the 
anxieties and problems that follow or giving in to it and risking social 
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rejection. For Deleuze and Guattari, the form of Oedipus is not only 
applicable to the family triad, as it is a schema whose function (rather than 
specific objects) regulate desire. For instance, it also applies to the prohibitive 
power of law and its constituted ‘object’ of desire. This double bind, however, 
is an illegitimate restriction of an unconscious synthesis done by positing it 
within the limits of transcendent use.421 It reduces everything to binary terms, 
while an immanent understanding would affirm a multiplicity of difference, 
as we will see shortly when we explore the disjunctive synthesis in more 
detail. 
The third paralogism is about application and is another illegitimate use of a 
synthesis.422 It concerns the familial structures which are given primacy by 
psychoanalysis. The triad of mummy-daddy-me is taken to be the place of the 
subject in the world, the place where it is determined and developed. 
Moreover, the triad/nuclear family is detached from the rest of society, thus 
limiting the forms of subjectivity that can be generated within it. This triad is 
then expanded to become the main framework we see the world through – an 
authority figure such as your boss becomes your father, etc. Psychoanalysis 
assumes that as adults, we always fall back onto patterns established in our 
childhood to understand new situations or unresolved problems. Moreover, it 
assumes that it can interpret subjectivities only through the lens of Oedipus 
and ignore the nuclear family’s participation in larger social formations, as if 
the triad is somehow detached from the forces of social determination. Thus, 
the two main errors of this paralogism are the division between us and them, 
or the constitution of the Other, and its assumed universality, i.e. it is 
applicable to everything. 
The final two paralogisms combine to form a critique of representation. The 
paralogism of displacement or lack is about the production of 
signifier/signified and referent. It is the problem of fictitious desire, where 
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desire is seen in the paradigm of lack – we desire that which we don’t have; 
moreover, that which we can’t have. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari want to 
invert the process: “The law tells us: You will not marry your mother, and 
you will not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so that’s 
what I wanted!”423 The creation of desire is performed through the act of 
prohibition of desire, but it is not a mechanical process of cause and effect. 
Rather, Deleuze and Guattari understand it as a representational system 
where the signifier of prohibition (Oedipus) generates its signified. The 
signified, in turn, is distorted because it is produced by representation and 
becomes the Oedipal complex. The referent, which is added by Deleuze and 
Guattari, is the desire itself within that framework.424 The effect of this 
position of desire is that what is repressed itself is not desire, but the image 
produced by the signifier. This mis/displaces desire onto the signified within 
a system of representation. Here we reach the culmination of Anti-Oedipus’ 
construction of desire as productive. Deleuze and Guattari argue that rather 
than desiring that which is prohibited, desire is actually created through this 
act of prohibition. Redefining Lacan’s notion that the unconscious is a system 
of signs, Deleuze and Guattari claim that it is a multiplicity of signs that 
create productive connections, rather than establish representative 
connections. Looking in particular at the example of Oedipus, incestuous 
desire is prohibited and regulated by a system of representation in the form of 
law, social norms, etc. The basic assumption is that if something is prohibited, 
then we must desire it and it is only because of social restrictions that we are 
not able to act upon that desire. The implications of desire being governed by 
a system of representation, however, are not limited to the individual, but 
extend further onto social formations, as exemplified in the other 
paralogisms. 
The final paralogism is that of the ‘whole person’, or subjectivity. It relates to 
the error of post hoc ergo propter hoc, taking effects to be causes. It conceives of 
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social repression as secondary to psychic repression, positing that Oedipal 
repression of desire is represented in a form of social repression. To elaborate 
the two types of repression, psychic repression is unconsciously applied by 
the mind to the instincts, and social repression is a conscious one that the 
mind applies to the desires it has. In psychoanalysis, psychic repression is the 
one that matters, and social repression is its epiphenomenon. Thus, Oedipus 
is conceptualised in a position of transcendence across cultures, historical 
context, time, etc. However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that psychic 
repression is an instrument of social repression. This paralogism is an effect of 
all other paralogisms, but, having critiqued them, Oedipus needs to be 
dethroned from its position as the source of repression of desire. The family is 
not the cause for Oedipalization, it is its agent. It creates the conditions and 
then teaches us to desire social repression. The site of repression, though, is 
not an Oedipalised subject but desiring-production. Again, the subject is just 
an appearance which results from the mode of individuation – thus, Deleuze 
and Guattari prefer to talk about machines and factories to emphasize that 
desire does not represent anything, does not express lack, but produces 
something. 
2.4.2 Desiring-production 
We can now develop our account of the three syntheses of the unconscious 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s reformulation of desire. In Anti-Oedipus, desire 
functions as a positive force that produces and sustains material flows. The 
subject comes into existence through desire. Rather than having an ‘agent that 
desires’, one becomes an agent through desire itself. It is also social, in so far 
as it directs collective experiences and forms connections. In opposition to the 
idealism at the core of psychoanalysis, their method, schizoanalysis, takes as 
its starting point a psyche that is materialist – that of a desiring-machine. A 
desiring-machine could be understood here as taking the place of what is 
traditionally thought of as ‘subject’ or maybe even ‘agent’, but also 
encompassing other entities under the umbrella of ‘machine’. Machines are 
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bodies in the broadest possible sense, understood through the connections 
they ‘plug’ into, such as the mouth-breast connection of the baby and the 
mother, or the hand-slot connection of the person and an ATM machine. 
Insofar as this is to relate to ethics, we should first briefly revisit the syntheses 
of time from Difference and Repetition. The second synthesis of the present 
which is constructed via a contraction of the past and the past present 
questions the idea that we have full determinacy of our actions, a cornerstone 
of most traditional ethical frameworks. Repetition in the form of habits is not 
conscious and not random – it is a product of the past as much as it is of the 
present. Thus, an ethical activity is not one that happens now and is projected 
towards the future, but one which eternally occurs. The possibility of creation 
and change lies in laying the conditions for it in the pure past and the past 
present. This moves us to the third synthesis of time – the eternal return and 
the cut. An ethical situation, or an Event, is one where pure difference is 
revealed. Time is cut and re-assembled. However, if both of these precede 
(human) consciousness, who is the actor capable of constructing an ethical 
action? Moreover, since the ‘I’ is only actualised at particular moments and is 
a product of processes of repetition, then habits must be understood as 
underlying self-determination and making it possible via its function as 
efficient energy-distributor. Grozs comments that: 
[h]abit schematizes both the ways of being and acting of living things 
and the effects of the forces that impinge on and affect living things. It is 
thus an index not only of the internal organization of living beings; it also 
signals a milieu or environment that living beings must internalize in 
order to live in comfort and with minimal energy expenditure – a 
cohesion between living being’s activities and its milieu.425 
In other words, if we had to choose and determine every single action of our 
lives, we wouldn’t be able to focus sufficiently on the actions that matter. 
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Through processes of repetition, humans appear as consistent and coherent 
entities. These mechanical processes, these syntheses, are thus habitual and 
productive. They form an entity which is then described and coded upon as 
an individual. A habit is both passive and active – it is often repeated 
unconsciously but can also be actively created or destroyed. Taking 
subjectivity as a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements that are always in a 
process of becoming, habits are the tendencies developed on the basis of 
various points of attraction (singularities). In Deleuze’s own words “We start 
with atomic parts, but these atomic parts have transitions, passages, 
‘tendencies’, which circulate from one to another. These tendencies give rise 
to habits.”426 Brian Keeffe, for example, describes them as particles in 
Brownian motion, which form clusters and coalesce.427 
Moreover, it is in the question of desire that Deleuze and Guattari find the 
tools to fully develop this ethical subjectivity and intentionality. Buchanan 
remarks on the uniqueness of Anti-Oedipus’ combination of Freudian (desire) 
and Marxian (social production) analysis for political philosophy.428 The first 
chapter of the book sets out the conditions for this approach – firstly, to 
introduce desire into social production and reproduction, and secondly, to 
introduce production into desire. Deleuze and Guattari explain their 
motivation as follows:  
In what he termed the critical revolution, Kant intended to discover 
criteria immanent to understanding so as to distinguish the legitimate 
and illegitimate uses of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of 
transcendental philosophy (immanence of criteria), he therefore 
denounced the transcendent use of syntheses such as appeared in 
metaphysics. In like fashion we are compelled to say that psychoanalysis 
has its metaphysics – its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this 
time materialist – can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by 
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Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. x. 
427 B. O’Keeffe, ‘Deleuze on Habits’, The Comparatist, vol. 40, 2016, p. 74. 
428 I. Buchanan, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. A reader’s guide, Continuum, London, 2008, p. 39. 
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denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as 
found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a transcendental 
unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria, and a 
corresponding practice that we shall call schizoanalysis.429 
In Capitalism and Schizophrenia, certain aspects of ‘subjectivity’ are translated 
into the concept of the machinic. Machines are physical entities, bodies, 
processes and flows, constituted by their connections. The machinic is a 
metaphysical, rather than purely instrumental notion. “The machine,” 
Guattari writes, “every species of the machine, is always at the junction of the 
finite and infinite, at this point of negotiation between complexity and 
chaos.”430 Machines are opposed to organisms and mechanisms. “Everything 
is a machine,”431 as they famously state at the beginning of Anti-Oedipus, and 
this should not be taken as a metaphor. Machines substitute both (Cartesian) 
minds and bodies – there is an input and an output, a machine always 
produces something, it either works or is broken (or works by breaking 
down).432 A body, for example, is a machinic assemblage, a multiplicity (as 
opposed to a unity, made of various heterogeneous elements). Deleuze and 
Guattari reject the value of the interior (identity, essence or truth) as 
meaning–making, and instead define machines on the basis of the connections 
they plug into. This is to say that the concept of a machine should not be 
taken to constitute the ‘essence’ of the subject, but rather that the ‘subject’ is a 
process of connecting with and disconnecting from other machines. 
As with Difference and Repetition’s syntheses of time, the syntheses which form 
the basis on which desiring-machines operate are passive, or unconscious, 
preceding a fully-formed individual. They are: the connective synthesis of 
production, the disjunctive synthesis of recording and the conjunctive 
synthesis of consumption/consummation. They could roughly be described 
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as what processes and constitutes experience. Rather than being simply a 
description of the micro-operations of desire, these are also mechanisms that 
can be used to understand political issues, such as the formation of collective 
subjectivity and production of tendencies. The next pages outline these 
syntheses, and their role in forming the subject.  
The connective synthesis 
The connective synthesis is explained with the formula for connection: ‘and… 
and then… and then…’, emphasizing that many connections are possible at 
the same time, rather than just two, as in dialectical systems for example. It 
refers to drives and instinct – desire is productive through its constant 
impetus to make connection. These connections are not necessarily between 
‘subjects’ (man and woman, for example), but between part-objects or organ-
machines, as Deleuze and Guattari call them. For example, the baby’s mouth 
connects to the breast, as two organ-machines, but to completely grasp the 
synthesis, there is also a connection between the baby’s eye and the dangling 
toy, the baby’s forehead and the mother’s hand, etc. From the point of view of 
the connective synthesis there are two separate relations – the mouth/breast 
and the eye/toy, which could happen simultaneously but without taking 
account of the ‘whole body’ of the baby or mother. Moreover, there can be 
multiple heterogeneous connective syntheses happening at the same time. 
Finally, this synthesis is productive because it necessarily serves the purpose 
of satisfaction – for example, nourishment or entertainment. The breast-
mouth and the satisfaction it brings comprise a dynamic unity of producing 
and product, which Deleuze and Guattari relate to the ‘body without organs’. 
The body without organs, a concept developed from the writing of Antonin 
Artaud, designates dimensions of embodiment, or, in other words, explains 
how bodies become organ-ised. This concept is necessary to account for 
becoming in the form of the different/ciation of elements of undifferentiated 
mass into organs, something that is neglected when being is taken as static or 
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’organic’.433 This undifferentiated mass is the pre-subjective state of the 
psyche, which helps elucidate how the body becomes an organism and the 
possibility of other forms of organisation.434 The body is not seen as a single 
coherent whole, but a combination of various ‘organs’, which function 
differently depending on the task we perform, such as typing with your 
fingers, but also holding a glass, or scratching, or poking. Thus, the body 
without organs serves to replace the transcendent model of a well-functioning 
machine, made up of discrete organs and controlled by a sovereign mind – 
the ‘hylomorphic schema’435 of philosophy which imposes order from 
without.  Instead Deleuze conceptualises the immanent self-organising, form-
generating capacities of matter. 
Moreover, the body without organs should not be taken to refer only to 
‘human body’ or ‘animal body’, but also to the formation of social bodies, in 
the ways that they organise themselves. Ian Buchanan, for example, argues 
that: “Communities are formed in the same way as subjects: an aggregate of 
syntheses gives rise to a ‘whole’ that acts retroactively on the syntheses to 
yield an entity qualitatively different from its component parts.”436  Not only 
does this enable Deleuze and Guattari to apply their concept of desiring-
production to social production, it allows them to have an all-encompassing 
theory of how bodies transition from a state of pre-determination (virtual) to 
an actualised state which does not map directly onto the virtual. 
Synthesis of disjunction 
The second synthesis of disjunction/recording is an emergent product of the 
first one. Its formula is “either… or… or” (but never just “either… or” as that 
would be an illegitimate synthesis), referring to iteration or repetition. It is the 
process of recording in the psyche, which does not rely on representation. To 
understand the second synthesis, it might be useful look at Eugene Holland’s 
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parallel with Difference and Repetition,437 specifically, that the second synthesis 
is about the form of repetition that Deleuze conceptualises in relation to 
difference, not just mechanical repetition of the same, but repetition with 
variation and improvisation. The disjunction, therefore, is the impetus to 
interrupt the connective synthesis. Instead of a constant mouth/breast 
synthesis, it is also possible to interrupt it and have a mouth/toy or 
mouth/bottle synthesis. This interruption ceases the process of production 
but allows for the recording of various connections that happen in the psyche 
(written on the surface of the body without organs) through identifying 
where they go. The first two syntheses thus refer to the organisation and 
disorganisation of the body. The process of recording, in these terms, is the 
embedding of signs in the unconscious.438 Similarly to Lacan, Deleuze and 
Guattari see the unconscious as the field of signs, but unlike him, they do not 
see this encoding as linear and based on a search for the long-lost object of 
desire. The unconscious is where signs freely associate and form complex 
relations without fixed meaning and code. The body without organs, in this 
sense, is where the recording of these signs happens, via the processes of 
production (first synthesis) and anti-production (second synthesis) of desire, 
with a multiplicity of connections (either… or… or). 
Synthesis of conjunction 
The last synthesis, the conjunctive synthesis of consumption/consummation, 
is dependent on the second synthesis. Its formula is ‘so that’s what it is…’ – 
the concept of recognition. It is the place where subjectivity arises, but not 
necessarily as a single coherent identity.439 As we have seen, the body without 
organs is produced in the first synthesis, is distributed during the second 
synthesis and during the third synthesis it starts appearing as what we might 
call the ‘subject’. However, we should not think of it as the aim of the 
synthesis or its agent, but more of as a by-product of desire that occurs during 
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the first and second syntheses. The conflict of connection and disjunction 
results in various types of subjectivity, two examples of which Deleuze and 
Guattari name: the neurotic and the pervert.440 The first is a product of the 
forces of anti-production, where desire is denied and therefore the 
connections that are made are unsatisfying; in the second the productive 
forces prevail and all sorts of desire-connections are created despite their 
unorthodoxy. Again, it is important to emphasize that these (or other) 
subjectivities arise from the connective/disjunctive forces of desire and not 
the other way around – the claim that we can ‘choose’ our desires is merely an 
illusion. What happens in the third synthesis is the recognition of that desire, 
“so that’s what it is…” and as such is necessarily retrospective. The 
(undeveloped) subject is formed in the recognition of its desires. However, we 
can only come to see this process in reverse, attributing these desires as 
originating in ‘subjectivity’. 
These syntheses, in addition, are not only applicable to what we might see as 
an individual subject. Collective subjectivity moves along the same lines, but 
also other entities, such as institutions and objects. The key to understand 
how this is possible is to reject the view of ‘desire’ as psychic experience or 
internal urge to fulfil a ‘lack’ and to conceptualise it as positive, active force. 
In other words, these syntheses are virtual, and as such not applicable to only 
one type of actual ‘being’. For example, Ian Buchanan illustrates very clearly 
how the three syntheses are reflected in the development of capitalism and 
are not necessarily applicable only to the unconscious. Using Marx’s formula 
of MCM’ (money-capital-money) it is possible to understand not only the 
production of commodity capital and expanded capital, but also the historical 
trajectory of capitalism. The formula MCM’ refers to money capital (M), 
which sets production in motion by converting raw materials to commodities, 
then commodity capital (C), which is the capital invested in ‘input-output 
combinations’ to achieve profit, and then the expanded money capital (M’) 
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which is the result of investment, and so more flexibility and choice. 
Buchanan emphasises that what is particularly important for this formula is 
that money capital is not just invested in production as an end in itself, but 
only in production that offers a potential for greater flexibility of 
investment.441 In terms of the three syntheses, we can draw a parallel with the 
three stages of the formula. The first synthesis of connection is the primitive 
accumulation of capital, the stage of free labour and connections. The second 
synthesis of disjunction is when capital soaks up the power of the workers 
and starts investing in industries. Finally, the third synthesis of conjunction is 
when banking, insurance, derivatives, etc are used to free money capital 
again. It is possible to take this a step further and engage in a question of 
how, under capitalism, certain desires are retrospectively understood as the 
desire to ‘do/be something’ and are placed in the symbolic. Through what 
Deleuze and Guattari call ‘coding’, flows (the flow of capital being one such 
example, but also human flows etc.) become codified and meaning is (later) 
produced. 
We arrive, then, at Deleuze and Guattari’s reformulation of desire, described 
now through the concept of flows. At this stage we move beyond the 
unconscious of individuals to see flows as being part of social processes of 
coding and decoding. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari claim that a 
“general theory of society is a generalized theory of flows,”442 with flows 
comprising anything from money, capital, water or sewage to menstrual 
blood, pleasure, matter and sweat, all of which are coded and subsequently 
fixed into meaning. The means by which flows are fixed in particular relations 
imbued with meaning is coding. The stricter these relations are, the more 
stratified the flows are. Desire is also part of that infrastructure443 and, as 
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such, is immediately coded by society.444 
Through the rejection of the transcendent, it becomes impossible to 
conceptualise desire as anything but an immanent productive force 
functioning through codified channels. On the other hand, desire is always 
revolutionary in a sense that “it always wants more connections and 
assemblages”445. Desire, in this sense, is not just a life-force that ‘flows’, but a 
network of shifting connections which constitutes reality. From that 
perspective, ‘good’ assemblages are those that allow desire to shift freely, 
whilst ‘bad’ ones are those that cause blockages. Free flows of desire, through 
their production of new connections, result in a bigger intensive field, which 
subsequently gives the body more capacities to engage with its environment. 
Intensities, as we mentioned previously, refer to the virtual/actual aspects of 
reality, defined as virtual differences in potential446. A bolt of lightning, for 
example, is an expression of an intensity which is the difference in the 
potential of positive and negative electric charge. In practical terms, this is a 
process of creating a functioning assemblage through a collective increase of 
power to affect and be affected. The increase of power comes through a 
transition, a becoming of a different kind. Desire produces the ‘self’, but also 
enters into various connections – and it is in this sense that it is machinic, 
there is no ‘meaning’ to be gleaned from its connections, it is merely being 
plugged in whatever outlets are available.  
In this context, Deleuze and Guattari talk about the tendency of advanced 
capitalism to create both the embrace and rejection of the same drives. In 
feminism, Braidotti refers to the double-pull of simultaneous displacement of 
gender binaries and the enforcement of stricter gender roles.447 Translating 
into Nietzschean drives, there is the drive to be a good feminist, but also the 
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pull towards entertainment and belonging to the group manifested in, for 
example, laughing at a sexist joke. The conscious alignment of the ‘self’ with 
the first one does not erase the second one. However, it is important here not 
to think of the ‘self’ as two dialectically opposed sides of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ that 
are fighting with each other, but of a flux of desire that constantly shifts its 
direction. “When the lambs say, ‘birds of prey are evil,’ they are presuming 
that the bird of prey is able to not manifest its force, that it can hold back from 
its effects and separate itself from what it can do,”448 thus, the birds of prey let 
their ‘bad’ drives dominate them, while in fact, the birds of prey cannot 
choose to eat grass instead of lambs. The drive which ends up being the 
dominating one is not consciously chosen and could sometimes be the only 
possible one, but, to tread carefully, this does not imply that we are exempt 
from responsibility for our actions. This is to say, I agree with Ian Buchanan 
when he claims that ‘there is nothing at all within Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theory of desire that can tell us either how we should live or how we should 
treat others”449, but I think there is something within their theory of desire 
which, by revealing false causality and providing a complex ontology can 
result in being able to de-code desire. We shall address that later.  
Through all this, the notion of ethical subjectivity as seen in traditional ethics 
disappears. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari present us with ‘subjects’ that are 
products of various processes of social formation. In capitalism, that 
relationship is organised via identity categories, both personal and 
collective.450 Tamsin Lorraine unfolds this notion as follows: “all desires of the 
body are of one body with a psychic self that is (more or less) unified with a 
coherent history that can be represented and collated with the narratives of 
other members of the community.”451 What we call ‘identity’ is in that sense a 
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habitual repetitive orientation of “physiological, social, and cultural processes 
that constitute one as an embodied human subject.”452 This idea of 
‘subjectivity’ is utilised in the next chapter in relation to ethics. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we started by tracing Deleuze’s understanding of morality as 
judgment and transcendence and ethics as immanent. Even though 
immanence is a central concept here, it proves to be difficult to define. Thus, 
we started with the critique of the image of thought, or the myriad of ways 
Western philosophy relies on transcendence to ground its epistemology. 
Rejecting this approach, Deleuze suggests a ground-breaking methodology 
which is capable of conceptualising pure immanence, by incorporating two 
seemingly contradictory approaches under the name transcendental 
empiricism. However, even if this approach is enough to show that morality 
as based on the dogmatic image of thought, we have argued that purely 
immanent ethics cannot be grounded on the same philosophical 
presuppositions as the ones it attempts to critique. Thus, the method we 
suggested was a Deleuzian understanding of problem-Ideas and philosophy 
as the creation of concepts, as he proposes with Guattari. 
The next step of our journey into immanence was to turn to the concept of 
difference. Deleuze’s starting point in Difference and Repetition is that no 
philosopher has yet managed to understand difference-in-itself which isn’t 
derivative of ‘identity’. Through a critique of Aristotle, Hegel, Leibniz and 
Plato, he rejects various ways of conceptualising difference and argues that, to 
understand difference, philosophy needs a different starting assumption 
about the nature of Being. Unlike Plato and the Scholastic equivocity, or 
Aristotle’s analogy, Deleuze follows Spinoza into the univocity of Being. The 
concept of univocity not only allows Deleuze to conceptualise pure difference, 
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but also gives him a foundation for pure immanence. Having established this, 
we run into other problems. An ontology based on difference leaves no scope 
for explaining how, or when, anything happens. Difference-in-itself results in 
complete chaos, unless coupled with the concept of repetition. Repetition, for 
Deleuze, is constitutive of time, but also gives us an understanding of reality 
as virtual/actual. It is also through repetition that the effect of ‘subjectivity’ is 
created, which we explained with Deleuze’s theory of individuation. 
Moreover, having posited univocity of Being at the heart of his metaphysics, 
Deleuze is compelled to understanding everything as equally ‘real’ and 
existing independently of mind. 
Deleuze’s metaphysics of difference are finally put in relation to his 
understanding of ethics as an Event. So far, we have discussed repetition, 
habitual activity and a seemingly deterministic account of reality, but the 
Event implies transformation. Ethics, in that sense, is when something new 
appears, rather than the issuing of judgment. Even though we have rejected 
the notion of ‘agency’, there is still the possibility of ‘making a difference’, 
which we expanded on in relation to active and reactive forces. Finally, we 
turned to Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative works to conceptualise a form 
of ‘subjectivity’ that allows for action, and argued that an understanding of 
the unconscious is vital for an immanent ethical theory. In the final section, 
we explored the productive aspect of desire in Anti-Oedipus. The third and 
final chapter takes this foundation and presents a form of immanent ethics 
which can serve to rescue anarchism from transcendence and open up the 
possibility for new ethical modes of existence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Introduction to Immanent Anarchist Ethics 
The primary argument of this thesis, introduced in chapter one, is that an 
anarchism (and by extension post-anarchism) which is committed to non-
oppressive structures, organisation and conduct must be considered 
incompatible with a transcendent ontological framework. I started by 
exploring the poststructuralist foundations of the postanarchist critique of 
representation, essentialism and oppressive morality and agreed with their 
epistemological position. I then argued that this epistemology alone is 
insufficient to answer the ethical challenges posed by postanarchists, and 
what is needed is a strong metaphysical foundation. There are predominantly 
two types of metaphysics found in contemporary anarchist literature: the 
‘strong’ metaphysics of universal normativity suggested by Todd May’s 
multi-value consequentialism and Benjamin Franks’ virtue ethics, and the 
‘weak’ metaphysics of Saul Newman and Simon Critchley, both tending 
towards a Lacanian/Levinasian ontology with lack at its core. We argued that 
neither of these responds to the anarchist criteria adequately, as Franks’ and 
May’s are reliant on universal notions of ‘subjectivity’ and ethical knowledge 
(which contain a recourse to potentially coercive practices), while ontologies 
of lack are, on one hand, essentialist and, on the other hand, reliant on a 
binary thinking that prioritises signification and thus promotes the 
representational practices postanarchists reject. Moreover, we argued that a 
transcendent metaphysics is incompatible with the anarchist project because it 
requires positing an ‘outside’, something which precludes both a dynamic 
understanding of the possibilities for change and the practical tools for 
achieving them. 
In chapter two we introduced our methodological tools through an 
elucidation of Deleuze’s metaphysics. We began by outlining a distinction 
between ethics and morality and introduced the notion of immanence and its 
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role in Deleuze’s philosophy. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze focused on a 
critique of transcendence and the ontological categories produced by 
transcendent metaphysics. Through the concept of univocity we established 
the category of difference-in-itself as primary and asserted the role of 
repetition in constituting reality. To fully account for immanence, we also 
introduced the concepts of virtual and actual, as well as a theory of time and 
individuation. We then moved on to discuss Deleuze’s own reformulation of 
ethics as immanent through the form of the Event and affirmation of active 
forces. Finally, I introduced one element from Deleuze’s collaborative work 
with Guattari which is important for understanding ethical subjectivity and 
ethical action which does not rely on the primacy of the symbolic, the critique 
of the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious and the subsequent 
notion of desire at the core of subjectivity. 
In this last chapter, I use the Deleuzian metaphysical framework of difference, 
repetition and the machinic to understand the possibilities for ethical action. 
The main argument, drawing on Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche and Spinoza, is 
that ethics based on a transcendent ontology supports existing values, and 
thus, despite a desire to do the opposite, functions to preserve the status-quo. 
Whilst other moral theories use transcendence as a way of ‘grounding’ their 
normative dimension, I side with Deleuze to claim that transcendence prevents 
ethics from taking place by restricting one’s capacity to act. Daniel W. Smith 
remarks that “whereas other moral theories see transcendence as a necessary 
principle – the transcendence of the moral law in Kant, for instance, or the 
transcendence of the Other in Levinas – for Deleuze transcendence is the 
fundamental problem of ethics.”453 Establishing a transcendent foundation for 
morality is fundamentally a rejection of the ability to make ethical decisions 
as it separates us from our capacity to act and requires us to follow pre-
determined rules and courses of action. 
In Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, Todd May identifies the 
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170 
 
main question of moral philosophy as the question of ‘what ought we to do?’, 
and the question of metaphysics as ‘what is it?’454 The task of political 
philosophy, then, is to mediate between the two. Overturning this principle, 
we start this chapter with the premise ‘given what it is, what can it be?’, thus 
preserving the relationship of continuum between metaphysics and ethics. 
The reformulation of this question is important for two reasons: first of all, to 
break away from the prescriptive and move to the analytical and, secondly, to 
highlight the materialism at the core of anarchist ethics. This position is 
congruent with Nietzsche’s in the recognition that there are things one can 
only think and do if they are in a particular position.455 Thus, we ask ‘what is 
the position we find ourselves in as anarchists’ and ‘what are the possible 
paths that can be taken’. 
In pursuit of this goal, the first section outlines what these immanent ethics 
might look like if they are taken as ‘modes of existence’. The first task, then, is 
to reformulate the anarchist ethical question outlined in chapter 1. Rather 
than a question of delineating anarchist values and their specific meanings, or 
suggesting ways of being an anarchist, the purpose of ethics becomes figuring 
out ways of working together (more technically, creating a functioning 
assemblage). How can we come together, how can we work, enjoy, exist 
collectively, without limiting or suppressing each other’s power, desire and 
potential? Not in the future, not in some ideal society, but here and now. 
Moreover, it becomes a question of the possibilities of being an anarchist, if 
anarchism is about immanent critique and the problem of creating the 
conditions for change. The way the word ‘change’ is used in this chapter may 
at times be in terms of ‘social change’, but is generally deployed with the 
more abstract meaning of anything that transgresses norms or breaks 
dogmatism, and, in this sense, is related to the practices of ‘experimentation’ 
                                                
454 T. May, Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, p. 1. 
455 This refers to Nietzsche’s famous division between master and slave mentality. It is most notably 
expressed in the parable of the lamb and birds of prey in F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil/ On 
Genealogy of Morals, tr. A. del Caro, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2014, p. 236. 
171 
 
discussed by postanarchists.456 The main difference between their approach 
and the one in this chapter is discussed later.  
Thus, it hardly comes as a surprise that many of the arguments this chapter 
brings to bear are precisely about how we can do that better. In following this 
trajectory, I take two paths simultaneously. Firstly, I identify the dogmatic 
image of thought in anarchist practices. This takes the form of ethical 
presuppositions that are exemplified with contemporary debates in anarchist 
organising. It is important to start with a critique of the image of thought 
because it “sustains a complacent conception of thought which is incapable of 
criticising established values.”457 Moreover, it is important to relay theory 
back to practices, both to pierce the blockages of theory and contribute to 
understanding what we do. Secondly, rather than attempting to answer these 
questions by appealing to an ultimate form of anarchist normativity such as 
that required by other ‘strong’ ontologies, I join a number of Deleuze-inspired 
philosophers to claim that his philosophy is conducive to a type of immanent 
normativity that is built collectively and through a common attribution of 
significance, only valid within the specific situations it entails. With this, I 
address the possibilities for change, and the emergence of new configurations. 
Finally, even though this chapter is concerned with ‘applied’ ethics in the 
sense that it draws examples from anarchist practices, it might seem that it 
does not provide satisfying practical answers. Rather than pointing towards 
anarchist ‘values’ or blueprints for how to act, I focus on ways of breaking the 
stagnation and boundaries of ethical debates. Having reformulated ethics as 
immanent, I argue with Karen Houle that “the better view of reality is the one 
that enables the greatest capacity to respond to reality,”458 rather than the one 
that gives us the most straightforward answers. In this sense, I claim that we 
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uncertain and “having to be experimented with” in order to be reinvented. For more, see N. Jun, 
Anarchism and Political Modernity, Continuum, New York, 2012 and S. Newman, Postanarchism, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016. 
457 P. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, p. 22.  
458 K. Houle, Responsibility, Complexity, Abortion: Toward a New Image of Ethical Thought, p. 143. 
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do not in fact need more answers, we need new ways of responding to the 
world. Roughly speaking, I have used the following set of reconfigurations as 
a guideline: 
transcendent ethics 
 
à 
immanent ethics 
judgment  response 
representation production 
unified subject desiring-machine 
reason problematic 
pre-given given 
reactive active 
essence assemblage 
 
Beyond presenting an epistemological critique of transcendence, or its 
incompatibility with anarchist values, in the following pages we explore 
reformulations of three traditional spheres of engagement in ethics – ethical 
knowledge (and methods for acquiring it), ethical subjectivity and, finally, 
ethical situations. In a sense, these three correspond broadly to the three 
pillars of the postanarchist epistemological critique. The discussion about 
ethical knowledge relates to the critique of universalism, the rejection of 
essentialism leads to our reformulation of immanent subjectivity, and the 
exploration of ethical ‘problems’ is our response to the discussion on 
representation. In turn, I map these onto immanent metaphysics using the 
tools given to us by Deleuze and Guattari. All three elements come together 
in immanent ethics to constitute a type of normativity which does not resort 
to a transcendent grounding. The purpose of this chapter then, is to suggest 
possible ways of applying Deleuzian immanent metaphysics to anarchist 
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ethics. 
3.1 Immanent normativity 
The Deleuzian understanding of ethics as the ability to re-define values 
compels us to return to the problem of normativity or, more specifically, the 
need for some form of binding communality which is outside (not subjective) 
to agents and thus serves as a referent of good/bad which is universally 
applicable. Normativity is defined by Korsgaard as ethical standards that “do 
not merely describe the way in which we in fact regulate our conduct. They 
make claims on us; they command, oblige, recommend, or guide.”459 In 
chapter two, we outlined how the concept of an external arbiter creates 
tension between modern anarchists and postanarchists through the 
problematic of moral relativism versus moral universalism. The problem with 
universals that anarchist theorists seem to struggle with, especially in the 
form of universal morality, has its counterpart in other strands of political 
philosophy where universalist assumptions are criticised as epistemologically 
dubious to say the least and coercive at worst, while also taken as a necessary 
condition for collective politics.460 Thus, in the opening section of the chapter, 
we return to this question and explore it in the light of immanent ethics. 
As the discussion on the works of Benjamin Franks, Saul Newman and Todd 
May in chapter two exemplifies, postanarchists and other anarchist theorists 
have recognised the problem of morality being coercive when grounded on 
universals.  This presents a double-bind for establishing normative anarchist 
ethics. On one hand, without external grounding, some (post)anarchists 
argue, there is no arbiter for judging actions, which would lead to a lack of 
collective boundaries. On the other hand, anarchism is positioned as against 
coercion, thus preventing us from imposing or recognising universal 
values/rules. This is often solved by positing an ethical framework as 
                                                
459 C. M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 8. 
460 For example, Badiou, Laclau, and Žižek. See our discussion in 1.3.1 on weak and strong ontologies. 
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‘blueprints’, guidelines etc., which are ‘optional’ instead of coercively 
imposed.461 Moreover, in practice it often results in a set of unspoken rules 
and an expectation to ‘self-monitor’ one’s behaviour for deviation from these 
rules. We address both of these later in this chapter. 
I put forward the claim that this paradox is established because transcendent 
universals are perceived as the only possible foundation for providing 
normative grounding. Moreover, this problem cannot be solved by offering 
blueprints which are only a suggestion – a disclaimer that an author does not 
intend something to be ‘coercive’ does not preclude the possibility of it 
becoming so. If suggestions and blueprints appeal to a transcendent ontology, 
they ultimately create the same problems for anarchist politics as strict moral 
rules. In other words, coercing somebody to follow a set of rules is not 
ultimately qualitatively different from suggesting a set of rules they should 
agree to follow if they wish to call themselves an anarchist (or be considered 
one by others). This type of transcendent normativity posits an ‘outside’ that 
regulates being, while the immanent normativity I would like to propose 
asserts that being can only be understood through the processes it is part of. 
The object is constituted through the action itself, such that, for instance, the 
ethics of what we do are found within the practices themselves.  
The form of transcendent morality we have problematised, starting with the 
debate between Foucault and Habermas and moving towards postanarchism, 
relies on a normative ‘objective foundation’ in the form of human nature, 
essence, or state law. As Braidotti contends, “[n]ormativity is traditionally 
expected to be structured around and to implement a number of axioms 
which are drawn either from a canonical set of universal rules – as postulated 
in the Kantian tradition – or by coercive reference to a master signifier, as 
                                                
461 See R. Kinna, ‘Utopianism and prefiguration’ in S. Chrostowska & J. Ingram eds, Political Uses of 
Utopia: New Marxist, Anarchist, and Radical Democratic Perspectives, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 2016, pp. 198-218; S. Shukaitis, ‘An Ethnography of Nowhere: Notes Towards a Re-envisioning of 
Utopian Thinking’ in N. Jun & S. Wahl eds., New Perspectives on Anarchism, Rowman & Littlefield, 
Lanham, 2010, pp. 303-314. 
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argued by Lacan and Derrida.”462 This is not dissimilar to postanarchist 
attempts we examined in Chapter 1, such as Saul Newman’s positing of a 
paradoxical ‘outside’ and Todd May’s attempt to outline a ‘poststructuralist’ 
normativity in the form of a moral theory. However, it would be an error to 
assume that just because there is no transcendent or universal grounding for 
normativity, it becomes ‘relativist’, or that it is irrelevant for anarchist ethics. 
The key to grounding immanent normativity is in the division between ethics 
and morality we established with Deleuze. Following his philosophy, 
metaphysics and ethics are not construed as two separate entities, but rather 
as a continuum. Immanent ethics is distinct from morality – it is not 
concerned with values, judgment or duty, but instead with the state of affairs, 
with what we do. Morality is founded upon essentialism and values – “In a 
morality it is always a matter of realising the essence.”463 Thus, an immanent 
ontology cannot arise from morality, and, conversely, if we start with an 
ontology of immanence, we cannot arrive at morality, which always refers to 
a higher, transcendent entity (i.e. God or Good). Deleuze discusses this in his 
lecture on Spinoza:  
In a morality, you always have the following operation: you do 
something, you say something, you judge it yourself. It is the system of 
judgement. Morality is the system of judgement. Of double judgement, 
you judge yourself and you are judged. Those who have the taste for 
morality are those who have the taste for judgement. Judging always 
implies an authority superior to Being, it always implies something 
superior to an ontology.464   
Following the notion that ethics is concerned with doing, in What is Philosophy? 
we saw that Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise ethical activity as creation, 
transforming metaphysics so that new concepts, new ways of thinking can 
                                                
462 R. Braidotti and P. Pisters, ‘Introduction’ in R. Braidotti and P. Pisters eds, Revisiting Normativity with 
Deleuze, Bloomsbury, London, 2012, p. 1. 
463 Deleuze, G., ‘Ontologie-Ethique’, Cours Vincennes lecture, 21 Dec 1980, tr. S. Duffy, 
<https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/190>, accessed 13 Feb 2015, para. 4.  
464 ibid., para. 15. 
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emerge.465 It is this impulse to create new ways of thinking that Ian Buchanan 
considers to provoke a “properly utopian confidence,”466 with Deleuze’s 
comparative approach providing an antidote to the fantasy that there are no 
other ways of organising society. In rejecting the Kantian a priori concepts of 
universality and necessity, Deleuze posits that necessity “has to be established 
as immanent conditions of what we do”467 or, in other words, the principles of 
what we do are within the practice itself. As the example goes, to play football 
we need to conform to the rules of the game, otherwise it wouldn’t be a game 
of football.  
Outside the anarchist tradition, a number of notable authors have utilised 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work in the formulation of new normativities. For 
example, the possibility for immanent normativity is put forward by 
Colebrook in the form of a neo-Kantian self. Since there is no universal 
grounding for humanity, she argues, subjects come into existence through 
their own self-regulation – “in the absence of nature and essence, ‘I’ am nothing 
other than a lawfulness that I grant to myself.”468 Moreover, she uses Foucault 
to analyse how subjects are constituted through social normativity and 
recognition, arguing against essentialised normalisation. Paul Patton has also 
suggested a form of political normativity through the concept of 
deterritorialisation.469 We engage with the meaning of this later, but for now I 
note that processes of self-reflexivity and critique are defining elements of his 
immanent normativity. Finally, Rosi Braidotti also rejects transcendent 
normativity in favour of nomadic subjectivity and “ethical accountability in 
the sense of a fundamental reconfiguration of our being in a world that is 
technologically and globally mediated.”470 
                                                
465  G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 28.  
466 I. Buchanan, Deleuzism: A Metacommentary, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2000, p. 119. 
467 A. Kristensen, ‘Thinking and Normativity in Deleuze’s Philosophy’, in Revisiting Normativity, p. 13. 
468  C. Colebrook, ‘Norm Wars’ in R. Braidotti & P. Pisters eds, Revisiting Normativity with Deleuze, 
Bloomsbury, London, 2012, p. 91. 
469 P. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, p. 106. 
470 R. Braidotti, ‘Affirmation versus Vulnerability: On Contemporary Ethical Debates’, Symposium: 
Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 236. 
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The features of immanent normativity that I propose here are defined through 
the concept of assemblage. Normativity, in this sense, has to be seen in 
relation to the assemblage it is part of, otherwise it becomes transcendent. 
Moreover, immanent normativity can only be glimpsed through its 
functioning within the assemblage. An example might be when we talk about 
codes of conduct at the workplace, such as doctor-patient ethics, or teacher 
ethics. These are based around problems, offering the best way to produce, 
respond to or avoid certain situations or configurations.  Understood in this 
way, it seems obvious to say that, for instance, bartenders do not have to 
follow the ethical standards of doctors. These standards only apply within a 
specific set of relations and allow this set of elements and relations to function 
as a whole. This approach echoes Franks’ own argument about prefigurative 
politics. He also recognises the importance of generating immanent ‘goods’ 
within the practice, such as that to get the benefits of playing chess you need 
to observe the rules of chess. The difference with the ethics I am arguing for 
here is that they do not necessarily lead to ‘goods’ or benefits in the way 
Franks conceptualises them as virtues, and there is no orientation towards 
external, end-result ‘goods’.471 The formula is simpler: if you want to play 
chess, you need to observe its rules. 
The word assemblage is commonly chosen to translate the French word 
agencement though, as Ian Buchanan notes, this fails to capture the full 
implication of the concept.472 The English word signifies a union or joining, 
while agencement, on the other hand, signals an configuration of 
heterogeneous elements.473 Buchanan emphasizes that assemblage could also 
be translated as ‘arrangement’, thus preserving the nuances in ‘working 
arrangement’, or ‘musical arrangement’.474 The difference, Nail argues, is 
crucial, as assemblages should not be thought of as a united or uniform entity, 
                                                
471 B. Franks, ‘Anti-fascism and the ethics of prefiguration’, Affinities: Journal of Radical Theory, vol. 9, no. 
1, 2014, p. 54. 
472 Buchanan, I., ‘Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents’, in Deleuze Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, 2015, p. 384. 
473 T. Nail, ‘What is an Assemblage?’, SubStance, vol. 46, no. 1, 2017, p. 22. 
474 ibid. 
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such as organs functioning together in the human body. Rather, assemblages 
are closer to multiplicities, where the entity is defined through its relations 
and elements can be added and removed at any time. None of the elements is 
necessarily essential for the continuation of the entity, nor is it dysfunctional 
on its own. Like the ship of Theseus, what makes an assemblage is not its 
parts, but the relationships between them.475 Beyond this, the interpretation of 
the concept is quite contested, with philosophical ‘close’ readings competing 
with the functional models found in disciplines such as geography, cultural 
studies and political science. Buchanan makes an argument for the analytic, 
rather than descriptive role of the assemblage. He charges assemblage theory 
with reformulating the Deleuzian-Guattarian question from ‘how does it 
work?’ to ‘what does it mean?’, thus removing the analytic power of the 
concept of assemblage and making it purely adjectival.476 Instead, he proposes 
four features of assemblages.477 Firstly, assemblages are explanatory of reality, 
and not an entity in the world. In this sense, assemblage is a concept 
according to Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of concepts. Secondly, they are 
constitutive and constituted by reality. Thirdly, they have limits of what is 
acceptable and what is not, operating under some form of sense. Finally, 
assemblages tend to persist in the way they are, maintaining their tendencies. 
As such, they are defined through both their form of content, which 
Buchanan claims is ‘machinic assemblages’ and their form of expression, 
called ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’. 
Similarly, Nail points to some formal aspects of the concept of assemblage 
(formal in a sense that it does not refer to particular applications such as 
enunciation, language, machines, etc.) The first is the constitutive importance 
of the relations of elements we just mentioned, referred to by Deleuze and 
                                                
475 G. Deleuze and C. Parnet, Dialogues II, p. viii.  
476 This position is expressed most forcefully in I. Buchanan, ‘Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an 
Illusion’, Deleuze Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, 2017, pp. 457-474. For the most part I follow Buchanan in 
aligning my reading as closely as possible to Deleuze and Guattari’s explication of assemblage. 
Weighing the relative value of the approaches of assemblage theory and actor-network theory is sadly 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
477 I. Buchanan, ‘Assemblage Theory, or, the Future of an Illusion’, p. 463. 
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Guattari as an ‘abstract machine’. An abstract machine is the immanent 
combination of a set of relationships that define the assemblage. It is thus not 
a transcendent framework of organisation nor an expression of a normative 
telos. It also not a representational model of anything. For this reason, abstract 
machines are only properly designated by their own name. For instance, 
instead of ‘a protest’ (which implies an essentialist category of entities defined 
by a certain identity), one might refer to ‘the assemblage of the COP15’, or 
‘G20’ (though these are only really a step closer to a proper designation). 
Secondly, the existing embodied elements that make an assemblage are the 
‘concrete assemblage’. They are the working parts of the assemblage and form 
a mutually transformative symbiosis with the abstract machine. Neither of 
these two features of the assemblage is primary or ‘essential’, and they change 
in correspondence with one another. Thirdly, assemblages are defined by the 
presence of ‘personae’, or agents.478 These are not self-determining subjects, 
but rather roles of connecting and relaying concrete elements to abstract 
machines. Again, personae are immanent to the assemblage they are part of, 
the same way the assemblage is immanent to the personae. Deleuze and 
Guattari state that “personae is needed to relate concepts on the plane, just as 
the plane itself needs to be laid out.”479 
Keeping this in mind, I would like to suggest a reconceptualization of 
anarchism using these concepts and vocabulary. I believe that the productive 
way to avoid constructing a straw-man of ‘classical’ anarchism or ‘post’ 
anarchism (risking the reduction of a whole tradition of theory and practice to 
generalisations) is to start with the premise that anarchism is not best 
understood first and foremost as a political ideology, or even a political or 
social movement with particular end goals.480 In the first chapter we pointed 
to Gordon, Franks and Graeber’s use of such definitions of anarchism, whilst 
Newman and Critchley tended towards conceptualisations of anarchism as 
                                                
478 Buchanan’s term is ‘actants’, emphasizing that they are not necessarily human. 
479 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 73. 
480 At least not in the way sociologists might talk about social movements. See, for example, R. Day, 
Gramsci is Dead, Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements, Pluto Press, London, 2005. 
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ethics, a system of values, ‘politics of anti-politics’, etc. While these definitions 
are undoubtedly useful for their respective projects, these approaches tend to 
prioritise the delineation of anarchism on the level of 
signification/meaning/discourse – the definition given is based around a 
common, shared understanding of the meaning of the various constitutive 
elements. For instance, in Rebel Alliances, Benjamin Franks moves from 
“anarchism is a historically located set of movements,”481 to anarchism as a 
combination of various ideas and practices with shared principles,482 to 
anarchism as political philosophy which provides an evaluative ethical 
framework.483 Franks’ definition is a response, on the one hand, to critics of 
anarchism who claim that it is too diverse a field to be a coherent political 
ideology484 and, on the other, to approaches that try to incorporate all distinct 
types of ‘anarchism’ into one definition.485 
I would like to argue that such an approach situates the ‘limits’ of anarchism 
in the wrong place. Conceptualising anarchism as a static politico-ethical 
position can result in excluding particular parts of anarchism from the 
‘official’ canon and re-writing history to either claim ‘problematic’ people 
were not anarchist, or to claim that they were somewhat mistaken and 
confused.486 This is analogous to what we referred to in 1.3.3 as employing 
‘mental gymnastics’, justifying that anarchists were ‘the good guys’ after all. 
A good example is the problem of ‘anarcho-purism’ which seems to lie at the 
core of various organising problems. In 2009, in the aftermath of Seattle, Sasha 
K defined anarcho-purism as “a morality that tries to keep anarchism pure 
and separate from certain tactics or from working with certain groups for the 
                                                
481 B. Franks, Rebel Alliances: The Means and Ends of Contemporary British Anarchisms, p. 15. 
482 ibid., p. 13. 
483 ibid., p. 93. 
484 ibid., p. 13. 
485 ibid., p. 14. 
486  S. Evren, for example, provides a similar critique of Woodcock’s reductive account of anarchism, as 
well as more ‘mainstream’ ideological presentations in S. Evren, ‘What is Anarchism? A reflection on 
the canon and the constructive potential of its destruction’.  
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sake of purity.”487 It is a system of judgment whereby activists judge 
themselves and others to be ‘true’ anarchists on the basis of a rigid set of 
qualities/behaviours they exhibit. More recently, again in Seattle, Frances Lee 
comments: “There is an underlying current of fear in my activist communities 
. . . It is the fear of appearing impure. Social death follows when being 
labelled a ‘bad’ activist or simply ‘problematic’ enough times.”488 
They also talk about rejecting the label ‘activist’ and the practices which 
activist communities adopt to self-police – punishment, preaching, but also 
more subtle behaviour like dismissing people who haven’t read the ‘sacred’ 
texts (i.e. of feminism, postcolonialism, etc.), or not respecting people who are 
not immediately identifiable in their appearance as ‘anarchist’, ‘queer’, etc. 
Anarcho-purism, then, is a result of drawing lines that define anarchism 
through a system of signification where (revolutionary) value is attributed to 
some actions and not to others. 
The anarchist search for ‘purity’ or strict definitions results in the de-
valorisation of certain practices or theories and a tendency to exclude the 
‘uncomfortable’ or ‘ill-fitting’ anarchists from communities/canon. A similar 
critique is put forward by the Invisible Committee: 
Since the catastrophic defeat of the 1970s, the moral question of radicality 
has gradually replaced the strategic question of revolution. That is, 
revolution has suffered the same fate as everything else in those decades: 
it has been privatised. It has become an opportunity for personal 
validation, with radicality as the standard of evaluation . . . What 
happens instead is that a form is extracted from each [revolutionary 
act].489   
                                                
487 Sasha K, ‘“Activism and “Anarcho-Purism”’, The Anarchist Library, 2009, 
<https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/sasha-k-activism-and-anarcho-purism>, accessed 24 Sep 2014, 
para. 8. 
488 F. Lee, ‘Excommunicate Me from the Church of Social Justice’, Kin Aesthetics [blog post], 10 July 2017, 
<http://www.catalystwedco.com/blog/2017/7/10/kin-aesthetics-excommunicate-me-from-the-
church-of-social-justice>, accessed 10 Jan 2018, para. 2. 
489 The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends, p. 142. 
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Thus, in exploring anarchism as an assemblage, without anything pre-given, 
‘anarchist’ shifts from being an identity one takes on to a position one 
occupies in particular places and times vis-à-vis power. If the body, or 
location, or time changes, the same action in the same assemblage will have a 
completely different ethical significance. The value, understood as the 
‘radicality’ of an action,490 is constructed together by the actors rather than 
being something inherent in the action itself, making it, first, impossible to 
pre-define and, second, impossible to replicate.491 Analysing anarchism as an 
assemblage allows us to see precisely this significance in the moment it 
occurs. Moreover, it allows us to incorporate seemingly contrary actions as all 
being part of anarchist politics (punching a Nazi at a march and staying at 
home and not attending the march, for example). 
Eschewing transcendent metaphysics, this notion of anarchism avoids 
positing a fixed set of pre-defined actions, values and structures that need to 
be followed. Anarchism as assemblage is a collective creation of sense, a 
tendency of a particular way of becoming and acting in a specific situation. 
This would imply that whether a response in a particular situation is 
‘anarchist’ is defined through the relations into which it enters. For example, 
in Calais, France an anarchist response to state oppression might be starting a 
free kitchen and providing refugees with tents. In London, on the other hand, 
an anarchist action might be to lock oneself to the gates of a detention centre 
to prevent people from being deported. These are fairly straightforward 
examples that few anarchists would think are problematic ‘ethically’. 
However, there are certainly more difficult situations – for instance, in one 
specific context getting married and, conversely, not getting married. Two 
completely opposing actions can both be radical depending on the collective 
assemblage of enunciation they enter. A judgment on these actions, in this 
                                                
490 This use of radicality is intended to refer to a system of judgment where ‘radicality’ is posited as an 
idea principle around which normativity as well as judgement is configured. Beyond this I do not 
develop a notion of ‘radical’ except to say that it is part of the anarchist/activist/radical milieu.  
491 Here I am still following Levi Bryant in identifying the actors as more than just human actors, thus 
including objects, the environment, and non-material entities.  
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sense, is always going to appeal to some form of authority, principle, or value, 
and the question we need to ask, in that situation, is: given this action, how 
does the assemblage function? 
So far, we have outlined some formal features of assemblages, but let us 
examine two instances of the application of assemblages in relation to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of representation. In the second volume of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia they discuss two types of assemblage. Machinic 
assemblages are physical/structuring, function-oriented entities; collective 
assemblages of enunciation could be thought of as the unconscious, molecular 
order which operates in terms of signs, not symbols. Signs here should be 
taken as a broad category that subsumes both language and symbols. The 
example Deleuze and Guattari give to illustrate the difference between signs 
and symbols is drawn from Benveniste’s research on bee communication. 
Bees transmit information to each other through signs (a certain shape-sign 
means there is food in a particular field), but these signs cannot be 
understood as language because they lack the ‘representative’ element of re-
telling, namely, a bee cannot tell a third bee what the first has communicated. 
The subtle difference is that a bee is capable of transmitting information it has 
acquired to another bee, but not capable of transmitting second-hand 
information. 
In politics or philosophy, anarchism is most often taken to be something like a 
collective assemblage of enunciation, as with the examples we mentioned 
previously that tended to situate anarchism on the level of signification, 
identifying shared political principles, ethical values, anarchist ‘ethos’, 
anarchist practices etc. Likewise, historical approaches often see anarchism as 
something like a machinic assemblage492 and, rarely, we find an author who 
also writes about the political aspects of anarchism as a machinic assemblage, 
                                                
492 For example, M. Schmidt, Cartography of Revolutionary Anarchism, AK Press, Oakland, 2013 outlines a 
selection of actors, situations and changes. 
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such as Colin Ward.493 The benefit of the definition I propose here is that it 
includes both machinic and symbolic elements, without privileging one over 
the other. Anarchism, thus, is an assemblage that consists of both the material 
environment and conditions and the meaning and signification we attribute to 
it, our actions and responses. As a result of this definition, it might appear 
that some elements of ‘self-defined’ anarchism should be disregarded as 
superfluous and we might perhaps incorporate some things that are not 
explicitly anarchist as part of the same assemblage. However, what is 
important is that it does not take any of these as given in advance. The focus 
is not what is included or excluded in a definition but how the struggle to 
achieve radical social change through direct action plays out and draws in 
various actors, institutions, regimes of discourse etc. Through this, in a sense, 
we get only the definitions that ‘fit’. 
To attempt to properly map out the anarchist assemblage would be beyond 
the scope of this work, but I would like to propose a few possible paths. The 
starting position would be Deleuze and Guattari’s: to ask what kind of 
machine is capable of producing the effects we are given. In other words, a 
cartography of the elements within the assemblage is necessary. For example, 
physical bodies, capitalism and the State-form, but also flows of money, 
aeroplanes that enable summit-hopping, climate change, police and border 
control, philosophy, literature and art, etc. However, these are not enough to 
provide a method for understanding anarchism, not least because they can be 
elements of any other assemblage. The anarchist assemblage is defined 
specifically through the relationships between those elements, and the shared 
collective significance they are attributed. Even though this is not going to be 
explored in the depth it deserves, the rest of this chapter is to an extent 
concerned with how this works. I argue that the definition of anarchism as an 
assemblage captures anarchism as a living force, a historical fact and a 
theoretical field, and calls for a pragmatic approach rather than a dogmatic 
                                                
493 Colin Ward promoted anarchism as a pragmatic approach towards organisation. See, for example, C. 
Ward, ‘Anarchism as a Theory of Organization’, Anarchy, vol. 62, 1966, pp. 97-109. 
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one. To make the terms of this re-definition doubly clear, I argue for its 
necessity on two fronts. First of all, if we were to think of metaphysics as 
entirely immanent, rejecting the notion of judgment or blueprints, then 
anarchism cannot be defined as any ahistorical, universal commonality 
between all anarchists (or their practices, their values, etc.) A definition 
claiming to trace shared practices or ethics among anarchists risks positing or 
searching for a transcendent ideal to compare them through, rather than 
looking at these practices as the immanent configurations they are. Secondly, 
such a definition follows an image of thought that resists identification of the 
conditions of change by positing what (or who) is desirable and acceptable a 
priori. By claiming certain elements as inherently anarchist, the result is that 
only certain practices are taken to be ‘revolutionary’ or constitutive of change, 
while we risk becoming incapable of recognising the radical possibilities of 
other practices. The concept of an assemblage in that sense replaces the idea 
of an ‘essence’. We have already outlined a critique of human essence in the 
discussion on postanarchism, but similar objections can be raised towards 
providing static categories of definition such as ‘anarchism as a political 
ideology’ or ‘anarchism as ethics’. Essence, as that which uniquely and 
necessarily defines an entity, requires a circular logic of assuming the thing to 
be complete. The task of providing definitions is then to explicate its enduring 
features in past and present and posit them as the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the entity to be itself. If we apply Deleuze’s ontology of pure 
difference, we cannot define anarchism on the basis of its ‘identity’, as this is 
only secondary. 
In accordance with this critique, moreover, we need to ask the question: why 
do we even bother using anarchism as a term or a concept? Wouldn’t the 
most obvious solution be to reject it entirely? By naming an assemblage, we 
already risk a potential spiral down towards the singularity (no name can 
capture it fully unless the name is the thing itself, a one-to-one 
correspondence). This is similar to the problem Deleuze and Guattari open 
with in A Thousand Plateaus, where they question their own continued use of 
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‘I’, after so deeply rejecting the concept of the ‘self’ in Anti-Oedipus. It is out of 
habit, they say, and similarly, it is perhaps out of convenience that I continue 
to refer to anarchism. Ultimately, however, I choose to use ‘anarchism’ 
because it is an order-word with great power and utility. Order-word is a 
term Deleuze and Guattari use in their rejection of the idea of language as 
representative. It refers to actions that are “accomplished in the statement.”494 
‘I’, they claim, is an order-word, evoking a transformation of partial objects 
into a coherent single self, making a certain body me.495 
In the plateau ‘20th November, The Postulate of Linguistics’, Deleuze and 
Guattari consider J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts and the notion of 
performativity.496 Their interest lies in Austin’s critique of logical positivism, a 
strand in linguistics which claims that the role of language is to represent the 
world, to provide an accurate description of feelings, objects, humans, and the 
rest of reality. Drawing on Austin and John Searle, Deleuze and Guattari 
point out three aspects of language: locutionary, or what is said; illocutionary, 
or what is intended; and perlocutionary, the result of the action of speaking. 
The illocutionary is particularly important, as it is where the concept of 
language as performative arises, in the sense that it not only 
describes/represents, but also does what it says – the act is done through the 
speech itself. These enunciations are order-words – not a category of types of 
statements, but a type of direct relation of performing, between the statement 
and the act. An example is that by saying ‘I swear’ one performs the act of 
swearing itself; ‘I promise’ is the act of promising but so could the statement ‘I 
love you’ be, depending on the context. Rather than being communication or 
information, Deleuze and Guattari claim the basic unit of language is the 
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order-word.497 These order-words are an immanent function of language that 
causes an incorporeal transformation, such as when a person becomes a 
convict as the judge announces ‘guilty’. An order-word is not necessarily a 
command word, but one that brings about something new. Moreover, they 
can only create an incorporeal transformation under the correct circumstances 
– not every time that we say ‘I do’ do we get married. 
Thus, it becomes clear that there are no purely linguistic assemblages. 
Language becomes inseparable from action. Any attempt to extract language 
from its concrete expression posits form as transcendent and universal. 
Moreover, “[t]he collective symbolic order is that by which its members make 
sense of the world, within which they organise their experience and justify 
their actions.”498 Collective assemblages of enunciation play a similar role in 
that they simultaneously construct and are constructed by the members of the 
assemblages as ‘making things make sense’. In the next section, we further 
examine the question of production raised by this conceptualisation. 
To conclude the defence of my attachment to ‘anarchism’, the term remains in 
use throughout this chapter for two further reasons. First of all, this work is 
part of the habitual repetition which re-produces anarchism as an assemblage 
of practices and ideas. This makes it possible to situate it in a historical and 
contemporary context. Secondly, through the use of anarchism as an order-
word, this work participates in the re-formulation of the assemblage in a 
certain way and delineates the limits of anarchism in new configuration. This 
does not imply a commitment to the ‘essence’ of anarchism, but to its eternal 
return as a process. Attaching an identity to anarchism would, as Elizabeth 
Grosz’ argues in relation to feminism, fail to produce a definition of a group 
which acknowledges its multiplicity and interconnectedness to other 
groups.499 Instead of providing a different definition and returning to the 
realm of symbolic and signification by asking ‘what is anarchism’, we have 
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turned to the question of ‘how is anarchism’, concerned with its functions.  
This inevitably implies a new take on normativity, but one that is immanent 
and held collectively through the re-creation of anarchism as such. To return 
to the problem of universals, this reformulation of anarchism might be 
labelled ‘relativist’ by proponents of strong ontologies. Indeed, in an 
immanent cartography of anarchism it might make it appear that the 
boundaries are very fuzzy. However, I would like to stress again that fuzzy 
boundaries are only a problem if seen through the lens of transcendence, that 
is, an atemporal, universal, all-encompassing position of absolute knowledge. 
Viewed from our own limited human situation, these are the only boundaries 
there are. Determining the boundaries is difficult. It is also a process, one 
which we go through every time in a new community, new group, with old 
friendships. If anarchism is defined as an assemblage then determining who 
is ‘in’ and who/what is ‘out’ necessarily becomes difficult, and this should 
not come as a surprise or be refused. Pretending it is easy is what creates 
problems and setting a criterion for inclusion/exclusion only satisfies over-
zealous activists with a tendency for dogmatism. Thus, in the rest of this 
chapter, we trace some of the features of this immanent normativity and the 
possible paths it might lead us down.  
3.2 Ethical Knowledge 
To begin with, a central aspect of transcendent ontologies with claims to 
universal morality is the necessary link between these universals and moral 
knowledge. In traditional ethical theories, ethics is usually taken to rely on an 
intelligible rational model. In Section 2.2.1 we discussed the primacy of 
rationality in moral thinking in relation to Kant’s understanding of moral 
knowledge, which I expand on now. Kant postulated that moral knowledge is 
a synthetic a priori, one that comes before experience because it is based on 
reason. In other words, we cannot know how we should act from merely 
experiencing how people act. The ability to reason, in this sense, is the ability 
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to discern subjective from objective knowledge, which is not a conscious 
process, but a synthesis of the faculties. In Kant’s words, “error is only 
effected through the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, 
through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgment join 
with the objective ones.”500 For example, to check the veracity of a fact, such 
as if I am indeed thirty years old, we might compare it to other facts in the 
world, such as ‘I was born in 1988’ and ‘it is now the year 2018’. If all factors 
point towards the same result, i.e. there is unity of reason, then we rationally 
synthesise this statement as true.501 
Kantian deontology thus rests on three aspects of reason. First, everyone is 
capable of rational thinking, which makes rationality a transcendent capacity. 
It implies that regardless of culture, religion, historical era or other factors, 
human beings all possess the same brain attribute that, if used correctly, 
would lead them to the same (universal) truth. Secondly, in his rejection of 
the possibility of knowing whether transcendent entities exist, Kant considers 
reason the only cognitive tool that allows for judgment – not only moral 
judgment, but also a general understanding of truth and error. Therefore, 
rationality is posited as the supreme method of morality. Finally, reason 
functions as the means for perceiving a relation between cause and effect, 
such as the ability to discern that if I touch something hot, I will burn myself. 
Most importantly, this leads us to believe that the experiences of the faculties 
are united by reason – it helps us understand (and judge) our experiences. 
Rationality, then, is seen as an attribute of the moral agent, or, more 
specifically, as an attribute that an agent needs to exhibit to be considered 
moral. This is the traditional Cartesian-Kantian subject which lies at the core 
of modern political philosophy, but also underpins the modern anarchist 
conceptualisations of ethical subjectivity. Prefigurative virtue ethics or multi-
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value consequentialism, for instance, both rely on a form of rationality to 
determine a causal relationship between action and result, as we discussed 
previously. Through the Spinozian/Deleuzian critique, however, reason 
ceases to be the method for reaching ethical solutions and becomes instead 
the method for justifying the desired outcome. This is clear, for example, 
when determining the right or wrong action – the ‘right’ one being the one we 
are able to provide reasons for, one for which we can demonstrate these 
reasons and that they are within the limits of what is considered acceptable. 
The main claim this section puts forward, then, is that the relationship 
between reason and truth operates in the inverse to the Kantian 
understanding of reason. Rather than being a tool for moral judgement such 
as making a rational choice – using reason to weigh the arguments – 
rationality is used to justify one’s desired outcome. 
Virtually the whole domain of ethics is oriented around judging, evaluating 
and logically constructing an argument for or against a particular decision, 
while moral responsibility is about giving an account of oneself, being able to 
coherently list reasons for one’s decision (and recognise when atonement for 
bad decisions is required). Similarly, an ethical individual is seen as someone 
who is reasonable, or can be reasoned with, able to logically defend their 
position and actions. This process is articulated by Nathan Jun: 
Rationality involves an alleged direction of fit between our thoughts and 
the world (theoretical rationality) or between our desires/moral beliefs 
and our actions (practical rationality). Both conceptions involve the idea 
of representation – our thoughts are rational to the extent that they 
accurately represent the world (i.e. are true); our actions, in turn, are 
rational to the extent that they accurately represent our desires/moral 
beliefs.502 
In terms of collective assemblages of enunciation, this situates ethics on the 
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symbolic plane, encompassing elements such as truth and universality. Thus, 
it would seem that the place taken by rationality and justification as primary 
elements of the domain of ethics reinforces the status-quo of ‘problem à 
solution’ and the ethical image of thought, effectively restricting an affective 
engagement with the Event. Moreover, the Kantian understanding of reason 
points to a liberal conception of an individual subject being solely responsible 
for the use of their faculties, whilst in practice it relies on the shared collective 
participation in the processes of reasoning, both to produce meaning and 
recognise it. De Acosta exemplifies this particular form of representative 
thinking with the following progression: 
Anarchists are against the State and Church 
implies... 
Anarchists are against the structures of representation and power at 
work in the State and Church 
implies... 
Anarchists are against any other structures of representation analogous 
to those at work in the State and Church 
implies... 
Anarchists are against any structure of representation and power 
implies... 
Anarchists are against all authority, all representation 
implies...503 
To illustrate this problem, it might be useful to offer an example. Karen Houle 
discusses the primacy of reason in relation to abortion, specifically the use of 
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abortion as an ethical problem in the classroom. She claims that this approach 
often misses the point of providing a method for making such a decision in 
real life, if it becomes necessary. Teaching abortion as a hypothetical situation 
where participants have a clear ethical choice between ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ is 
supposed to “[cultivate] in all . . . individuals the same basic capacity to think 
through the issue such that later, outside the classroom, if and when they 
encounter it in real life they will be better equipped to handle it.”504 In other 
words, it is taken to cultivate ability to reason, to ‘detach’ oneself in order to 
reach ‘objective’ knowledge via rational thinking. However, she observes, in 
practice this method posits the decision-making process outside of context 
and can actually be more detrimental than helpful. Her argument is that by 
‘rationalising’ the two sides of the debate, it becomes possible to learn how to 
justify our desired outcome, rather than learn to determine which decision is 
better in a particular situation. By not taking into account the specificities, 
experiences and concerns of the actors in a situation and positing it as a 
‘moral problem’ in the classroom, we solidify and consolidate people’s 
preferences instead of teaching them to come up with new solutions or 
reconfigurations of the problem. 
In moral philosophy, Braidotti comments, one upsets the predominance of 
Kantian moral universalism “at one’s own peril.”505 Likewise, in anarchist 
moral philosophy, the primacy of reason has also remained largely 
undisputed. For example, in the postanarchist theories we discussed earlier 
there is also a critique of rationality – discussed in relation to the rejection of a 
‘universal rational subject’ – mostly expressed by Saul Newman and Simon 
Critchley. Newman’s critique of rationality starts with Stirner, who argues 
that it serves as an oppressive method of domination by the ego: rationality as 
a method for searching for truth results in the rejection of individual 
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perspectives and truths and as such is just another ‘spook’.506 Newman 
continues to pile up the reflections of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Derrida 
and Lacan on rationality, rejecting it once more as one of the ‘metaphysical 
first principles’ used for domination over the individual.507 In the 
postanarchist ethics he proposes, however, rationality returns as a necessary 
condition for the critique of authority.508 This time, it is not as part of an 
essentialised human nature, but an ‘empty signifier’ in Laclau’s sense. Since 
Newman himself does not make it clear how this change affects the use of 
reason in ethics, I turn briefly to Laclau. 
In chapter two, we placed Laclau, together with Newman and Critchley on 
the side of ‘ontologies of lack’, which are characterised by a tendency towards 
privileging the ‘social’ in the society vs. nature debate. This results in the 
primacy of the symbolic order as constitutive of ethics and politics. The 
notion of the empty signifier is a main constitutive element of the symbolic. It 
is derived from Saussure’s linguistic theory, in which the sign is composed of 
a signifier (for example, the word tea), and a signified (the idea of tea). An 
empty signifier, in that sense, is a signifier without signified, an element of the 
symbolic that has no referent in the ‘real’ world. This is Laclau’s starting 
point, which leads him to differentiate between floating and empty signifiers, 
the first being equivocal or ambiguous, while the latter is only possible if 
“there is a structural impossibility in signification as such.”509 Newman takes 
that possibility to be expressed in the Lacanian Real, something which cannot 
be signified. If taken as foundational for postanarchist epistemology, this 
approach poses a few problems. First of all, it falls prey to our initial criticism 
that, operating through a transcendent framework of representation, the 
process of reasoning is not a suitable method for making an ethical choice. In 
Lacan, the Real is not a kind of first being which is exempt from signification, 
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but it is itself part of the domain of representation and signification.510 Indeed, 
Newman’s own proposal to move beyond representation and Todd May’s 
anti-representational principle both provide an adequate critique of the 
primacy of signification and meaning which is at the core of ontologies of 
lack. Second, from Deleuze’s position, signification is an obstacle that 
prevents us from grasping the immanent relations of reality. His critique of 
representation is also a critique of the Lacanian Real that posits lack at the 
heart of signification. In the previous chapter we addressed Deleuze and 
Guattari’s critique of Oedipus and desire, thus reformulating representation 
as productive, rather than as a signifying relationship. 
Critchley, on the other hand, suggests a theoretical critique of the ‘fact of 
reason’, claiming that Kantian moral law is only binding insofar as there are 
agents that recognise it as binding.511 His own ethics dispense with reason 
through an infinite loop of demand-approval, which does not require a 
method for deciding or justifying. The problem with this, as already 
discussed, is the transcendence of the demand, which, as we argued with 
Deleuze, prevents ethics from actually taking place. As Bestigui observes, 
Deleuze is in fact entirely in opposition to Levinas with his analysis that the 
“history of ontology is actually a systemic subordination of ontology to 
morality, a transcendent ontology.”512 
Despite the commitments of the postanarchists, then, Kantian rationality has 
not been sufficiently displaced by a specifically anarchist (ethical) 
epistemology.513 Using Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, however, it is 
possible to critique the fundamental problems of Kantian ontology by 
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examining the limits of real experience. The problem for Deleuze is not reason 
or rationality itself, but its orthodoxy in philosophy and thinking – a 
dogmatic position which is founded on the notion of transcendence. In 
Deleuzian ethics, rationality comes after desire – our unconscious is the 
productive element and reason is the method we apply to validate our 
desires: “Once interests have been defined within the confines of a society, the 
rational is the way in which people pursue those interests and attempt to 
realize them.”514 Desire is not driven by rationality or logical thought. Desire 
is produced within the limits of what is possible in a particular context, 
which, in turn, is what makes the unconscious a factory. Thus, rationality 
cannot be the process for discerning an ethical choice as it is subsequent to the 
choice; it is the tool used for justifying the choice after it has been ‘made’. This 
inversion of the relationship between choice and reason is a sufficient 
condition to reject the transcendence of reason as a method for reaching moral 
truths. 
To replace the primacy of reason we offered a Deleuzian conceptualisation of 
the problematic. As James Williams comments, “Deleuzian empiricism is the 
creation of concepts in response to individual problems, but individual 
problems are a take on the whole of the actual and the virtual.”515 Problem-
Ideas are concerned with conditions, rather than decisions or justification. As 
we have seen, like Kant, Deleuze conceives of problems as transcendental, but 
rather than being concerned with the conditions of possible experience, they 
are concerned with the conditions of genesis of real experience. There are two 
main reasons why such an approach is better for anarchist ethics. First of all, 
it bypasses the need for representation in thinking. Representational thinking, 
as exposed in the image of thought, relies on recognition as the ‘mediating’ 
faculty. An ethical methodology of problem-Ideas, however, reveals the 
possibilities of change. Ideas, as we established, are multiplicities created by a 
set of differential relations and elements that we named singularities. The 
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purpose of an Idea is to structure these intensive processes into patterns. In 
that sense, bodies and individuals are both ‘solutions’ to problems. In ethical 
practice, such a transformation would imply, for example, an understanding 
of people’s choice to engage in violent protest as the solution of certain 
conditions, rather than compelling a judgement or condemning specific 
tactics as ethically ‘wrong’. The violence argument is particularly common 
and divisive in anarchist organising, so let’s explore it as an example. 
There have been numerous texts written and discussions had of whether 
violence in the form of property destruction, acts of physical violence against 
the police and state representatives or individual attacks against oppressive 
behaviour are justifiable from an anarchist perspective.516 Peter Gelderloos, 
for example, identifies seven reasons why non-violence as a tactic in protest 
action is not compatible with the values that anarchism holds.517 Non-violence 
is racist and sexist, he argues, as it ignores the fact that women, people of 
colour, or people of the global South are subjected to violence on a daily basis, 
and only white, male, privileged people live in a world of ‘safety’ – being 
arrested for protest violence, for example, can be a wildly different experience 
for different bodies. Similarly, the principle of non-violence supports the state 
by admitting that only the state has the legitimacy to use violence.518 
The framing of this as an ethical ‘problem’ which can be solved with the use 
of reason is indeed clear in Gelderloos’ approach of appealing to an 
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argumentative form positioned against the state. However, regardless of 
whether the violence argument is ‘better’ logically, or more fitting with 
anarchist values, or more compellingly made, a person’s decision is already 
determined by the conditions which push them towards privileging one set of 
values over the other. The possibility of changing one’s mind, or of accepting 
‘diversity of tactics’, is determined even before the event – any event – by 
framing the argument as an exclusive disjunction of ‘either… or…’. Rather, 
approaching this question from a methodology of Deleuzian problems, we 
can analyse and understand the conditions that have created the 
(im)possibility for violence during a protest. For example, throwing a brick at 
a McDonald’s window during a big demonstration with thousands of people, 
in a group of close friends all dressed in black and wearing face masks is a 
result of certain conditions – the force of the reason the demonstration is 
happening, existence of black clothes and the tactic of wearing them to avoid 
being recognised, prior experience of the tactic, as well as conversations to 
ensure that everyone in the group has the same intention, a person’s own 
physical and mental preparedness, lack of video recording equipment nearby, 
and many others, some going back years or even centuries. Similarly, not 
engaging in destruction of property is not necessarily a result of an ethical 
choice, but of the lack of conditions to perceive the alternative as an ethical 
choice. That is to say, throwing bricks is a result of a particular configuration 
of singularities that produces an intensive field which makes it possible. In 
fact, being ‘convinced’ to participate in a violent action through a compelling 
argument might have the opposite effect of feeling coerced to do something, 
which the person was not prepared for. Thus, an understanding of the 
conditions is vital if we want to change the outcome. We discuss this further 
later in the chapter in relation to the Event. 
Replacing reason with problems means that ethics is not situated exclusively 
on the symbolic plane. Taking ethics as a collective assemblage of enunciation 
and reason as an ‘empty signifier’ is at the heart of the problem of 
universalism versus relativism. It follows the logic that ethics or values are 
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about the meaning of actions/characteristics, that meaning could either be 
objective or subjective, and that it is either possible to construct that shared 
meaning or not. Reason is then erroneously posited as the condition for 
shared meaning. As Rolando Perez comments, reason is “the guiding 
Structure of all structures, the Structures that makes it possible to see the 
world in terms of structures.”519 Thinking of ethical situations as Ideas avoids 
the problem of relativism and universalism because there is no meaning to be 
attributed to conditions. It takes ethics away from coded desire and imposing 
signifying regimes, into a-signifying regimes where the relationship of 
representation becomes one of production.  
In this sense, we need to return to Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy? 
and the concept of thinking. Thinking for them happens when there is an 
encounter with something unknown and the mind is provoked to engage 
with it. This is what a problem/Idea is – a disruption of habitual thoughts of 
‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’. Thus, this understanding of thinking is 
what is deployed when re-formulation of the anarchist limits occurs. Ethical 
knowledge is acquired as a methodology through various ethical encounters. 
This also implies that thinking is a collective process, not too dissimilar to 
Wolfi Landstreicher’s definition of theory as “the unitary body of thought 
that we consciously construct for our own use. We construct it when we make an 
analysis of why our live are the way they are, why the world is the way it is, 
and when we simultaneously develop a strategy and tactics of practice – of 
how to get what we really most desire for our lives.”520  
Approaching ethical situations in this way allows us to see the conditions that 
have produced a specific result, rather than simply justify it. Moreover, such 
an approach precludes the possibility for ‘moralising’ in the form of imposing 
guilt, judgment or rules under the guise of ‘critique’. By starting from what is 
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given, problems do not claim legitimacy of their answers on the basis of 
‘objective’ thinking but eschew entirely the categories of subjective and 
objective. Just like water, sun and soil are subjective factors responsible for the 
grape seed’s growth, and at the same time objective factors for everyone, a 
problematic starts from what is given and proceeds to identify processes, 
rather than final solutions. 
Truth  
This critique of reason has further implications for ethics that claim 
universality on the basis of objective truth. In a dualist system of 
representational thinking, rationality is opposed to ‘emotions’, sometimes 
also framed as ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ thinking. Slightly diverging in 
meaning from Deleuze’s objective and subjective presuppositions in 
philosophy’s image of thought, objectivity in ethics is the idea that it is 
possible to step outside of one’s position and consider all sides of a debate on 
equal terms, with subjectivity meaning thinking from a particular point of 
view, often involving emotions and preferences which guide the decision-
making process. Objectivity is based on the fallacy of inclusivity – “that it is 
right and good to include all relevant parties or evidence.”521 It is through 
‘objective’ thinking that rationality completes its full circle of representing 
that which is universally known – by rationalising one’s choice, common 
sense moral values are re-created, thus once more positioning reason as the 
ultimate method of ethics. This is precisely the mental gymnastics which 
allow the justification of any action as long as it represents common 
knowledge through the method of reason. As Levi Bryant puts it, 
[S]o long as philosophy assumes that thought has a natural affinity with 
the true (a naturally upright thought), a specific form of objectivity 
(natural common sense), and bases itself on the model of recognition, 
thought cannot help but become unconsciously trapped in its own 
implicit presuppositions which are culturally, historically, and socially 
                                                
521 K. Houle, Responsibility, Complexity, Abortion: Towards a New Image of Ethical Thought, p. 127. 
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contingent.522 
In other words, truth, as that which is ‘real’, becomes dependent on reason 
and representation – through reason, we are able to represent the real world 
in a way which is ‘truthful’. 
In order to explore the concept of truth further, we need to turn to the 
understanding of time in Difference and Repetition. The concept of objective, 
universal truth, Daniel W. Smith argues, is based in a disconnection from 
time: “a proposition is true when it is true universally, eternally, in all times 
and in all places.”523 Indeed, the objective/subjective division of ethics is often 
mapped out onto the universal/relativist debate around the nature of truth. 
Universal truths in this case are atemporal and always valid, with relative 
truths only valid for a particular situation in time. This division, however, is 
reliant on a conceptualisation of time as abstraction, which Deleuze argues is 
already visible in Kant.524 For Kant, time ceased being a unit used to measure 
movements and became a pure and empty form with various modes such as 
simultaneity or series.525 In contrast, Deleuze proposes the three syntheses of 
time discussed previously. They reformulate past, present and future so as to 
propose a different form of time. The first synthesis of the present is a passive 
synthesis of habits and repetition. The second synthesis proposes an idea of a 
pure past which creates the flow of time. The third synthesis of future is the 
condition for production of the new. 
In Deleuze’s form of time, ‘truth’ is downgraded from its role as the ultimate 
goal of philosophy, or as a transcendent value, to a concept which, along with 
other concepts, comes from a particular plane of immanence. With regard to 
ethics, this implies that Deleuze considers concepts such as ‘universal’ and 
‘relative’ as only applicable to a specific form of truth, dependent on a specific 
concept of time. Of course, this is a path that starts with Nietzsche and 
                                                
522 L. Bryant, Difference and Givenness, p. 19. 
523 D. W. Smith, ‘Temporality and truth’, Deleuze Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 2013, p. 377. 
524 G. Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, p. vii. 
525 C. Kerslake, Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy, p. 170. 
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weaves its way through other poststructuralist texts. The question of objective 
truth, for example, haunted Foucault’s work from the very beginning, 
culminating in his identification of ‘regimes of truth’ as mechanisms that 
produce discourses perceived as ‘true’ in that particular time and context. 
“Each society has its regime of truth”, he writes. These regimes of truth are 
identified as: 
1. “the types of discourse [society] harbours and causes to function as true” 
2. “the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from 
false statements” 
3. “the way in which each is sanctioned” 
4. “the techniques and procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth” 
5. “the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.”526 
Similarly to Foucault’s regimes of truth, Deleuze and Guattari identify the 
role of philosophy as a problem-solving activity, where truths arise from 
within the process of creating concepts. In anarchist practices, this is 
especially evident through processes of community-building and community 
responses to problems. The practical impossibility of repeating these 
processes in other places and times points to their function as immanent 
modes of existence. Anarchism, moreover, has always had a special 
relationship with time, its writings mostly transient and its practices often re-
defined and re-situated. To claim universality of truth, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue, would be to surrender the possibility of critiquing established 
values.527 Moreover, such a rejection of universal truth presents the possibility 
of reaching a pragmatic understanding of the world through situated 
response, through the ways in which reality is enacted rather than pre-given.  
Smooth and striated 
To assume that ethical thinking is only possible from an objective or a 
                                                
526 M. Foucault, ‘The political function of the intellectual’, p. 13. 
527 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 46. 
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subjective position is a function of what Houle terms ‘striated metaphysics’.528 
Deriving from Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of smooth and striated spaces,529 
striated metaphysics refers to a clearly divided, categorised way of seeing the 
world, also called arborescent thought in A Thousand Plateaus. In the plateau 
on Nomadology, striated space for Deleuze and Guattari is a space530 that is 
clearly organised, such as when we look down from an aeroplane and see 
fields neatly divided by borders, or a town with each property delineated 
with a fence. It is a way of describing, for example, social structures as 
hierarchical vectors of constraining identities. Similarly, striated metaphysics 
offers clear, rigid lines of thinking: “We are either dead or alive. A body is 
either me, or it is you . . . [It] also presumes a definitive step-wise linear 
sequence to human development.”531 
Striated metaphysics is binarizing. It assumes that there is a clear-cut point at 
which life begins or ends, that genitalia and sexes can be neatly divided into 
two groups without any ambivalence, or that human beings have an identity 
(sometimes called essence) which never changes and stays with them for the 
rest of their lives and the life of the species. This logic is dangerous, claims 
Houle, because it shifts the terms of ethical debates so that they become 
unsolvable.532 For instance, in the ethical discussion of abortion this implies 
that there are two ethical positions, pro-life and pro-choice (and perhaps 
everyone in the middle is simply confused). Moreover, it implies that there 
should be a moment we can identify (even if through negotiation and 
compromise) where ‘life’ starts, when a bunch of cells becomes a human 
being and lives, to subsequently die in a moment of ethical significance. 
Therefore, the ethical debate is shifted to the question of when exactly a foetus 
becomes a human which has the right to live, with pro-life supporters 
                                                
528 K. Houle, op. cit., p. 60. 
529 These concepts are most explicitly developed in ‘1227: Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine’, 
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 369-441. 
530 Not necessarily a physical space, but also space in the abstract, such as a dimension, or even a system 
of signification.  
531 K. Houle, ibid. 
532 ibid. 
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generally claiming that this is the moment of conception and pro-choice 
supporters claiming it is somewhere around the third to fourth month of 
pregnancy. 
Using a Deleuzian lens to explore this discussion, it seems first of all that 
striated metaphysics is not a conducive way of thinking to achieve a solution 
to this debate – though, clearly, we are required to have a position. It might be 
said that nowadays such debates are easily solved with science, by precisely 
determining the moment when the heartbeat starts, when the brain starts to 
function, or when the foetus resembles a human in form. However, of course 
this has not resulted in a solution to the problem. Such an approach resembles 
Leibniz’ search for infinitesimal difference which Deleuze outlined in 
Difference and Repetition. Every time we reach a certain definition through 
difference, we can always subdivide it to even smaller differences, thus never 
able to reach a final definition of when a foetus becomes a human. Houle 
states: 
This sort of metaphysics often runs aground in the face of embodied, 
practical matters. That abortion law cannot agree on the actual moment 
when the so-called personhood happens to the foetus in utero testifies to 
that.533 
In addition to striated space, Deleuze and Guattari theorise ‘smooth space’. If 
we imagine the same clearly divided fields and territories to be at war, there 
will be lines and spaces that will become more important than others, such as 
roads, embankments or rivers. These lines will be fluid, criss-crossing and 
constructed on the basis of an immanent meaning. For example, an army will 
have a completely different tactical relationship to a field on the day it is 
attacking to the day it is retreating. Smooth space is a space of intensities and 
events. Similarly, if we were to reject the notion that there is such a thing as a 
universal rationality, we can understand why people often act in non-binary, 
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paradoxical ways, often inconsistent and uncertain. One individual, in their 
teenage years, might be a Christian dedicated to fighting against abortion; the 
same person, once the lines and vectors of importance have shifted in the 
space they occupy (what Deleuze and Guattari call the plane of consistency), 
might end up having an abortion and defending other people’s decisions to 
make that choice. A smooth space thus exists as a state of differentiation 
where the elements are configured immanently according to their function. 
The constant fluidity of moving between smooth and striated spaces is what 
is important, positing the ability of knowledge to produce values. 
To return to anarchism, this binarising logic of a striated space can also be 
seen in our example of violence, both in relationships and in collective action. 
For example, in the zine ‘What have we done for us lately?’ Dot Matrix 
analyses situations of domestic abuse where anarchists take an approach of 
splitting the conflict into fixed categories of abuser/victim. We either blame 
the accused, or the accuser. We either support one, or the other. Furthermore, 
either we exclude and ostracise the abuser, or the victim will never be safe in 
the community (or, to return to the question of purity, we either ostracise the 
abuser or we’re not good feminists534). The abuser either self–flagellates and 
atones, or leaves the community: “The accuser is put in a position of either 
completely turning on the partner, or of not being taken seriously as a 
victim/survivor.”535 Such an approach reduces a complex situation into black 
and white choices which do not allow for new solutions and ways of acting 
and relating to each other. The essay argues, “This all-or-nothing attitude is a 
cultural response that might arguably be meaningful for violence from 
strangers, but definitely is not useful for dealing with people who have 
loved/cared for each other, who share family, friends, spaces, goals.”536 
To foreshadow the question of the ethical subject which is taken up in the 
next section, an ethical framework with a striated metaphysics relies on a 
                                                
534 This is not to imply a heteronormative male/female mapping of abuser/victim. 
535 D. Matrix, ‘What have we done for us lately?’, [zine], 2008, [unknown source], p. 4. 
536 ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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coherent subject as the location where ethics happens, and moreover, 
proceeds to assume that this subject is capable of and responsible for rational 
decision-making. Being ‘responsible’ is taken to mean giving a rational 
account of one’s actions, making a logical, reasonable justification. To return 
to the women in the abortion clinic, we can also add an element of 
collectiveness – their action was moral only insofar as they were able to give a 
reason that other actors in that situation were able to recognise as rational. 
Similarly, a great value is placed on ‘consistency’ – sticking to one single 
ethical framework and logic. Not being consistent is often taken as valid 
grounds to reject somebody’s decision (You eat meat so who are you to talk about 
the benefits of veganism?) That human beings are complete, self–determinable 
subjects has already been disputed in the previous chapter, but in terms of 
ethical questions, the primacy of reason further results in hampering the 
capacity to build alliances and engender collective action. Moreover, it 
simplifies complex situations where feelings and emotions can be equally 
valid and important down to a single aspect of the situation – that which is 
rational. 
To conclude the discussion on the rejection of the primacy of reason in ethical 
situations, I briefly mention again the criticism that the ideas of post–
structuralists theories lead to a dangerously relativist position of ‘anything 
goes’. To claim that truth is either objective and therefore universally valid, or 
relativist and therefore ultimately meaningless is to continue thinking in 
terms of striated space, where these two positions are binarized and put into 
opposition. Instead, it is possible to simultaneously claim that certain 
functions of power and discourse produce contingent ‘truths’ which are then 
posited as ahistorical and universal, and that this contingency does not imply 
that anything is acceptable and everything is meaningless. In other words, it 
is possible to have ethics which start from the critique of universal truths, and 
indeed, do not imply that ‘anything goes’, as we shall be examining in the 
final section. The immanent method we argued for compels us to discern the 
problematic field of certain ethical responses, which still allows us to discern 
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which practices are acceptable, but now in relation to an immanent 
understanding of their purposes. This dispenses with judgment and guilt, 
while still holding an idea of the shared, collective boundary/truth. 
3.3 Virtuous Machines 
We begin this section by outlining the role of the unconscious in ethics. This 
initially situates us in one of the classic debates of traditional ethical 
philosophy. Here, habits are usually taken to be a form of bridge between 
body and mind, seen as a form of unconscious signal from the mind that 
directs the actions of the body.537 Habits are seen as something the individual 
needs to either control or embrace. For example, Kant rejected mindless action 
as dangerous and passive, while seeing moral action as always deliberate and 
active. Conversely, Aristotle’s virtue ethics are all about cultivating and 
acquiring good habits which then form the virtuous character.538 Both of these 
approaches to understanding unconscious acts still operate within a 
transcendent framework of judgment according to which habits can be 
evaluated as good or bad. In Saul Newman’s work, which relies heavily on 
Lacan, the question of the unconscious returns as the subject of Lack, which 
we discussed in 1.3.2. Rather than defining the unconscious in terms of a 
value judgment, this serves as the grounding, i.e. the transcendent arbiter, of 
such a judgment. 
Whereas these traditional accounts of ethics understand habits as delineated 
by a framework of conscious/unconscious actions performed by a subject, for 
Deleuze habits are what give the impression of a subject and act as a form of 
‘glue’ for social life. Applying this to ethics, there are two questions that 
might arise from this conceptualisation of habits. The first is whether ethical 
                                                
537 See, for example, Plato’s chariot discussed in section 2.1.2, or Descartes’s conception of nature in 
relation to mind-body dualism, examined in, for example, S. Patterson and J. Cottingham, ‘Descartes on 
Nature, Habit, and the Corporeal World’, Aristotelian Society, vol. 87, 2013, pp. 235-258. 
538 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, tr. R. Williams, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1989, pp. 
19-25. 
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activity in that sense might be analogous to the cultivation of good habits, or a 
virtuous character, as in Aristotle’s ethics or Frank’s prefigurative virtue-
ethics. The second is where the possibility of agency lies. In both questions, 
the underlying problem is one of immanent metaphysics’ understanding of 
the acquisition of habits. These two questions are addressed in the next two 
sections. 
All forms of virtue ethics we have discussed are teleological accounts based 
on some form of external judgment. This poses a problem, since in immanent 
ethics habits are constitutive of the self but cannot be consciously 
manipulated towards a desired outcome. Unlike reason, which through a 
process of logical steps proceeds to create a principle, Deleuzian habits are not 
acquired through an ‘objective’ weighing of arguments and facts. Neither is 
the causality of habits a straightforward Aristotelian progression of acquiring 
good habits leading to an ethical life. This implies a circular logic of ‘we 
define an ethical life as one led by a person with virtuous character’. The task 
of ethics here becomes acquiring a virtuous character. In anarchist terms, if 
we stipulate that anarchist ethics is about not oppressing others, then not 
oppressing others becomes the goal of anarchism. Such a circular image of 
thought does not adequately question the framework of ‘who does the 
defining?’, ‘where does this definition come from?’, and ‘what compels us to 
define it in such a way?’ 
In traditional ethics, these questions are answered through an identity 
category – anarchist ethics is defined as not oppressing others, because the 
essence of anarchism is the desire for freedom from oppression. In Deleuzian 
ethics, such a move is not possible. Instead, we start from what is given. Thus, 
the normative dimension of habits in immanent metaphysics comes from the 
notion of machines. This understanding of habits takes us away from the 
Aristotelian judgment of virtuous and vicious character and Franks’ notion of 
multiple telē and situates us back in the material. Thus, the notion of 
machines/machinic plays two important roles in our discussion – firstly, it 
takes away the categories of good/evil and, secondly, creates a material basis 
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for ethics. Through their rejection of the value of the interior as meaning-
making (identity, essence or truth) Deleuze and Guattari define machines on 
the basis of the connections they plug into. This is to say that the concept of a 
machine should not be taken to constitute the ‘essence’ of the subject, but 
rather that the ‘subject’ is a process of connecting with and disconnecting 
from other machines. 
Machines operate through active and reactive forces, or one force with two 
manifestations. In section 2.3.2, we introduced affirmation as an active force, 
with representation as a reactive one. In relation to ethics, these forces can be 
understood as good/bad or positive/negative but only on the level of life itself, 
i.e. only in relation to whether these are destructive of the machine or increase 
its affects. In a Spinozist approach, active forces (also called forces of desire in 
Nietzsche in Philosophy), go to the limits of their power, while reactive forces 
(also called oedipal in Anti-Oedipus) reduce power through regulation or 
blockages.539 In this sense, ‘good’ machines are those that are life-affirming, 
rather than those judged through an external conception of the good. To 
return to the question of whether immanent ethics should be concerned with 
the cultivation of virtues, in immanence it becomes impossible to define 
virtues or vices that are not intrinsic to the assemblage. It then follows that 
any notion of ‘cultivation’ of specific virtues is illusory, because the ‘virtue’ is 
not necessarily to be found outside of the assemblage. Moreover, habits are 
not consciously ‘selected’ on any basis, as they are pre-conscious. Despite this, 
it is possible to conceptualise some form of ‘training’ of oneself within 
immanent ethics, but it will require a reworking of the understanding of 
virtues and cultivation. 
The possibility for a form of cultivation lies in the revolutionary potential of 
desire. As we have seen, desire is positive and productive, and this is what 
accounts for the ‘plugging in’ of machines into other machines. The 
unconscious is a factory, and the body becomes a desiring-machine. What in 
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traditional ethical theories would be conceptualised as an ‘agent’ is here 
subsumed into the concept of the desiring-machine. Desiring-machines also 
operate on unconscious syntheses, which posits subjectivity as a process of 
multiple directions and contradictory tendencies, only retroactively 
understood as a ‘self’. Thus, it becomes possible for an individual to be pulled 
towards different connections, such as being driven to smoke and wishing to 
stop. It is possible to wholeheartedly subscribe to the values of freedom and 
equality yet act misogynistically at the same time. 
A desiring-machine, thus, produces all sorts of connections, some of which 
are productive and some which are not. The machinic does not produce or 
contain meaning and cannot be evaluated in ethical terms such as good/bad. 
Machines are assessed on the basis of what they do – whether they produce 
something. When a seed is ‘bad’, it is incapable of sprouting and growing. For 
a seed to grow, it needs certain conditions, such as water, warmth, soil. 
Depending on the quality and quantity of these conditions, it will either grow 
to be a fruit-bearing tree, or it will be unable to produce fruits, or it will 
wither away while it is young. Similarly, desire is channelled on the basis of 
the conditions that are available. To return to the question of smoking – a nice 
summer evening spent with friends enjoying a drink and an available pack of 
cigarettes might be conditions channelling the ‘desire’ to smoke, which is a 
flow that has been codified. This compulsion may come from being a smoker 
for many years, the influence of the media, a drive to be part of the group, or 
another ‘coding’ that has occurred on the unconscious at some point. 
The first step in an immanent ‘training for good habits’, in that sense, is an 
embrace of the uncertainty in the connections desire makes. The 
revolutionary potential of desire is in creating more connections, and not 
putting limits on this is vital. The logic of affinity groups in anarchist 
organising comes to mind, as the practice of creating short or long-lived 
collectives through shared problems or actions. Rather than rejecting 
organising in ‘single-issue campaigns’, for example, these could be seen as 
ways of connecting that have not previously existed and can only enhance the 
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affect of the anarchist assemblage. Notions of a ‘revolutionary programme’ 
which encompasses such affinity groups in a bigger project are attempts at 
codifying desire. In the previous section we discussed how particular drives 
(flows of desire) come to be codified, and subsequently acquire meaning as 
‘good’ and ‘bad’.  The role of traditional morality, in this sense, is to perform 
the coding, imbuing actions and drives with social significance and meaning. 
This might suggest that in immanence, the goal of ethics is to ‘liberate’ desire 
from its coding or alternatively channel it towards particular end goals. Such 
an approach, however, is not possible, because desire cannot be ‘controlled’.  
Codes, Deleuze and Guattari claim, are imposed on desire to make it enter, 
and remain in specific relations (capturing desire). The more that specific 
desires are codified, the more rigid these structures become and the less 
‘revolutionary’ desire is. Society’s main function here is to code the flows of 
desire.540 Moreover, desire should not be understood in its already coded 
form – for example, the desire to be free, or the desire to eat pizza for dinner. 
Anarchists are frequently portrayed as desiring freedom above all else.541 To 
talk about the anarchist ‘desire for freedom’, in this sense, is an error in 
understanding desire and is best understood as an expression of the way it 
has been codified in contemporary society. It implies a progression from an 
abstract principle of ‘desiring freedom’ towards material fighting of 
oppressive practices, whilst I argue that such ‘desire’ is produced by, and a 
result of, a problematic (such as experiences of oppression), rather than 
constituting an ideal principle or value. Thus, once the economic and social 
structures change, what we might ‘desire’ as freedom is likely to shift and re-
form. The Invisible Committee note the vulnerability that this understanding 
of freedom produces for anarchists:  
Only free subjects, taken en masse, are governed. Individual freedom is 
                                                
540  G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 139. 
541 See W. Price, ‘Do Anarchists Believe in Freedom?’, Anarkismo [blog post], 24 Jun 2008, 
<http://www.anarkismo.net/article/9206>, accessed 02 May 2015 and M. Wilson, Rules Without Rulers: 
The Possibilities and Limits of Anarchism, Zero Books, Alresford, 2014. 
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not something that can be brandished against the government, for it is 
the very mechanism on which government depends, the one it regulates 
as closely as possible in order to obtain, from the amalgamation of all 
these freedoms, the anticipated mass effect.542 
Thus, the ‘desire’ for freedom should be understood as a coded flow, where 
‘freedom’ is specific to the conditions that have produced it, rather than a 
transcendent principle. This also suggests that there is no simple causal 
relationship between ‘freeing’ our desires from internalised oppressive 
practices and achieving large-scale social change.543 
To conclude this section, we have identified two problems that prevent us 
from positing an Aristotelian-style cultivation of good habits as an ethical act. 
First of all, acquiring habits is a chaotic process of connection and disjunction, 
in a complex network of intensive fields, which prevents us from positing a 
straightforward causal relationship between ‘good’ habits and virtuous 
character. Moreover, since habits and repetition come pre-individuation, there 
is no ‘self’ that is capable of deciding which habits are to be cultivated and 
which rejected. Secondly, we cannot direct desire towards a preferred 
outcome. Desire is coded in complex ways and stratified into particular 
tendencies, and subsequently destratified by others.  So far, despite our 
account of intentionality through the theory of the unconscious in 2.4, this 
formulation of desire/subjectivity still appears to produce too deterministic 
an account of ethical activity. The coding and decoding of desire, as well as 
the constitutive role of habitual actions to individuals seem to leave little 
scope for agency. Indeed, in traditional ethical ontologies, determination and 
self-determinism form a binary pair that is posited at the heart of ethical 
activity. In immanent metaphysics, however, it is more useful to understand 
determination, or ‘agency’ as processes, rather than fixed sets of relations. 
                                                
542 The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends, p. 126 
543 This idea might be developed further in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the molecular 
and the molar. See, for example, J. Windsor, ‘Desire lines: Deleuze and Guattari on Molar Lines, 
Molecular Lines, and Lines of Flight’, New Zealand Sociology, vol. 30, no. 1, 2015, pp. 156-171; B. 
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That a ‘subject’ is an effect of our habitual ways of thinking and existing does 
not imply pre-determination – though it does imply a certain degree of 
determination, or, rather, a certain model of determination. Moreover, we 
should not forget that for Deleuze, transcendence and judgment are the 
ultimate agents of determination, as they deny the individual’s capability to 
act within the immanent conditions it is part of. Given this, it seems futile to 
pursue the question of ethical agency further, especially in the traditional 
moral form of ‘what should I do?’ I would like to argue, however, that the 
reason to jettison this question is not the perceived determinism of Deleuzian-
Guattarian ethics, but because of the erroneous position of the ‘I’ in it. Despite 
the underlying unconscious syntheses that constitute the subject, partial 
objects are nevertheless capable of establishing connections, which can be 
fostered and nurtured. Similarly, Daniel W. Smith formulates the ethical 
question of desire as a question of ‘what am I capable of doing given my 
degree of power’,544 which I would agree with, insofar as we take the ‘I’ to be 
comprised of partial object/organ-machines. 
To supplement this, I propose an understanding of bodies in terms of the 
cartographic notion of scale. Zooming out from our focus on the individual as 
an agent, it is possible to understand collective bodies utilising the same 
concept of desire through mapping it out on a larger scale.545 The same way 
                                                
544 D. W. Smith, ‘Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Towards an Immanent Theory of Ethics’, p. 125. 
545 This notion should not be confused with what Buchanan calls the problematic of ‘scaling up’. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, Buchanan makes the point that Deleuze and Guattari understand 
the social in terms of the law of large numbers, specifically in terms of ‘populations and coefficients of 
speed’. However, we should not reduce our understanding of social formations to these terms, which 
denote something like the “limit-points of social formations” (p. 91) and do not explain their endurance. 
Thus, we have the concept of ‘coding’ added to our concepts of populations and speeds. The addition is 
important here because coding is ambivalent, obscuring the question of the nature of the distinction 
between the linguistic and the non-linguistic and at the same time enabling a re-working of the 
distinction in terms of codes (for example, linguistic and non-linguistic codes may all share basic 
fundamental features that derive from being codes). It is here that Buchanan offers a criticism of 
assemblage theory’s ‘scaling up’, arguing that despite the use of populations and speeds as central 
analytical tools it is not sufficient to take micro- factors and simply scale them up to macro- effects: 
“What DeLanda excises from Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is the difference in kind between the two 
regimes of desiring-production . . . In a ‘field of immanence’ all relations are interior to the terms 
inasmuch that the terms themselves are simply states of intensity through which desire passes.  There is 
no ‘scaling up’ from the schizo delirium to the social field, instead one has to bring about an alteration 
in the regime of desiring-production for change to occur. In other words, what DeLanda eliminates 
from Deleuze and Guattari is desire itself” (p. 92). 
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that a body is an assemblage of various partial objects which are taken to be a 
single ‘self’, the anarchist assemblage is also composed of partial objects that 
establish various connections with each other and with ‘outside’ elements. In 
other words, all people, towns, squats, political issues, anger, flows of capital, 
that are part of the assemblage we consider anarchism, are also part of and 
connect to, various other assemblages, such as nation-states, party politics, 
mouldy walls, means of transport, and this is applicable to the smaller scale of 
‘human individuals’. This de-focusing of ethical activity from the human as 
the central actor is also put forward by various post-human theorists. The 
enhancement of one’s degree of power, in this sense, means to increase the 
ways desire flows within and outside of the assemblage. Since desire is 
always seeking more connections, the simple answer seems to be to just let it 
be.546 However, it is here that we encounter the greatest problem of desire. As 
Deleuze and Guattari put it:  
The astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others 
occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do 
not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not 
continually out on strike.547 
Or, invoking Wilhelm Reich, why do people appear to desire their own 
oppression? It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a full theory of 
capitalism’s control over the flow of desires, or all the ways desire gets coded, 
but it is worth mentioning Braidotti’s criticism of the notion of capitalist 
progress. Attributing a positive notion of ‘progress’ to capitalism’s processes 
of deterritorialisation and subsequent reterritorialisation is fatal for radical 
politics, she argues, because it only serves to commodify transgressive 
practices (for example, being an anarchist collapses into wearing a punk t-
shirt).548 However, it is worth exploring the collective and individual 
processes of de-coding that are latent in some assemblages. Paul Patton 
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observes that Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between types of assemblages 
that are “fixed or delimited in particular ways, shut off from all but certain 
specified relations to the outside, and on the other, more fluid and open-
ended assemblages in which new connections and new forms of the relation 
to the outside are always possible, even at the risk of transforming the 
assemblage into some other kind of body.”549 
Thus, it would appear that one ethical activity would be to keep the anarchist 
assemblage (and others) open to new connections that would enhance its 
power. In other words, what is needed is to find mechanisms for creating 
bonds within and outside of the assemblage so as to destroy the very 
assemblage that is constituted by those bonds. To return to the question of 
cultivating good habits, the possibility of ethical activity is then to ‘train’ 
oneself to ‘create’ relations. Rather than ‘training’ with a specific goal in mind, 
such as training for the revolution, for example, it is ‘training’ in the sense of 
increasing one’s capacity to respond to the state of affairs (respond, here, 
instead of judge). Thus, there is no particular telos which orientates the 
cultivation, such as in virtue-ethics, but a rejection of the method which 
stratifies desire so as to allow for new habits to become formative. Training, in 
this sense, is more open-ended than cultivation, and less certain, since it is 
training for the unknown. The anarchists Do Or Die, for example, 
conceptualise this very well in their call for an insurrection:  
It is through acting and learning to act, not propaganda, that we will 
open the path to insurrection – although obviously analysis and 
discussion have a role in clarifying how to act. Waiting only teaches 
waiting; in acting one learns to act. Yet it is important to note that the 
force of an insurrection is social, not military. The measure for evaluating 
the importance of a generalised revolt is not the armed clash, but, on the 
contrary, the extent of the paralysis of the economy, of normality. If 
students continue to study, workers and office employees to work, the 
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215 
 
unemployed to solely strive for employment, then no change is 
possible.550 
Moreover, the capacity to respond is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari 
intend by the term ‘affect’. In his famous interview with Claire Parnet, 
Deleuze comments that he is fascinated by animals with limited affect, such 
as insects.551 For example, we can point to three affects of a tick – it is attracted 
by light (to climb to higher positions), by odour (to find an animal), and to 
find a warm, less hairy place where it can reach the skin of that animal. 
Deleuze’s fascination comes from the fact that in a world of immense 
potential, a tick is only really capable of these three degrees of freedom. Thus, 
he is compelled to reaffirm, “we don’t know what a body can do” – humans 
tend to think they have unlimited affect, but this is only true because we do 
not know what other possible affects there are. The concept of affects, in this 
sense, is Deleuze’s re-working of the concept of power. Unlike Foucauldian 
power, which for Deleuze and Guattari more closely resembles their notion of 
desire, power is a positive Nietzschean-Spinozian force of ‘power-to’. Power 
is the capacity to affect and be affected, and conversely, having no or little 
power means that there is a limit on the relations into which one can enter. In 
the example of violent tactics and pacifism, the lack of appropriate conditions 
effectively results in limiting people’s affects by separating them from the 
power to act, a limit in the ways they can affect and be affected. 
To return to the question of activism, a problem often arises from the 
assumption that all humans have the same (unlimited number of) affects, 
while there are often limitations on what certain bodies can do which others 
do not have. For instance, this is something discussions around sexual 
consent often try to bring forward – that certain people (often those socialised 
as female), in certain situations, do not have genuine capacity to ‘say no’, for 
example. In Learning about good consent, an anonymous author discusses 
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domestic abuse and consent, claiming that if one is under threat of violence, 
for example, consenting to sex is not a genuine consent.552 We can draw a 
parallel with ideas of ‘privilege’ and the concept of affects through the 
suggestion that white or male privilege, for example, grants a number of 
affects on certain bodies whilst denying them for others. An ethical activity, in 
that sense, affirms the Event in the way it transforms the assemblage through 
increasing one’s and the other’s capacities to respond. 
Such an understanding is not too dissimilar to Brian Massumi’s politics of 
affect, articulated in an interview as taking “little, practical, experimental, 
strategic measures to expand our emotional register, or limber up our 
thinking, [so that] we can access more of our potential at each step, have more 
of it actually available.”553 Massumi advocates increasing one’s affects in 
order to avoid being  bound by our situation – in every situation, there is 
some degree of freedom, and affirming it makes more intense becomings 
possible. This method of enhancing one’s power and relationality is, 
unsurprisingly, also reminiscent of the ‘politics of experimentation’ advocated 
by postanarchists. Undoubtedly, this is a path often trodden by Deleuze-
inspired political theorists. However, experimentation in the sense it has been 
advocated by postanarchist seems to boil down to protest tactics of humour, 
carnivals, satire and parody,554 rather than a fully conceptualised 
understanding of the relations anarchist bodies (both collective and 
individual) enter into, such as the one I am proposing here. These would 
include, for example, possibilities of creating new ways of existing with the 
planet, which green anarchism has been attempting to address, but also new 
ways of co-existing with black holes, with supporters of the Tory party, with 
computers, etc. The possibilities for creating such open-ended assemblages lie 
in processes of intensification. To enter more speculative grounds, these 
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553 B. Massumi, Politics of Affect, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 6. 
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might be seen as the processes that are at the heart of spontaneous riots, for 
example, where the field of intensities has reached such a boiling point that it 
becomes actualised, such as the 2011 riots in London. Insurrectionary 
anarchists, for example, identify such collective expressions as the ‘authentic’ 
revolutionary subject, as opposed to managed revolutions.555 However, these 
processes do not happen only in ‘natural’ as opposed to ‘artificially’ 
engendered protests, as intensities can become actualised through a range of 
different modes of existence. On a larger scale, the anarchist revival of the 
beginning of this century was an expression of precisely these processes of 
intensification through their expression in Occupy, the Arab Spring, and the 
proliferation of activist causes – a production of anarchism. The cultivation of 
active forces as those that increase one’s capacities for connection is therefore 
a possible and desirable act for the anarchist assemblage. 
Moreover, to invoke Patton’s sentiment,556 these activities can indeed lead to 
such a deep transformation of the assemblage that it would not be 
recognisable as such. Undoubtedly this will cause some anxiety for anarcho-
purists, who might perceive such an activity as destructive for anarchism. 
There are two responses to this. First of all, the passion to destroy is a creative 
passion, carrying with itself the possibility of something new. In Deleuzian 
language, flows of desire cannot be destratified without destroying the 
current stratification. An anarchism which is stratified, I would argue, is not 
an anarchism worth having, as it has lost its creative potential. In that sense, 
anarchist ethical activity is an eternal return of destruction, of an anarchism 
that is re-negotiating its limits and positioning – very punk, in fact. This 
destruction is directed both outwardly, towards the connections the 
assemblage makes with the world, but also inwardly, towards itself, until the 
anarchist body we have is unrecognisable from the one we started with, and 
from the one it will continue becoming. 
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An ethical becoming, in this sense, emphasises process and change rather 
than fixed states. Affirmation is not to adopt a feeling of ressentiment, such as 
rejecting one’s positionality, but instead to be responsive, embody one’s 
affects. Examples of such becomings, Deleuze and Guattari contend, are a 
becoming-woman or becoming-animal. Both of these are revolutionary 
insofar as they increase one’s capacity to affect and be affected. This implies 
that a revolutionary path is constituted as such depending on one’s position, 
relating to what Braidotti refers to as politics of location – unmasking and 
reflecting on the socio-economic-cultural-world intersection each one of us 
inhabits as a subject and the power relations that we participate in.557 More 
importantly, becoming should not be taken as a pre-defined path, but an 
expression of forces of affirmation, negation or denial, which always differ. 
Thus, when Deleuze and Guattari discuss becoming-woman, it is not to claim 
that revolutionary politics is bound to a particular (female) expression of 
humanity, but rather to the constant production of immanent difference. 
Braidotti comments, “The reference to ‘woman’ in the process of ‘becoming-
woman’… does not refer to empirical females, but rather to topological 
positions, degrees and levels of intensity, affective states.”558 
Politics of location play a vital role in both conceptualising revolutionary 
becomings, and disentangling Deleuze and Guattari’s work from the charges 
feminist critiques have laid at them.559 Braidotti suggests an understanding of 
becoming which does not imply “a symmetry between the sexes [which] 
results in attributing the same psychic, conceptual and deconstructive 
itineraries to both.”560 To be committed to a politics of difference, she 
continues, is to recognize the asymmetry of the sexes. In this respect, Braidotti 
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adopts Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of majority and minority. Majority 
and minority do not refer to numbers, but to a kind of difference that is 
evident in politics. Majority corresponds to what is constructed as the 
standard, ideal member of society, and as such is always in position of 
domination.561 In Western society, for example, the majority might 
correspond to the white, heterosexual, male, middle-class, able-bodied, 
middle-aged, married, etc. Conversely, minority is that which is not part of 
the majority, often with less clear boundaries or definition. It contains what is 
separated from the majority on a specific axis – for example, women differ 
from the majority on the axis of gender, which redefines them as a minority. 
Deleuze and Guattari characterise a minority as “multiplicities of escape and 
flux.”562 Moreover, they claim, the minority is where revolutionary potential 
lies: 
[The power of a minority] is not measured by their capacity to enter and 
make themselves felt within the majority system, nor even to reverse the 
necessarily tautological criterion of the majority, but to bring to bear the 
force of the non–denumerable sets, however small they may be, against 
the denumerable sets.563 
A revolutionary becoming is not one that fights for the rights of a certain 
group to be recognised (for example, identity politics focused on the right to 
vote, abortion rights or gay marriage) or one that wants the replacement of 
dominant values with another set of values (for instance, misandry) but one 
that is able to create and sustain a system of multiplicities – here I am 
contrasting multiplicity with plurality, following Houle.564 Plurality is a 
feature of numerable sets which “refers to a proliferation through the 
elaboration of a thematic continuity, or, through repetition of a single 
operation.”565 All elements are said to belong to the same interior, divided 
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and ordered into categories. They can all be referred to the same 
(transcendent) criterion to understand their meaning. Multiplicity, on the 
other hand, is a product of mechanical operations. It is a feature of non–
denumerable sets and thus minorities, because they cannot be reduced to a 
common denominator which lies outside their immanent meaning. A rhizome 
is a multiplicity. To return to their previous statement, Deleuze and Guattari 
imply that a minority has the potential to create new systems of meaning, but 
also new connections and structures. Thus, majority/minority is not a 
dualism, and their revolutionary becomings are not symmetrical. A majority 
can become revolutionary in a minoritarian becoming, such as a becoming-
woman, but a revolutionary becoming of women could be the assertion of 
positive sexual difference (women have been becoming-women for all of their 
lives!) Breaking away from binarizing thought in this way implies the 
recognition that our revolutionary paths are not the same, that there is no 
opposing Other that follows a perfectly symmetrical trajectory to reach an 
ideal place of (anarchist) synthesis. Finally, if we were to understand 
revolutionary becomings in terms of minority/majority, it becomes clear that 
the axes of divergence/the axes of oppression are contextual positions where 
individuals fall in relation to majoritarian politics. This is precisely what the 
editors of Queering Anarchism: Addressing and Undressing Power and Desire 
refer to here: 
[P]art of why ‘queer’ began to be used as shorthand for sexual and 
gender minorities of all kinds was due to some of these debates over who 
‘belonged’ [in the LGBT community], in what contexts, and how we 
might think about our sexual and gendered selves in ways that weren’t 
based on identities.566 
Queer has thus been used to describe a variety of people who do not share the 
same ‘identity’ in a strict sense. Queer is defined through its opposition to 
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what is ‘normal’ or ‘dominant’, and as such has no essence. Moreover, as 
what is ‘normal’, and ‘dominant’ is constantly in flux, so queer becomes a 
dynamic position which translates differently in different contexts and points 
in time. 
That said, becoming-minoritarian or being part of an oppressed, marginalised 
group is clearly not a sufficient condition for radical politics. Even if a 
particular configuration is presently pushing boundaries against dogmatism 
and is in this sense ‘radical’, the processes of coding still channel affects and 
bodies into their assigned categories. Brian Massumi illustrates this with the 
plane of transcendence: 
The life cycle of a plane of transcendence: 1) production of a coded 
image, 2) application of the code to bodies/infolding into habit, 3) 
unfolding into life’s paths, 4) reproduction of the code in new images 
(most likely with defects or selective modifications). A plane of 
transcendence is a cycle of becoming-transcendent, becoming-immanent, 
and rebecoming-transcendent: A special kind of virtual-actual circuit.567 
Not only are revolutionary becomings different, but they are also 
‘revolutionary’ only for a limited period of time. The application of codes 
reconfigures the assemblage so as to bring out the potential for dogmatic 
normativity. For example, activist practices such as the search for authenticity 
and glorification of individuals tend to focus precisely on this becoming-
majoritarian. What I mean is that by inverting hierarchies and prioritising 
certain ‘anarchist’ practices over others, we can create a new normativity, new 
rules that people should follow to be an authentic ‘queer’, authentically 
‘black’, and so on – and this lacks the potential for change. Abbie Volcano’s 
critique here is spot on: 
[T]he ways we fuck, love, and gender ourselves are not inherently 
revolutionary. But creating a politics that refuses the hierarchical 
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arrangement of people because of their sexual and/or gender practices – 
and, importantly, one that does not pressure people into certain practices 
under the auspices of being more authentically “queer” – does, indeed, 
have radical implications.568 
This is not to say that inverting hierarchies is to be avoided. On the contrary, 
it is important that marginalised people have power in contexts they wouldn’t 
normally be. Indeed, this leads us towards recognizing levels of political 
situatedness rather than a generalised notion of collective becoming. 
We have now arrived at a position from which we can assert our immanent 
form of subjectivity. In Braidotti’s feminism, taking difference as primary 
ontological category entails not only the differences between men and 
women, but also the differences among women and among men, and within 
themselves as well (each of us is several).569 This last step is crucial for 
immanent anarchist ethics as well. It serves to separate ‘identity’ from 
political subjectivity. Identity, Braidotti argues, 
is a play of multiple, fractured aspects of the self; it is relational, in that it 
requires a bond to the ‘other’; it is retrospective, in that it is fixed through 
memories and recollections, in a genealogical process. Last, but not least, 
identity is made of successive identifications, that is to say, unconscious 
internalized images that escape rational control.570 
Taking difference as a primary ontological category entails the recognition, 
and creation, of a ‘thousand tiny anarchisms’,571 pushing us towards 
relinquishing any idea of essentialised or stable (revolutionary) subjectivities. 
Through their fragmentation and the revolutionary aspect of desire, subjects 
act ethically by increasing their affects both collectively and individually. This 
increase of capacities to affect and be affected is a form of ‘cultivation of good 
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habits’ we called becoming. Moreover, with Braidotti’s politics of location, we 
argued that an immanent analysis of ethical becoming includes recognising 
the starting position, and asymmetry, of different paths. Political subjectivity, 
thus, is reformulated as a form of pragmatic, embodied moment of a 
particular location, the final articulation of which appears in the next section 
in the form of the Event. 
3.4 The Event 
In this section, we focus on the question: what are the conditions for ethics to 
emerge? Or, to paraphrase, when is an ethical action possible? For the 
postanarchists, anarchism is always already ethics; it is ‘politics of ethics’.572 
As we have seen, this claim presupposes that an anarchist is somebody who is 
primarily concerned with what is good – if one subscribes to principles of 
non-coercion, anti-hierarchy, anti-capitalism etc. (i.e. is an anarchist), then 
what is the ‘right’ action? This puts an unbearable burden on the individual to 
constantly scrutinise one’s actions – it implies that all actions are somehow 
concerned with ethics; it implies that in any given situation there is the right 
thing to do. What follows is that ethics entails a life of constant judgment and 
self-judgement, of structuring one’s life so that it is always as close as possible 
to the ideal – not too dissimilar, in fact, to the infinitely demanding ethics 
which Simon Critchley advocates. Moreover, it assumes that ethical problems 
always have a solution, an ultimate end – there is a ‘truth’ or solution to 
resolve the ‘problem’ of abortion, for example, if only we are capable of 
mustering it. Activism in particular suffers from such an unsustainable 
burden, seen in the discussion of anarcho-purism, where individuals are 
expected to constantly behave according to unattainable ideals (or prefigure 
their actions as such). In addition to risking social expulsion when ‘wrong’, 
such demands cause widespread issues such as ‘burn-out’, taken as the 
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difficulty of keeping up with the high standard of political activity activists 
set for themselves (or others).573 
My position, however, is different. For immanent metaphysics, ethics is not 
part of everyday life in the sense of being faced with ethical decisions all the 
time. Rather, ethics is concerned with the Event, the moment when a 
transformation happens. This is not to imply that there are certain moments 
in which ethics happens, separate from our daily lives. On the contrary, an 
Event is something that contains the possibility for both a collective and 
individual change within its immanent conditions – an Event is when an 
incorporeal transformation takes place. This idea of the Event is not dissimilar 
to the ethical approach of contextual ethics, whereby ethics only happen in 
ethical ‘situations’. Peter Unger, for example, defines certain (semantic) 
contexts as ethically demanding, and others as ethically lenient.574 However, 
this notion of context is still evaluated in relation to an external ethical 
standard,575 while the Event is posited in immanent metaphysics. In other 
words, the Event is the moment where a new path could open up in the 
current state of affairs and it becomes possible to reconfigure it. That ethics is 
connected to the Event should be understood first of all as a claim that there 
exists the possibility for change in certain moments and, secondly, as ethical 
situations which are part of an assemblage which cannot be pre-judged. The 
possibility of agency, in this sense, interrupts the machinic repetition that 
habits entail, both on the individual and collective level. As Deleuze 
comments, 
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There is no reason, as with some philosophers, to subject all the actions 
we do to the criterion: is it free or not? Freedom is only for certain acts. 
There are all kinds of acts that do not have to be confronted with the 
problems of freedom. They are only done, I would say, to calm our 
anxiety: all our machinic and habitual acts. One can speak of freedom 
only when the question arises of an act capable or not of filling the 
amplitude of the soul at a given moment.576  
The Event, as outlined it in 2.3, is a concept Deleuze takes from the Stoics to 
refer to a situation that transforms the actors and conditions around it. Ethics 
is therefore concerned with the Event insofar as it is 
concerned with affective relations among bodies in a composite or 
collective, and those assemblages that fit together in such a way so as to 
enhance the power of acting among the elements of the collective and 
those that are unable to fit together.577 
Here, the order of ethical deliberation is reversed – it is not individual actors 
who make a judgment about the Event, but the Event that draws actors in and 
creates a new collective that is compelled to respond to it. 
Given this, an Event is not an ethical ‘problem’ in the way traditional ethics 
frames problems (the trolley problem, abortion, euthanasia, etc.), even if it is 
related to the problem-Idea. Neither is it an ethical ‘problem’ in the sense of a 
conflict between one’s desires and duties, for example, or an internal 
deliberation. The Event is indifferent to categories of good and bad – it speaks 
simultaneously to “the individual and the collective . . . because it is 
actualised in diverse manners at once, and because each participant may 
grasp it at a different level of actualisation within its variable present.”578 
Events, moreover, persist because they are bound to the eternal return, and 
subsequently are never simply ‘solved’ once and for all. To make an analogy 
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with processes in chemistry, the Event might dissolve into the state of affairs 
under certain intensities, and it might crystallise again under others. 
One of the more obvious examples of an Event in anarchism is a protest. 
Seattle was an Event where intensities were actualised in a mobilisation on a 
scale and in a form not seen before. I was not in Seattle, yet it is part of the 
collective (American) anarchist imagination which re-produces to such an 
extent that I am part of its eternal return. Recently, for instance, the ‘Welcome 
to Hell’ week of protests against the G20 meeting in Hamburg in 2017 created 
similar a transformation for its participants. Following Bryant’s approach, we 
can identify the actors in it – the twenty world leaders, protestors who 
gathered from all over Europe, police and private security, but also the issues 
that were debated by the politicians, and the radical left history of Hamburg 
as a city, all the spaces where people met and engaged, the anarchist social 
centre Rote Flora which was just around the corner from the G20 meetings, 
weapons such as molotovs, etc. It is the Event of G20 that drew in all these 
people, and, from an anarchist perspective, made activists get together and 
work together in a way that transformed them (or did not). The Event, in this 
sense, issues a challenge for activists that, through its unfolding, given the 
right conditions, a new path is possible. In other words, as the Invisible 
Committee observe, we encounter an inverse relationship – “[i]t is not the 
people that produce an uprising; it is the uprising that produces its people.”579 
Yet, the Event is not simply the demonstration itself. It is something that 
‘hovers’ above it and captures a variety of actors. The ethical act, as we 
discussed in the previous chapter, is becoming worthy of the Event. This 
becoming worthy is expressed in two modes – ‘training’ for the conditions for 
something new to emerge by unblocking flows of desire, and affirming 
change, if it happens, rather than preventing it. This transformation of the 
assemblage, however, does not entail an ethical principle of constant change 
for the sake of change. Positing it in this way would necessitate a recourse to 
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transcendence in the form of a positive principle of change, along the lines of 
Todd May’s principle of affirming difference. Rather, it should be taken more 
analytically than prescriptively that, if you want to act ethically, then the 
event is when such an activity is possible in that it allows for change at the 
level of life. What is important about the Event is that this change is not just 
linguistic (such as in contextual ethics), or a ‘rupture’ (such as, for example, in 
the way Badiou understands the Event), but re-evaluates both in terms of 
something else (desiring-production, for example). 
In the anarchist assemblage, change as the ability to redefine existing values 
and the state of affairs is vital. For example, Daniel Colson defines anarchism 
as “first and foremost the rejection of any first principle,”580 and I would like 
to extend this to claim that an assemblage with dogmatic rules or principles 
does not ‘work’ as an anarchist one, but of course may work very well as one 
which is complicit with established values. As with Nietzsche’s active and 
reactive poles, anarchist bodies are pulled always backwards and forwards 
between affirming the anarchist ‘conatus’, and thus making anarchism more 
‘anarchist’, or swinging towards the reactive pole and destroying anarchism 
as it is. This is a choice anarchist (personal and collective) bodies are 
constantly discovering, encountering and reaffirming. The Event, thus, is a 
problematic, because it is an unfolding of conditions, that is, a response to the 
challenges set by the environment, in the broadest possible sense of the term. 
The results of the Event are not based on an actualisation of a transcendent 
form but are the resolution of a complex equation.  For example, one 
argument against using violent action during protests and demonstration is 
that women (one of the many categories of people often cited alongside 
undocumented people, people of colour, disabled people, etc.) are not able to 
participate on equal measure with men. The solution is thus to advocate for 
the adoption of non-violent tactics in the name of inclusivity. Such behaviour 
not only exhibits the binary thinking we rejected earlier but refuses to 
                                                
580 D. Colson, Petit Lexique philosophique de l’anarchisme. De Proudhon á Deleuze, Le Livre de Posche, Paris, 
2001, p. 26. 
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acknowledge that we are capable of changing or creating the conditions for 
women (and others) to participate in violent tactics. Indeed, the problem is 
not that certain people cannot participate, with the respective solution being 
to advocate for non-violent tactics; the solution is that certain people do not 
participate, and the problem is that the environment for their participation to 
occur has not been created. Inverting this problematic by advocating for non-
violent tactics obviates the fact that this argument results in keeping certain 
tactics from certain people by not creating the conditions for them to increase 
their capacity to act – through support (physical, emotional or legal, for 
example). Finally, the affirmation of the Event can only be done if we leave 
space for failure as well. Ethics, as a constant process of change and 
experimentation, cannot function if limited through judgment that produces 
guilt and social expulsion. Immanent ethics reject a fixed notion of the 
individual, who, once having learnt ‘the proper way’, never makes mistakes. 
In this sense, an immanent ethics of re-defining the assemblage carries with it 
the implication that the only ‘true’ anarchist is the person who ‘fails’ to be an 
anarchist. 
Following this, it is possible to see how the Event can have both a collective 
and individual expression. This does not mean, however, that all Events 
encompass necessarily a large number of (human) actors. In a fragmented 
self, an ethical Event can be a small-scale affair as well, which should be 
understood through its interconnectedness with the rest of the world. To 
draw from the previous sections on thinking and subjectivity, an ethical 
response is constituted by its connections in relation to its response to the 
Event. Earlier in this chapter, we defined the ethical question as one of 
existing and working together, and in this final section we return to this in the 
form of anarchist solidarity as a defining factor in anarchist subjectivity. 
Even as far back as the beginning of the century, Kropotkin placed solidarity 
at the core of anarchist morality. Solidarity, he claimed, is a general feeling of 
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connectedness which compels us to perform acts of mutual aid.581 His ethics 
were also pragmatically oriented towards building this ‘something more than 
brotherhood.’582 Similarly, I would like to argue that through our 
reformulation of representation in 2.2, in immanent ethics the political bond 
becomes one of production. Solidarity, therefore, has two functions. On one 
hand, it brings the anarchist assemblage into existence and re-produces it 
through the act of creating a certain type of relations. This activity 
simultaneously regulates the normative dimension of the assemblage. On the 
other hand, it fosters an individual ethical becoming through an emphasis on 
one’s immanent connected position in the assemblage. Solidarity, in that 
sense, emphasizes a political becoming of individuals through their 
acceptance and location within anarchism. 
Houle articulates a similar notion in the form of immanent accountability, 
which she defines as a “habitual opening oneself up to affect”, to what one 
might become.583 Rather than being prohibitive, accountability has a 
productive role in relations of value. In this conceptualisation there is no 
‘punishment’ or ‘guilt’, but an understanding that both an individual and 
collective becoming happens through the fostering of certain types of 
relationships. In some feminisms of sexual difference, a similar notion is 
articulated as ethics of sustainability.584 For instance, Braidotti defines 
sustainable ethics as those that push us towards the limits of what we can 
become and then further. Sustainability is reached in a momentary state of 
equilibrium and co-existence with the world, disrupted by the building up of 
tension through intensities. Such ethics, she continues, are deeply embedded 
in the material world, but also recognise that existence is a process. Moreover, 
she argues, such ethics are “based on the shared capacity of humans to feel 
empathy for, develop affinity with and hence enter in relation with other 
                                                
581 P. A. Kropotkin, Ethics: Origin and Development, tr. L. S. Friedland & J. R. Piroshnikoff, Thoemmes 
Press, Bristol, 1993 [1922], pp. 225-251. 
582 ibid., p. xii. 
583 K. Houle, Responsibility, Complexity, Abortion: Toward a New Image of Ethical Thought, p. 112. 
584 For example, D. Haraway and L. Irigaray. 
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forces, entities, beings, waves of intensity.”585 
With this, I want to put forward a notion of care, and argue with Shukaitis 
that the ethical becomings and collective increase in our capacities to affect 
and be affected by the world means that personal relationships and caring 
become a significant, if not primary, aspect of anarchist politics.586 Caring, 
and the feeling of interconnectedness that solidarity brings forth, is a 
productive relationship insofar as it is an act, it has to be done. It is, therefore, 
active and responsive. Indigenous Action Media articulate this notion in their 
critique of ally-ship. It is not allies we need, they claim, but ‘accomplices’, 
people who do things together: 
Accomplices are realized through mutual consent and build trust. They 
don’t just have our backs; they are at our side, or in their own spaces 
confronting and unsettling colonialism. As accomplices, we are compelled to 
become accountable and responsible to each other; that is the nature of trust.587 
The concept of ‘production’, or doing, however, should not be confused with 
anarchist propaganda of the deed or similar. Neither should it be thought of 
in terms of prefiguration where the actions are supposed to reflect values or 
plans for future society. On the contrary, immanent ethics allows for the 
unfolding of complex phenomena in ways which allow us to better 
understand and approach them. Non-representational thinking and affective 
relations play a crucial role in these ethics – they enable us; that is, they create 
the conditions in which we can respond to reality. Concomitantly, they 
increase our capacity to be ‘ethical’ by demanding recognition of all the 
relations involved in an ethical Event and increase our becoming ethical 
agents. The type of solidarity expressed in immanent ethics is conceptualised 
                                                
585 R. Braidotti, The Ethics of Becoming Imperceptible’ in Boundas, C. ed., Deleuze and Philosophy, 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006, p. 141. 
586 Shukaitis, S., ‘Nobody Knows What an Insurgent Body Can Do: Questions for Affective Resistance’ 
in R. Cleminson & J. Heckert eds, Anarchism & Sexuality: Ethics, Relationships and Power, Routledge, 
London, 2011, p. 32. 
587 Indigenous Action Media (an Indigenous perspective), ‘Accomplices Not Allies: Abolishing the Ally 
Industrial Complex’ in C. Milstein ed., Taking Sides: Revolutionary Solidarity and the Poverty of Liberalism, 
AK Press, Oakland, 2015, p. 96. 
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by Thomas Nail as a relationship where “political bodies adopt each other’s 
struggles as their own.”588 They do not fight together out of charity or 
altruism, neither notions of duty or shared goals, but out of a mutual 
understanding of their interconnectedness. By understanding, however, we 
should be careful not to recourse back to transcendence by assuming 
‘understanding’ is passive and ‘doing something about it’ is active. In 
Deleuze-Guattarian language, there is no distinction between what something 
is and what it does.589 Passive solidarity based on the symbolic loses its 
significance as a revolutionary order-word, as its ‘function’ as glue for the 
struggle is lost. 
On the other hand, as Berardi comments, migrants, refugees, low-paid 
workers, and all those with precarious lives share a similar position, yet 
cannot find commonality.590 Indeed, problems with building a shared 
struggle on the Left have existed since Marx and Bakunin’s argument during 
the First International and I do not claim to have found a solution. However, 
through this idea of solidarity, I want to put forward an argument for the 
insurrectionary idea of the revolution as an active, unending process of the 
here and now. The Event requires a questioning of the basic causality 
suggested by traditional ethics that the right action produces the desired 
result (propaganda à revolution; class consciousness à revolution, etc). 
Action-effect does not exist in a linear progression of time but in the 
interchange between the virtual and the actual. In immanent ethics, nothing 
about the constitution of bodies, entities or assemblages is given 
independently of the material processes that produce them. This also requires 
us to re-think simplistic notions of the revolution being one among many 
‘possibilities’ that can be actualised. It is rather something that comes forth 
and, through attraction to singularities, becomes actualised through desire. 
                                                
588 T. Nail, Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari and Zapatismo, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2012, p. 153.  
589 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 9.  
590 F. Berardi, After the Future, tr. A. Bove et al., eds G. Genosko and N. Thoburn, AK Press, Edinburgh, 
2011, p. 129.  
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The Event, in this sense, is the stimulus that provokes a response, bringing the 
potential of new actualisations. 
Similarly, in insurrectionary anarchism, Bonano argues, the revolution is a 
concrete event which is built in everyday life through small actions, none of 
which is directly ‘liberatory’ or explicitly related to a large-scale social and 
political revolution.591 These are activities which serve as preparation for a 
future society, but one whose outlines we cannot see yet. To return to the 
question of the anarchist assemblage, the practices Bonano promotes could be 
seen as an ethical activity: an open-ended process of ‘pushing’ oneself to the 
limits of what they can do through an increase in their individual or collective 
affectivity. In this sense, as Colson argues, “[t]he event, whether fortunate or 
unfortunate, each time singular and indefinitely repeated in its singularity, is 
the most constant, direct, immediate and positive experimentation with the 
limits inherent to all domination and the possibility of affirming another 
order that would liberate the power that this domination confines.”592 
Through affirmation of the Event, then, anarchism can free itself from the 
limits that it self-imposes. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have argued for the adoption of an immanent ethical 
framework in (post)anarchist theory and practice. The entire work has been 
informed by three ethical questions. The first is the question of how we 
should act (as anarchists), which I explored through the postanarchist critique 
of morality, its reliance on essentialism, universalism and representation. 
Despite the perhaps reductive construction of ‘classical’ anarchism, I argued 
that they are correct in positing anarchist ethics at odds with such 
epistemological foundations. In addition, I argued that future anarchist ethics 
                                                
591 A. Bonano, ‘Why Insurrection?’, Pantagruel, [pamphlet], 1982, <http://pantagruel-
provocazione.blogspot.co.uk/search/label/Why%20Insurrection>, accessed 30 March 17. 
592 D. Colson, loc. cit., p. 113. 
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can no longer be satisfied with an epistemological critique. They need to be 
grounded in a strong metaphysical foundation capable of supporting an 
anarchism which is neither essentialist, nor universal, nor representational. I 
argued that these three categories are, in fact, a symptom of transcendent 
metaphysics, which extended the applicability of the critique of ‘classical’ 
anarchism and led us to suggest that postanarchist metaphysics should be 
immanent. 
The second ethical question was ‘how do we act?’ Here, I problematised the 
traditional understanding of ethics and morality as interchangeable. Instead, 
ethics is understood as immanent modes of existence, suggesting a materialist 
approach (through the given). To answer the question, I needed a philosopher 
of immanence and took Deleuze’s philosophy to be the best available example 
of articulating immanence-in-itself. Through a critique of Western philosophy 
and the nature of thinking, Deleuze identifies the danger of transcendence in 
philosophy. At the core of our conceptual tools is his work on difference and 
repetition, which leads him to claim the univocity of Being. Furthermore, we 
engaged with two specifically ethical concepts in his work – the Event, which 
is understood as the possibility of change, and the concept of desire which 
Deleuze and Guattari develop together. 
In the last chapter, these immanent tools were applied to a re-definition of 
anarchism as an assemblage and therefore established the conditions for 
immanent normativity. We then transmuted three elements of ethical activity, 
in turn re-posing our third ethical question as ‘how can we act?’ The first 
element was ethical knowledge, which changes from Kantian reason to a 
process of responsive engagement with problems, leading to the production 
of new concepts/theory/understanding. The result of this reformulation was 
to dethrone universal truths and binary thinking in the form of striated 
metaphysics. Second, we reformulated the position of the ethical subject from 
being a primary agent within transcendent metaphysics to a Deleuzian-
Guattarian machine, operating on the basis of desiring-production. The 
possibility of ethical activity appeared in the form of increasing one’s affects 
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as a form of ‘training’ and a process of ethical becoming. Third, we defined 
the moment of ethics as the moment of change through the Event. I pointed 
towards an immanent understanding of revolution as an ongoing activity of 
building solidarity. 
Some limitations of this work could be addressed in future applications of 
immanent metaphysics to anarchism. For instance, Matt Lee suggests that 
Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence necessitates beginning with a ‘case’, 
otherwise the thinking of immanence becomes difficult to maintain.593 A 
starting position from a specific anarchist ethical ‘problem’, I would agree, 
allows for a more focused application of Deleuze’s methodology. Moreover, 
to relate to Events and actors through an immanent epistemology might 
suggest creating new concepts, which this work did attempt. Other fruitful 
future paths would include widening the scope of immanent ethics even 
further to develop the role of non-human agents, such as in the intersections 
between animal rights and anarchism, or anarchism and nature/physical 
environment.594 Perhaps towards the end we will end up/have ended up 
with something which does not immediately look like anarchism, but 
achieves the function we have identified for anarchism. Unlike Ibáñez,595 I do 
not think that the anarchism-to-come needs to exhibit certain elements to 
continue calling itself anarchism. The practices, thoughts and networks of 
anarchism underpin the politics through our commitment, wherever the 
battleground arises. 
                                                
593 M. Lee, Oceanic Ontology and Problematic Thought, Barnes & Noble, 2011, Ebook Library [online 
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